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ABSTRACT
RELATIONS BETWEEN OTTOMAN CORSAIRS AND THE IMPERIAL 
NAVY IN THE 16th CENTURY
Mehmet Kuru
History, M.A. Thesis, Spring 2009
Thesis Supervisor: Y. Hakan Erdem
This  thesis  endeavors  to  present  an  analysis  of  the  nature  of  the  relations 
between ottoman corsairs  and the imperial  navy in  the 16th century.  Recruitment  of 
corsairs as naval officers by Ottoman central authority to  make up for the insufficient 
numbers of skilled seamen was presented as a fact in various works. However, there is 
no study to explain construction period of this relationship and to define the system. 
This thesis aims to construct a model to explicate this relationship.
As of  the mid-fifteenth  century,  Ottoman seapower started to strengthen and 
Empire conquered several crucial harbors and islands in Black sea and Mediterranean 
until  the  end of  this  century.  Ottoman  Imperial  navy gained  a  strong infrastructure 
thanks  to these conquests.  Apart  from Imperial  navy,  Ottoman corsairs'  attacks  that 
were based on these harbors increased and they strengthened gradually. In 1495, an old 
corsair, Kemal Reis was taken into Ottoman service, thus he became a pioneer for the 
recruitment of corsairs to Imperial Navy. This was a turning point  regarding relations 
between corsairs and imperial navy. Second and more important stage was promotion of 
Barbaros Hayrettin Pasha as a Kapudan Pasha of Imperial Navy in 1534 and formation 
of Cezayir-i Bahr-i Sefid province as a province of Grand Admiral. Therefore, relations 
between corsairs based North Africa and central authority grew stronger.
In this study, a subjective periodization  for purpose of analysis was used ; Pre-
Kapudan Pasha Era, formation of Kapudan Pasha post and post-Lepanto era. On the 
other hand, both parts  of this relation,  Ottoman imperial  navy and Ottoman corsairs 
were handled simultaneously. Corsairs could be independent as pirates, semi-dependent 
as privateers or dependent as naval officers and those were not opposite poles in early 
modern world. There was not a strict line between legal and illegal acts and this was 
considered as a part of early modern world in conceptualization of this relationship.
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ÖZET
16. YY'DA OSMANLI KORSANLARI İLE MERKEZİ DONANMA 
ARASINDAKİ İLİŞKİ
Mehmet Kuru
Tarih, Master Tezi, Bahar 2009
Tez Danışmanı: Y. Hakan Erdem
Bu  tez,  16.  yy'da  Osmanlı  korsanları  ile  Donanma-i  Humayun  arasındaki 
ilişkinin analizini  yapmayı  amaçlamaktadır.  Osmanlı  merkezi yönetiminin,  korsanları 
donanma  hizmetine  alarak  onların  denizcilik  bilgisinden  faydalandıkları  tezi  çeşitli 
akademik yayınlarda sürekli tekrarlansa da bu ilişkinin nasıl kurulduğu ve sistemin nasıl 
işlediği konusu üzerine bir çalışma bulunmamaktadır. Tezin amacı bu ilişki üzerine bir 
model kurmaktır.
Osmanlı  İmparatorluğunun  deniz  gücü  15.yy  ortalarından  itibaren  yükselişe 
geçmiş, imparatorluk, yüzyıl sonuna kadar Karadeniz ve Akdeniz'de pek çok liman ve 
adayı  ele  geçirerek  donanma  için  önemli  bir  altyapıya  sahip  olmuştu.  Bu  süreçte 
merkezi  donanma  dışında  Osmanlı  korsanlarının  saldırılarında  da  artış  görüldü. 
Korsanlar  da  Osmanlının  eline  geçen  adaları  ve  limanları  üs  olarak  kullanarak 
saldırılarını gittikçe arttırdılar.  1495 yılında korsan bir reis olan Kemal Reis'in devlet 
hizmetine alınarak, donanmanın başına getirilmesiyle  korsanların donanma hizmetine 
alınmasının önü açıldı. Bu korsan-merkez ilişki açısından bir dönüm noktası oldu. İkinci 
ve  daha  önemli  aşama  ise  1534  yılında  Barbaros  Hayrettin'in  Kapudan-ı  deryalığa 
getirilmesi  ve  Cezayir-i  Bahr-i  Sefid  eyaletinin  kurularak  Kapudan  Paşa'ya 
bağlanmasıydı.  Bu tarihten itibaren  Kuzey Afrika'yı  üs olarak kullanan korsanlar  ile 
merkez arasındaki ilişkiler güçlendi.
Çalışmada,  konuyla  ilgili  olarak;  Barbaros  Hayrettin  paşa  öncesi  dönem, 
kapudan  paşa  dönemi  ve  İnebahtı  savaşı  sonrası  dönem  olmak  üzere  öznel  bir 
dönemleştirmeye  gidilmiş,  bununla  birlikte  ilişkinin  iki  tarafı  merkez  donanma  ve 
korsanlar  birlikte  ele  alınmaya  çalışılmıştır.  Donanma  hizmetine  alınan  korsanlar, 
devletin  izniyle  düşman  kıyılarına  ve  gemilerine  “yasal”  yağmada  bulunan  yarı-
bağımsız korsanlar ve Osmanlı kıyılarına saldıran “harami” korsanların devlet açısından 
konumları tanımlanmaya çalışılmıştır. Bu değerlendirme yapılırken erken modern çağda 
yasal-yasadışı arasındaki çizginin çok net olmadığı vurgulanmış ve bu durum korsan-
merkez arası ilişkilerin kavramsallaştırılmasında gözönüne alınmıştır.
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Ömürlerini beni adam etmeye adayan anneme, babama 
ve doğdukları günden beri bana katlanan Fatih ile Ferda'ya...
Tez konumu seçmemde farkında olmadan bana yardımcı
olan İhsan Oktay Anar'a teşekkürlerimle:
“Kimdir bu Kırbaç Süleyman?”
“Korsanın teki işte! Geçmişini de geleceğini de, yedi ceddini de 
  bilsen ne çıkar, kerksen ne çıkar.”
 (İhsan Oktay Anar, Amat, p 81)
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Introduction
...The thing happened thus: Uchali, king of Algiers, a bold and successful  
corsair, having attacked and mastered the flagship of Malta, in which there 
remained  only  three  knights  alive,  and  these  desperately  wounded,  the 
vessel commanded by Giovanni Andrea Doria, in which my company was 
stationed,  hastened to  her relief,  and I  doing my duty on that  occasion, 
leaped into the enemy's ship, which disengaging herself immediately from 
our galley that was grappled with her, my soldiers were prevented from 
following their officer, and I found myself alone among my foes, whom, by 
reason  of  their  numbers,  I  could  not  resist;  therefore  was  obliged  to 
summit, after having been almost covered over with wounds; and Uchali, 
as  you  have  heard,  having  saved  himself  with  his  whole  squadron,  I 
remained his prisoner. ......... I was carried to Constantinople, where Selim 
the Grand Turk, created my master general of the sea, for  having done his 
duty in the battle...1
Uchali, afore mentioned, is Uluç Ali Reis who had managed to return to Istanbul 
with his squadron,  in the war of Lepanto.  This quote is not taken from a historical 
document,  a  prisoner's  letter,  or  a  memoir.  It  belongs  to  a  fictional  character, 
participated  to  Lepanto  naval  battle  in  Cervantes’s  masterpiece,  Don  Quixote. 
Cervantes was actually among the Christian warriors who fought at Lepanto in 1571. 
Told by a witness at first hand, there is a possibility that this scene roughly corresponds 
to reality.2
However,  there  is  confusion  about  the  rank  of  Kılıç  Ali  Reis  in  this  short 
citation.  As to the text, he was “King of Algiers” and a “brave and bold corsair”, then 
1 Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra, Don Quixote,  trans. by Tobias George Smollet  Barnes & Noble 
Classics 2004) p 332 
2 Cervantes lost his left arm in this war but has not been captured. In 1572, as soon as he gets well, he 
again sailed to sea, and in 1575, traveling from Naples to Spain, he was taken prisoner by Memi Reis, 
a Turkish corsair who was often referred in the records of Mühimmes. Cervantes was then; brought to 
Algeria where he lived for five years, until his liberation, following the payment of 500 escudo gold 
by the Trinitarian order, as ransom.  
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he returned to the Istanbul with his squadron at the end of the war and became the 
Grand Admiral  of Ottoman Imperial  Navy.  This poses us some questions about  the 
position of  Kılıç Ali Reis in historical context.
If he was a corsair, why did he participate in a naval battle between the Ottoman 
Imperial Navy and the Holy League? Was he a corsair and King of Algiers at the same 
time? What was the nature of the relationship between Algiers and Istanbul? Was the 
king of Algiers dependent to Istanbul and was he a naval officer3 of the Imperial Navy? 
If he was, how could he be both simultaneously? These are the difficult questions to 
answer. It is an even more formidable task to analyze the relations between Ottoman 
corsairs  and  the  Ottoman  Imperial  Navy  in  the  16th century.  This  requires  a  close 
examination of the two sides of this relationship.
Before analyzing the relationship between Ottoman corsairs  and the Ottoman 
Imperial navy, which has been usually seen as a blurred and dangerous area, a literature 
survey  of secondary sources would help us to underline the controversial points of this 
multifaceted question.   Before all we should mention that these two entities,  closely 
associated with each other, should not be handled independently. In spite of this obvious 
link, many of the studies on Mediterranean corsairs and the Ottoman navy are  limited 
in the scope they cover.
There exist several studies trying to understand this relationship within the wider 
framework of the formation process of European royal navies. During the 16th century 
maritime activities and naval warfare shifted from the Mediterranean to Western and 
Northern  Europe.  Consequently,  Ottoman  naval  power  turned  into  a  “peripheral 
enemy.” Structuring of European royal navies, thanks to cooptation and integration of 
pirates/privateers  is  analyzed  as  a  part  of  general  state-formation  process  in  early 
modern era. This view point view focusing on Atlantic warfare and North European 
navies precludes Ottoman naval structure, as well as the other Mediterranean navies. 
Besides,  political,  social  and  economical  dynamics  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  and the 
peculiar characteristics of the Mediterranean are usually neglected. On the other hand, 
3 In this work, naval officer means seamen served Ottoman Imperial Navy. 
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Ottomanists have never focused on similarities and dichotomies between Ottoman naval 
structure and European navy systems of the 16th century. Comparison of the structures 
and consequences of the decline of the Ottoman seapower are dealt very superficially. 
Despite the scanty number of studies, the topic of “the Ottoman warfare at sea” 
in reference to the Mediterranean world was approached with different perspectives by 
several scholars. This useful debate might give us an overall idea for sixteenth-century 
Mediterranean world.  First,  summary of  this  debate,   then  a  literature  survey about 
corsairs may provide us a general framework before focusing on Ottoman corsairs. 
Ottoman Seapower in  the 16th century has been always  a  controversial  topic 
among modern scholars.   First studies on the Ottoman naval activities were published 
in the first half of the 20th century. They were generally descriptive works rather than 
conceptual. Several scholars made the first contributions to Ottoman naval history with 
articles, books and publishing primary sources. As an example, the crucial one of these 
initial works was published by İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı.4 This study describes Ottoman 
naval organization in detail and provides crucial information for further investigations. 
However,  this  study  does  not  aim  to  discuss  Mediterranean  naval  conflict  in  a 
comparative perspective.  
In  1949,  Braudel's  magnum  opus on  the  Mediterranean  civilizations  was 
published.5 In this revolutionary work, Braudel tries to explain historical and cultural 
unity of  the Mediterranean civilizations. Ottoman navy as an important actor in the 
courte  durée  of  Mediterranean  is  handled  under  the  subtitle,   “Events,  Politics  and 
People”.  Considering  our  research,  Braudel  examines  pirates  as  instruments  of  a 
different type of war called “little  war”. However,  Piracy is analyzed in the  second 
duree as one of the social groupings, constituting an integral element of civilization. He 
emphasizes the importance of piracy/privateer for Mediterranean history but he does not 
focus on relationship between corsairs and royal navies. Piracy is handled as a part of 
Mediterranean social history, rooted in antiquity. We should repeat here one of his main 
4 İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, Merkez ve Bahriye Teşkilatı, (Türk Tarih Kurumu basımevi, Ankara, 1948)
5 Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the age of Philip II, (University 
of California Press, 1995)
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points about piracy.  Braudel emphasizes that privateering in the 16th century was not 
the exclusive domain of any single group or seaport. There was no single culprit. He 
underlines  that  western  historians  have  put  forward  corsairs  of  Islam  but  in  fact, 
privateering  was  all  over  the  Mediterranean.6 In  this  study,  phenomenon  of 
piracy/privateering  will  be  discussed  in  a  wider  perspective  as  a  crucial  part  of 
Mediterranean world in the 16th century. Going back to Ottoman Seapower, this work 
presents the conflicts in Mediterranean but he does not attempt to establish a framework 
about Ottoman naval policy.
This  model  presented  by  Braudel  was  challenged  by  Andrew  Hess7.  While 
Braudel draws the picture of an integrated Mediterranean world, Hess underlines the 
diversity in the 16th century Mediterranean world. He tries to explain Mediterranean as a 
world fragmented into different,  well-defined cultural  spheres. In his work, Ottoman 
Empire is defined as an anti-Iberian civilization, distinct in its ideological, structural and 
constitutional structures.  In his view, even if Braudel shows the similarities between the 
experiences  of these two cultures  such as  inflation,  population  increase,  diseases  or 
climatic change, the Mediterranean cannot be illustrated without accepted cumulative 
divergence of two civilizations characterized in distinctive features for the 16th century.8 
He claims  that  the  gap  between  the  Ottoman  Empire  and the  Habsburgs  gradually 
widened during the 16th century. In this rivalry, Ottoman Empire was positioned as a 
land-based  empire  which  could  not  adopt  to  new  technologies  and  new  economic 
tendencies.   To  explain  this  dichotomy  between  the  Iberian  and  Turco-Muslim 
civilizations, Hess focuses on Africa-Iberian frontier zone as a dividing line between 
empires.9 This  work  was  a  reflection  of  “Europe  and  the  Orient”  vision.  This 
conceptualization based on the sphere of politics established in the sixteenth century 
6 Braudel, The Mediterranean , 867
7 Andrew C. Hess, The Forgetten Frontier, A History of the Sixteenth-Century Ibero-African Frontier, 
(University of Chicago Press, 1978)
8 op. cit 207
9 For an alternative attempt to Braudel and Hess, see Molly Green “A shared world, Christians and 
Muslims in the early modern Mediterranean” (New Jersey, Princeton University Press,2000)  In this 
work, Green presents eastern mediterranean as a point of three civilisations; Latin Christiniy, Eastern 
Orthodoxy and Islam. She examines Crete in this context. This work concludes the continuity in the 
island under the rule of Venetians and Ottomans.  
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and  several  works  are  still  influenced  by  this  approach  in  the  study  of  politics, 
economies and histories10 like Hess' one.
This study remained as a unique work about socio-political environment of 16th 
century  Mediterranean  until  Palmira  Brummet  presented  Ottoman Seapower  and 
Levantine  Diplomacy  in  the  Age  of  Discovery.11 This  work  constructed  a  new 
Mediterranean  world  completely  opposite  of  the  one  presented  by  Hess.  Brummet 
interprets Ottoman expansion in a radically different way from that of Hess. Brummet's 
main argument is the following: “The objectives of Ottoman expansion in the sixteenth 
century were the same as those of European voyages of discovery: wealth, power, glory, 
religious  legitimation.”12 In  this  study,  Ottoman  commercial  interests  and  Ottoman 
navy’s  role  in  shaping Ottoman foreign affairs  is  analyzed.  Brummet  concludes  her 
study  with  the  illustration  of  the  “inadequacy  of  Christian-Muslim  or  Oriental-
Occidental polarizations for explaining the evolution and articulation of political and 
economic policy among the contender states in the Levantine world.”13
Brumett's  comparative  perspective  and  critical  approach  to  existing 
historiography of  the  Age of  Discovery is  criticized  by Hess.14 According  to  Hess, 
Brumett’s study covering only the first decades of the 16th century, leaves the following 
period out. According to him, Brummet does not attempt to make a comparison between 
Ottomans  and  their  European  counterparts.  This  work  excludes  the  scientific 
developments and the naval technological differences between empires.
These  missing  points  in  Brumett’s  study  were  completed  satisfactorily  by 
Giancarlo  Casale.   He  justified  and  developed  the  original  thesis  established  by 
Brummet.15 Casale  takes  his  place  in  the  recent  revisionist  trend  in  the  Ottoman 
10 Cemal Kafadar, “The Ottomans and Europe”, in  “Handbook of European History 1400-1600, Late 
Mıddle Ages, Renaissance and Reformation, eds. By Thomas A. Brady Jr., Heiko A. Oberman, James 
D. Tracy (Leiden; New York: E.J.Brill, 1994) p.615
11 Palmira Brummet,  Ottoman Seapower and Levantine Diplomacy in the Age of Discovery, (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 1994)
12 Brummet, ibid,  2
13 Brummet, ibid, 179
14 Hess,  “Book  Review :  Ottoman seapower  and  levantine  diplomacy in  the  Age  of  Discovery,  by 
Palmira Brummet,” International Journal of Middle Eastern  Studies 27/3 (1995), 377-380 
15 Giancarlo Casale,  The Ottoman Age of Exploration: Spices, Maps and Conquest in the Sixteenth-
Century Indian Ocean, Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 2004
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historiography, by trying to place the Ottoman Empire within the context of the world 
history.  He focuses on the conflict in the Indian Ocean between the Portuguese and the 
Ottomans. This study begins with the conquest of Egypt in 1517 and covers the entire 
century chronologically until the last naval expedition of the Ottomans in the Indian 
Ocean in 1589. Finally he examines thematically the similarities between Ottomans and 
contemporary Western intellectual life in the “Discovery Age” context.
Apart from this debate on the role of the Ottoman seapower in world history, 
several  studies  published  provided  a  wealth  of  data  and  paved  the  way for  new 
researches.   An extensive article of Imber based on his Ph. D. thesis about the navy of 
Suleiman  I16,  Bostan's  Ph.  D.  thesis  about  Tersane-i  Amire,  his  articles17,   and  the 
publication of some papers presented in several symposiums18 are prominent works over 
Ottoman naval history. This accumulation of studies on the Ottoman naval history -even 
it is still limited-  aided the construction of a new perspective on Ottoman seapower. 
However, none of these works focus on the effect of Ottoman pirates/privateers in the 
assessment of Ottoman seapower.
On  the  other  hand,  there  is  a  great  number  of  publications  related  to 
Mediterranean piracy. As mentioned above, the pioneer of this field was Braudel who 
mentioned the importance  of piracy in  the Mediterranean world of the 16th century. 
Some other works were published following Braudel's remark. Fisher handled Barbary 
corsairs as a side of diplomatic  and trading relations between England and Barbary, 
despite their image as the bloody murderers of the seas.19 His work covering the period 
between the early 15th  and 19th centuries focuses on English diplomatic relations with 
Barbary.  Earle conceives piracy as a part of Mediterranean economy and studies the 
corsairs  of  Barbary  and  Malta  together.20 This  work  covers  the  17th and  the  18th 
16 Imber, Colin, “The Navy of Suleyman the Magnificent," Archivum Ottomanicum VI/1980
17 Bostan's phd theis was published titled  “Osmanlı Bahriye Teşkilatı : 17. yy'da Tersane-i Amire” (TTK 
Yayınları,  Ankara,  1992)  Bostan  gathered  major  part  of  his  articles  in  Beylikten  İmparatorluğa 
Osmanlı Denizciliği, (Kitap Yayınevi, Istanbul, 2006)
18 Özlem  Kumrular(ed),  Türkler  ve  Deniz,  (İstanbul,  Kitap  Yayınevi,  2006) and  Elizabeth 
Zachariadou(ed)  Kapudan Pasha ,  His office and his  domain: Holycon days  in  Crete IV. (Crete 
Univesity Press, Renthymon, 2002)
19 Godfrey Fisher, Barbary Legend; War, Trade, and Piracy in North Africa, 1415-1830, (Clerandon 
Press, Oxford, 1957)
20 Earle,  Peter, Corsairs of Malta and Barbary, (Sidgwick & Jackson , London, 1970)
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centuries.  The most  attractive  period for the studies on piracy is  between 1575 and 
1620.  In this era, power of piracy reached its peak point and pirates became a leading 
actor of Mediterranean history. Especially, piratical activities in the Adriatic constitute 
the main theme of some publications. Alberto Tenenti showed the impact of piracy in 
the  decline  of  Venice  in  his  research.21 Subject  of  Bracewell's  work  was  piratical 
activities of Uskoks in Adriatic for the same period.22 In a recent publication, Bostan 
focused on not only activities of Uskoks but also Ottoman and Venetian pirates.23 Heers 
studied on the Barbary corsairs as well from 14th century to 16th centuries. He examined 
the internal affairs of Algiers24 Pryor emphasized the importance of privateering in the 
balance of seapowers in Mediterranean and he assesses the corsairs as a crucial element 
of this rivalry.  Yet, he does not mention the corsairs in the service of the navies.25 Apart 
from these publications, an unpublished Ph. D. thesis prepared by Şenay Özdemir is 
available. This thesis covers almost the whole 18th century and includes rich data about 
Ottoman pirates/privateers26 These are the prominent works on Mediterranean piracy.27 
However,  these  works  generally  focus  on  the  last  decades  of  16th century  and  the 
following periods.  Besides, none of them are interested in the relationship between 
corsairs and imperial navies. 
Very  few historians  have  tried  to  construct  an  analytical  framework  for  the 
impact/support of corsairs in the formation process of Royal Navies. Jan Glete shows 
the integration of privateers to the navies in the foundation process of European royal 
navies. According to Glete, this process was an integral part of the state formation28 
21 Tenenti, Alberto, Piracy and the Decline of Venice : 1580-1615 (London, Longsman, 1967)
22 Bracewell, Catherine Wendy, 16.yy'da Adriyatik’te Korsanlık ve Eşkiyalık, (İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi 
Yayınları, 2009)
23 Bostan, İdris,  Adriyatik'te korsanlık, Osmanlılar, Üskoklar ve Venedikliler 1575-1620,  )Timaş 
Yayınları, Istanbul, 2009)
24 Heers, Jacques, Les barbaresques - la Course et la Guerre en Méditerranée, XIVe et XVIe siècle, 
(Edition Perrin, Paris, 2001)
25 John H. Pryor,  Geography, Technology, and War : Studies in the maritime history of the 
Mediterranean 649-1571, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, New York, 1992
26 Özdemir, Şenay,  Akdeniz Hakimiyetinde Osmanlı Devleti ve Korsanlık 1695-1789, Unpublished Ph. 
D. dissertation, Ankara Universitesi 2004
27 My work does not include piracy of Atlantic. There are great numbers of work related Atlantic piracy 
as well. A rich literatıre survey based on Atlantic piracy written by C. R. Pennell could be find in 
introduction chapter of “Bandits at sea : A pirate Reader “(NYU Press, New York, 2001) p 3-24 
28 Glete,  Jan,  Warfare  at  Sea  1500-1650,  Maritime  Conflict  and  the  Transformation  of  Europe, 
Routledge, New York, 2000. 
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Thomson presents an original framework about corsair-state relationship as well.  He 
analyzed this process with regards to transition period between early modern state and 
modern state.29 Even if these two crucial publications focused on the European cases 
and relatively late periods (especially Thomson focuses on the period between the 17th 
century  and  the  20th centuries)  they  provided  me  a  broader  perspective  for  the 
examination of the relationship between Ottoman corsairs and the Imperial Navy in the 
16th century. 
Even if all these studies on Ottoman seapower, corsairs and corsair impact on 
state formation, provide a ground for my thesis, there exists no academic publication on 
the  relations  between  Ottoman  corsairs  and  the  Imperial  Navy  in  the  16th  century. 
However, Ottoman corsairs are attractive figures for novelists. Barbaros Hayrettin, Kılıç 
Ali or Turgut Reis were usually illustrated as brave Turkish seamen and enemies of 
infidels.30 These stories are shaped around the theme of “Mediterranean transforming 
into a Turkish lake thanks to these corsairs.”  These fictions take the corsairs and not the 
Ottoman imperial  navy as the main actors of Mediterranean.  Yet, both parts of this 
motto are totally wrong: Mediterranean was never transformed into a Turkish lake and 
if it would be realized, this would not be by the hands of the corsairs but that of the 
Ottoman navy. Analysis of nationalistic reflections on historical novels about Ottoman 
corsairs is beyond the scope of this study.  Yet, the fact that there are several novels on 
the issue despite the lack of academic researches is worth to be mentioned.
Countless questions may be posed about this subject.  However this study can 
not cover all the aspects.  I will focus on the following question: “What was the nature 
of the relationship between Ottoman corsairs and the Ottoman Imperial Navy?” Trying 
to  answer  the  question  I  tried  to  comprehend  both  parts  of  this  relation;  Ottoman 
29 Thomson,  Janice  E.,  Mercenaries,  pirates,  and  sovereigns.  State-building  and  Extraterritorial  
Violence in Early Modern Europe, (Princeton University Press, Princeton 1994)
30 Tülbentçi, Feridun Fazıl,  Şanlı Kadırgalar: Büyük Tarihi Roman (İstanbul : İnkilap ve Aka Kitabevi 
1963),  Barbaros Hayrettin Geliyor (İstanbul, İnkilap ve Aka Kitabevi, 1974) , Turgut Reis (İstanbul: 
İnkilap ve Aka yayınevi: 1962) Halikarnas Balıkçısı, Turgut Reis (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi: 1996), Uluç 
Reis (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi: 1997), For a recent example of this line, Alper Uygur, Bizim Korsanlar:  
Akdeniz'i Köpürten Osmanlı Leventleri (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları ,2009) Murat Belge wrote an 
article  about  natiolistic  tendance  in  these  books  of  Halikarnas  Balıkçısı  as  well;  Belge,  Murat, 
Türklerin Anayurdu 'Anadolu' in Genesis: Büyük Ulusal Anlatı ve Türklerin Kökeni, (İstanbul: İletişim 
Yayınları: 2008) 
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Seapower and Ottoman corsairs. In general, this relationship is handled in three periods; 
before the kapudan pasha – the kapudan pasha era – the post Lepanto era. 
In  the  first  chapter,  I  tried  to  overcome terminological  problem.  Then  I 
constructed a conceptual framework as a guide for my thesis. Finally in the last part of 
this chapter, I tried to deal with the history of Mediterranean piracy/privateering briefly 
until the emergence of Ottoman corsairs.
In  second  chapter,  after  a  chronological  presentation  of  formative  period  of 
Ottoman seapower, I tried to analyze the simultaneous rise of the Ottoman corsairs and 
the seapower. Following this part, historiography of Ottoman corsairs as sea ghazis was 
discussed. Last part of this chapter covers the reigns of Selim I and first decades of 
Suleiman  I,  until  the  formation  of  the  province  of  Kapudan Pasha.  The  rise  of  the 
Ottoman seapower and the establishment of the Barbarossas in North Africa were also 
examined.
Third chapter is the main and the most intensive part of this work. This chapter 
presents the new structure of relationship between corsairs and the Imperial Navy in the 
Kapudan  Pasha's  era.  This  was  a  new era  that  has  begun  with  the  engagement  of 
Barbaros Hayrettin Pasha with the Ottoman navy as a Grand Admiral. 
Fourth and the last chapter is on the “decline” of  Ottoman Seapower. I tried to 
analyze  the reasons of this  “decline”  and transformation  of the relationship  in post-
Lepanto era was presented in this chapter, as well.
Finally,  a few words about the scope of this study. Ransom and slavery were 
certainly a crucial part of piracy/privateering.  However this study does not cover these 
topics.  Naval  technology of  the  16th century was  another  determinant  factor  of  this 
subject. Therefore, this could not be excluded totally but examining naval technology of 
the 16th century is not among the aims of this study, and it is given place only as far as it 
is related to our main theme.  
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CHAPTER I
THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF 
PIRACY / PRIVATEERING 
I. 1: Explanation of Terminology
Today piracy simply denotes illegal acts of pillage and plunder, and those who 
exercise such acts are called pirates in other words brigands at  sea.  However, in its 
historical course “piracy” conveyed two different meanings, as in the modern senses of 
piracy  and  privateering,  as  opposed  to  the  single  Turkish  equivalent  of  korsanlık.  
Additionally  the  interchangeable  usage  of  levend  and  korsan,  as  seen  in  historical 
sources,  contributes  to  a  general  conflation  of  the  distinct  senses.  Therefore  it  is 
necessary to overcome this terminological problem by analyzing the difference between 
piracy and privateering and by positing them against each other.
In terms of their activities and operations, there were no essential  differences 
between piracy and privateering.  Both were based on capturing a ship as their  prey, 
seizing  property  or  forcing  ships  ashore  and  then  plundering  them.  The  principle 
difference  between  these  two notions  was  legal.  While  the  first  one  was  an  act  of 
robbery without any legal support and/or legitimate ground, the second was a form of 
plunder in the knowledge of and even supervision by the state, and were aimed at the 
ships and shores of  hostile countries. In order to be recognized as a privateering ship, a 
privately owned ship required a  special  permit  for  privateering  from the state.  This 
license/permit,  lettre de marque / commision en course, also granted the privateering 
ship the right to use that state’s harbors and logistical support if needed. In return, the 
privateering ship was obliged to pay a share of the booty to the state. Furthermore, the 
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ship had the option to join any battle along the navy of the king's ships it was attached 
to.
Privateers were distinguished from the navy ships in the ways that they were 
both privately owned and were under the command of non-officer private individuals; 
and from the pirates,  in such a way that they took part in acts  of pillaging with an 
official  permit.31 Nevertheless,  this  license  lacks  a  strict  definition  of  borders  and 
circumstances.  The privateer  had a commission  from a recognized  authority to  take 
action against a designated enemy, but if the privateer were to attack a neutral or an ally 
ship, they are reprimanded in spite of the existence of a lettre de marque. On the other 
hand, a captain without a  lettre de marque who only attacked enemy ships was not 
considered a pirate.32
In  European  languages  this  distinction  was  generally  compensated  by  two 
different words (piracy / piratrie / prirate and privateering / course / corsaire) but in its 
modus  vivendi they  were  far  from  being  distinct.  Moreover,  they  are  not 
institutionalized structures; in practice there is not an absolute difference between them. 
It is not possible to speak of clearly defined identities between pirates and privateers. 
Seamen were called after  one or the other identity,  but in fact  while  a plunder was 
directed  against  an  enemy  at  a  time,  the  next  one  could  be  against  allies  and/or 
coreligionists.  Therefore  it  was  hard  to  discern  the  difference  between  pirate  and 
privateer, for their activities or operations. Guilmartin’s example is useful to illustrate 
the  difficulty  of  the  concept.33 A  Spanish  document  from  1551  contains  detailed 
information about Dimas de Gustaldo, who owned a fusta (a small oared warship); and 
his  campaign  to  the  Aegean  Sea.  Captain  Gustaldo,  after  leaving  Messina,  first 
plundered  small  boats  belonging  to  Turks  and  Armenians,  then  plundered  a  wheat 
carrying cargo ship coming from Alexandria. Later on, he boarded a Genoese ship that 
was in alliance with the Spanish. He enters a small harbor in the Morea and attacks 
31 Seha L. Meray, “Bazı Türk Anlaşmalarına göre Korsanlık ve Deniz Haydutluğunun Yasaklanması,” 
Ankara Üniversitesi  Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi, v: XVIII (1963) 116
32 Kenneth R. Andrews,  Elizabethan Privateering, English Privateering During The Spanish War 
1585-1603 (Glasgow: Cambridge University Press 1964) p 5
33 John Francis Guilmartin Jr. “Gunpowder and Galleys, Changing Technology and Mediterranean 
Warfare At Sea In Sixteenth Century”  (Oxford : Cambridge University Press, 1974) p 23-25
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small merchant ships, taking 40 captives. Of these captives he returns the Christians to 
the shore, keeping the Muslims.  The same day,  he robs a Venetian ship.  Lastly,  he 
captures  a  Florentine  ship,  again  an  ally  of  the  Spanish.  He sold  back  the  ship  he 
captured  from  the  Turks  for  500  ducats.  Taking  all  these  raids  into  account,  are 
Gustaldo and his men a unit linked to Spanish navy and commissioned to raid enemy 
merchant ships, or simple thieves? This gray zone makes it hard to match the actual 
activities to neat categories and conceptual boundaries of piracy for historians, as the 
events and the operations of the pirates run their courses.
As previously noted, in Ottoman Turkish there weren’t two different words for 
the pirate/privateer distinction; the word korsan was used for both of terms. The word 
korsan has passed to Turkish from Arabic kursan. The etymological root of the word is 
based  on  Italian  corsaro.34 But  even  though  there  weren’t  two  different  terms,  in 
practice the pirate/privateer distinction did exist. Privateers, or exchangeable, corsairs, 
as long as they raided the enemy ships, were called sea ghazis; however in the event that 
they raided Ottoman ships, shores or privileged ships they were called as harami korsan 
(bandit corsair).35 At this point it should be pointed out that in this chapter piracy is only 
deciphered  terminologically.  The  debate  concerning  the  historical  use  of  the  word 
“ghazi”  and  its  religious  and  other  connotations  will  be  analyzed  in  the  following 
chapters.  
The word korsan was also used in Ottoman Turkish, in addition to its meanings 
of pirate and corsair, for experienced seaman.36 For example, Seydi Ali Reis relates his 
survival of a great storm in Mirat’ül Memalik to his experience in seamanship and there 
proclaims himself as a  korsan.  As told by Seydi Ali Reis, Muslim people of Gujarat 
says that;
Such a great storm has never seen since Noah's era, but from the era of 
Adam to this time, never has a corsair, that is, a captain versed in the 
34 C. H. Pellat, “Kursan” Encyclopedia of Islam, C.V, p 502
35 İdris Bostan, “Adriyatik'te Korsanlar ve Deniz Gazileri,” Toplumsal Tarih 127 (July 2004)
36 Henry and Renée Kahane, and Andreas Tietze,  The lingua franca in the Levant: Turkish nautical  
terms of Italian and Greek origin, (İstanbul: ABC Kitabevi , 1988) p 194
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science of navigation,  come from the Land of Rumi to these parts  of 
India.37
Additionally, even though Seydi Ali Reis called himself a corsair, it should be 
noted that he was a seaman educated in the dockyards and never operated as a pirate in 
a  way that  resembles  above described senses.  Both his  grandfather,  originally  from 
Sinop, and his father were dockyard custodians (kethüda) in Istanbul.38 We encounter a 
similar  example  in  Katip  Çelebi’s  chronicles.  Katip,  while  narrating  the  Battle  of 
Lepanto (Inebahtı), describes Kapudan-ı Derya (Fleet Admiral) Müezzinzade Ali Paşa 
as  “in  fact,  Kapudan  Pasha  was  an  eager  and  serviceable  man  but  he  has  not 
experienced at naval battle and did not know the science of corsair.”39
Another  word  in  Ottoman  sources  to  counter  corsairs/pirates  was  levend.  
Levends were divided into two as land and sea levends and in seamanship, it was used to 
represent seamen who operated with corsairs and corsair captains (korsan reisleri)40 . In 
contemporary  sources  of  the  time  levend  reisleri  were  generally  used,  meaning 
corsairs41; but some entries in mühimme records illustrate that levend, korsan levendler,  
eşkıya levendler were other usages that stood for pirate.42 Even in its earlier usage, the 
word levend,  which started to appear in historical sources from the second half of the 
15th century onwards, denoted only corsairs / pirates in the senses we mentioned above. 
After levends were incorporated into the navy and became a combatant force, the term 
levend was also used for the navy personnel.43 
37 Seydi Ali Reis, Mirat'ül Memalik , transcripted by Dr Mehmet Kiremit (Ankara: Türk Dil Kurum 
Yayınları, 1999 ) p 90
38 Cengiz Orhonlu, “Seydi Ali Reis,” İ.Ü.E.F. Tarih Enstitüsü  Dergisi v.1 (İstanbul :1970) p 39-56
39 Katip Çelebi, Tuhfetü'l-Kibâr Fì Esfâri'l-Bihâr (İstanbul: Kabalcı Yayınevi, 2007) p 115
40 Mustafa Cezar, Osmanlı Tarihinde Levendler (İstanbul : İstanbul Güzel Sanatlar Akademisi Yayınları : 
1965) p 17
41 İdris Bostan, Adriyatikte korsanlık, ve deniz gazileri , p.64
42 Several examples;
MD,  H951-952 tarihli (1544/1545) E 12321 hüküm no:386
MD, 5 numaralı mühimme defteri, (973-1565/1566) (Ankara :T.C. Başbakanlık devlet arşivleri genel  
müdürlüğü, Osmanlı arşivi daire başkanlığı 1994) hüküm no: 215, 244,  1318
MD, 7 numaralı mühimme defteri (975/976 - 1567/69)  (Ankara :T.C. Başbakanlık devlet arşivleri  
genel müdürlüğü, Osmanlı arşivi daire başkanlığı 1997)  hüküm no:1431, 1515
43 Cezar, Levendler, p 173
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I.  2:  The Conceptual  Framework of   Piracy  /  Privateering  in  the  Early 
Modern Era
Outlining a framework, at this point, for piracy on the one hand and relationship 
between pirates and states on the other, will surely contribute to the development of the 
chapters ahead.44 Above all, the economic aspect of privateering should be underlined. 
As Braudel mentions, “privateering was a means of making of living”,45 therefore, the 
corsair46 is someone who is engaged in trade. The corsair must report to people who 
invested money,  equipped necessary ships,  provided necessary supplies  for  corsairs. 
Even though the ship belongs to the  corsair  captain,  he has  to share  his  spoils  with the 
authority that  lets  him use ports. Additionally,  privateering was not an occupation one 
could do for a whole year. Considering the maritime technologies of the 16th century, 
within  certain  logistical  limits  some  raiding  activity  could  be  carried  out  in  winter 
months too. But the vast bulk of the raids were in the spring and summer months when 
the ships were at sail. Consequently, in this short time period the corsairs had to earn 
enough to  last  a  year.  In  short,  the  principal  aim of  the  corsair  raids  was  to  seize 
commercial goods and take captives and later to sell them.47 If handled the economic 
aspect of the privateering in the specificity of the Ottoman corsairs, the treatise (risale) 
of Koçi  Bey seems to  confirm Braudel’s  assertion,  “Algerian ships include  levends. 
These ships sail to the domains of Christians and capture Christian ships when they 
come across. Their livelihood is in this way.”48 Briefly, privateering and armed ships 
were a type of investment and were an inseparable part of economic system. They had 
permits, were supported and presided by the political  authorities who provided these 
44 For the backbone of this part, see; Halil Berktay and Tosun Terzioğlu, “Osmanlı Denizcilik Tarihinin 
Evrensel, Karşılaştırmalı ve Teorik Çerçeveleri”, in Türkler ve Deniz, ed. Özlem Kumrular (İstanbul: 
Kitap Yayınevi, 2007) p 118 – 122.
45 Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II (University 
of California Press, 1995). 
46 The terms of corsair and privateer will be used interchangeably in this work. Beginning from 17th 
century “Privateer” was used as a term in European documents instead of  “corsair.” Both of them 
have same meaning.
47 Miguel Angel de Buenes Ibarra, “Osmanlı berberi korsanlığı ve İspanya sahilleri,” Toplumsal Tarih 
v:127 (July 2004) p 74
48 Koçi Bey, Koçi Bey Risaleleri (İstanbul : Kabalcı Yayınevi 2009)  p 142 – my translation
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privileges in exchange of a share from their spoils.49 Because of these reasons, Rhodes, 
one of the most important corsair harbors in the beginning of the 16th century, became a 
rich port town. In Rhodes, every type of smuggled goods and slave trade were available; 
and the knights and their folk not only joined the ranks of the corsairs but their religious 
leaders gladly opened the harbors, sometimes even by invitation.50 On the Ottoman side, 
the markets for booty were corsair bases such as Seferihisar, Milet and Antalya.51  In the 
period, which saw a growth and enlargement in piratical activities, seized goods from 
Alexandria-Istanbul, Istanbul-Venice and Marseilles-Barcelona routes were auctioned 
in markets of Algeria, Tunis, Malta and Leghorn. The prices these goods fetched were 
naturally  considerably less  than the price that  they would have had at  their  port  of 
origin. That’s to say, “privateering was thus another system of exchange”.52
Therefore, corsairs’ means of subsistence was based on booty. The routes which 
saw a rise in ship traffic at certain times of the year, intersections of difference routes or 
places within were all suitable hunting grounds, or convenient spots for raiding. It was 
more of a necessity than a luxury that the corsair bases were in close proximity to these 
areas. Basically, there were two important variables for the cruising range of the light 
galliots  that  the corsairs  used in  Mediterranean.  The first  one was the speed of the 
galliots. Since they were oared ships, they could reach high speed in short distance in 
relation to sailing ships however they could not keep on this speed for a long time. 
Therefore  average  speed  of  oared  ships  was  low  unlike  sailing  ships.  The  second 
variable that brings out the importance of the first variable was that the galliots had 
serious limitations of stowage capacities for provision. Taking into account that corsairs 
could not enter many ports as the commercial ships could, they had to be loaded with 
supplies that would last longer; also they had to store arms and had to keep decks of 
their  ships clear in case of a sea battle. Additionally the galliots had a greater crew 
considering  their  weight.  In  these  circumstances,  water  reserves  for  a  normal  light 
galley or galliot were sufficient for two or three weeks in maximum. This logistical 
49 John H. Pryor, Geography, Technology, and War: Studies in the Maritime History of the 
Mediterranean 649-1571 (Cambridge and  New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992) p 154-155
50 Nicolas Vatin , Rodos Şövalyeleri ve Osmanlılar: Doğu Akdeniz'de Savaş, Diplomasi ve Korsanlık 
(İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları: 2000) p 55-56
51 Ibid., 95.
52 Peter Earle, Corsairs of Malta and Barbary (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1970) p 16
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limitation, in addition to their speed, limited the galleys’ cruising range to a maximum 
of 960 sea miles.53
Because of these reasons, the maintenance of convenient bases was an integral 
part of raiding operations. The proximity of these bases to target areas was making the 
raids more effective and reducing the costs; thus, modest though, the raids could be 
carried on in winter. Also, fortified ports offered protection against enemy warships.54 
The survival for corsairs depended on their ability to use some ports and being protected 
by the port authorities under a minor prince or a greater sovereign.
As we mentioned above, pirates / corsairs existed where commerce is active. But 
it  was  not  the  only  condition.  Lively  commerce  was  only  one  of  the  necessary 
preconditions.  Besides  that  throughout  history,  piracy  /  privateering  has  arisen  in 
periods in which the political realm has changed. In naval history, corsair attacks have 
arisen in frontier regions where no single authority could have outdone the rest of the 
contenders, or if an emergent power had claims about a trading zone and a struggle 
ensued between two powers. The prize of the piracy is  economic,  the dynamic that 
drives it  is political.55 Ottoman corsairs  appeared in the Aegean when the Ottomans 
began to  settle  in  the Aegean islands  and Eastern Mediterranean coastline  from the 
mid-15th century  onwards.  In  the  first  decades  of  the  16th century,  after  Eastern 
Mediterranean  became  under  the  control  of  the  Ottoman  rule,  the  axis  of  corsair 
activities had shifted to Central and Western Mediterranean, and Algeria became the 
main  base  of  corsair  raids.  After  Rhodes,  the  Christian  center  of  corsairs  in  the 
Mediterranean, was captured by the Ottomans, the new area of struggle became Central 
Mediterranean and Malta happened to be the most important corsair base, together with 
Sardinia, Tuscany, Sicily, as other corsair ports of importance.
The privateering was an integral part of the maritime activities in the ocean, as 
well as Mediterranean. Even though navy fleets did sail in the Mediterranean besides 
the pirates,  it  is  misleading to  talk  about great  royal  navies in the sixteenth-century 
53 Pryor, Geography, Technology, and War,  p 71 - 86
54 Guilmartin, Gunpowder and Galleys, p 97
55 Anne-Purotin Dumon, “The Pirate and the Emperor: Power and The Law on the Seas, 1450-1850,” in 
Bandits at Sea: A Pirate Reader, ed. C. R. Pennell (New York: NYU Press, 2001) p 26
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Atlantic. Inability of the states to build large navies of their own was the greater part of 
the reason. To summarize the way Anderson quotes from Thompson, sea war means for 
Atlantic “was a war not of states but of subjects, not of navies but privateers, corsairs 
and armed merchantmen”.56 As early as 1523, one of the Norman captains, Jean Florin, 
had been raiding the Spanish ships coming back from Mexico in the vicinity of Canary 
Islands and the Azures.57 It was with the help of these corsairs that the English started to 
disrupt  the  Spanish  hegemony  in  the  Atlantic.  Queen  Elisabeth’s  privateers,  as 
epitomized by Captain Drake, caused much damage to Spanish by organizing raids to 
the islands under Spanish rule such as Caribbeans, New Cartagena, Cape Verde. After 
1580,  English  and  Dutch  privateers  entered  the  Mediterranean  and  altered  the 
commercial patterns and the balance of power in the Mediterranean, notably forcing the 
Venetians out of business. The Dutch corsairs, who took the stage in the second half of 
the 16th century, started to raid Spanish ships under the protection of William, Prince of 
Orange, after Philip II directly intervened in the Dutch administration that was under 
Spanish  rule.  They  co-operated  with  French-Huguenot  and  English  privateers  with 
French letters of marquee, and together they could use English and French ports, as well 
as Emden in Germany, as bases. Between 1568 and 1572, this coalition from North Sea 
to Azores and Canaries was influential in this area.58 
From the end of the 16th century, English corsairs used Ottoman ports too for 
their  operations.  Divan-ı  Hümayun had been receiving complaints about the English 
corsairs from the French consul and the Venetian bailo in Istanbul, reporting that some 
English  corsair  ships  disguised  as  commercial  ships  were  raiding  the  French  and 
Venetian commercial freighters they encountered at sea or in some ports. The English 
privateers, since they were far off from their homelands, visited the nearby ports of their 
allies, the Ottomans, offering gifts and selling the booty to Ottoman administrators.59 
But privateering, was a peculiar combative strategy like a double-edged blade that could 
56 M. S. Anderson, The Origins of the Modern European State System, 1494-1618 (London and New 
York: Longman, 1998) p 27-28
57 Dumon, “The Pirate and the Emperor,” p 30
58 Jan Glete, Warfare at Sea 1500-1650: Maritime Conflict and the Transformation of Europe (New 
York: Routledge, 2000) p 153
59 İdris Bostan, Adriyatik'te korsanlık: Osmanlılar, Üskoklar ve Venedikliler 1575-1620 (İstanbul: Timaş 
Yayınları, 2009) p 50
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hurt its wielder, too. Queen Elizabeth ordered the English ports to be cleared out of the 
Dutch pirates, also known as Sea Beggars, who began to raid English ships60. A similar 
decree regarding Ottoman ports was issued by Suleiman in the middle of the century. 
After the Ottoman control in the Aegean was ensured, Ottoman government attempted 
to  control  the  activities  of  corsairs,  forbidding  the  construction  of  privateer  vessels 
without special permission.61 However, that was not a solution and Muslim pirates never 
disappeared from the Aegean.
On the other hand, for early modern states the corsairs were sources that could 
not  be  dispensed  with.  As  we  noted,  at  this  time  the  struggle  in  the  Atlantic  was 
essentially based on privateers  and privateering.  The high costs  of  shipbuilding and 
scarcity of resources in some periods were major barriers for states to reserve a navy. 
For example, in late sixteenth-century England, the Queen had to expend the limited 
resources  to  continental  fronts  and  maritime  operations.  In  the  same  period, 
Elizabethan England was at war, to suppress Tyrone’s Rebellion in Ireland, known as 
the  Nine  Years  War  (1594-1603)  that  kept  the  Queen  under  pressure.62 Therefore 
Elizabeth did not have an opportunity to build a imperial navy. As a consequence, in the 
Battle of Cadiz, that has an important place in the Spanish-English struggle between 
1585-1603, among the 150 ships that took part in the attack on Cadiz in 1596 only about 
a tenth were owned by Queen Elizabeth.63 In addition to the temporary recruitment of 
private ships by states, it is qualified seafarers' employment by the state that is arguably 
more significant. Even in those states which were economically able to build big navies, 
e.g.  the  Venice  and  the  Ottomans,  there  weren’t  any schools  available  in  the  early 
modern period that would provide the necessary personnel for those ships.64 Therefore, 
the maritime savoir-faire could only be transferred via social reproduction, transfer of 
skills and lore through apprenticeship. There were no other ways than coming from a 
mariner family, doing sea commerce for long years or being a pirate to acquire maritime 
60 Bülent Arı, “Akdeniz'de Korsanlık ve Osmanlı Deniz Hukuku,” in Türkler ve Deniz, ed. Özlem 
Kumrular, p 270-274
61  “Kursan,” EI, p 506
62 Andrews, Elizabethan Privateering, p 10
63 Anderson, The Origins of the Modern European State System, p 29
64 Berktay and Terzioğlu, “Osmanlı Denizcilik Tarihinin Evrensel, Karşılaştırmalı ve Teorik 
Çerçeveleri,” p. 120
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lore. Because of these reasons, the pool of private entrepreneurs, or corsairs, who were 
just a particular sort of entrepreneur common at the time, were invaluable for the navy 
fleets as manpower. Spain, whose control in the northern seas was in decline, began to 
mobilize a large fleet in northern Spain in early 1574, through the traditional method of 
requisitioning armed merchantmen. In the Spanish-English struggle, mentioned above, 
the composition of the parties was similar. The Invincible Armada that left Lisbon for 
Channel operations in May 1588 was again mobilized in a traditional Spanish way, with 
armed merchantmen hired from Castile’s Biscay provinces and Andalusia, Italy, Ragusa 
and Venice.65 The Dutch Republic, which had the most important maritime economy of 
the time, inevitably recruited private entrepreneurs to compensate for the lack of skilled 
and experienced seafarers.66 Spain, Dutch’s long time adversaries, followed the suit. As 
in the Dutch navy, officers were recruited from men with long seafaring experience that 
made the Armada of the Flanders unique in the Spanish navy.  67At the end of the 17th 
century, Louis XIV created the last great galley fleet of maritime history and enlisted 
Maltese corsairs. In 1672, Jean Baptiste Colbert, French Minister of Finance from 1665 
to 1683 under the rule of Louis XIV, decreed that all the officer candidates should be 
experienced men that “should have served on Maltese and should be members of the 
Orders.”68 
Starting from the end of the 15th century, the Ottomans also employed corsairs 
for being experienced seamen in their official navy as captains. In the first half of the 
16th century  the  corsairs  in  the  Aegean,  and  later  in  the  century  the  Algeria-based 
corsairs served in the Ottoman navy as official sailors. These seamen were not solely 
employed as captains, but some like Barbaros Hayrettin and Uluç Ali Reis rose to the 
post of Grand Admiral. Similar to the process of incorporating English privateers, Dutch 
privateers and armed merchants, Spanish armed merchants and Maltese corsairs into 
greater  navies,  the  same can  be  witnessed  in  the  relationship  between the  Ottoman 
imperial  navy and the Algerian corsairs  which we will  be described in detail  in the 
65 Glete, Warfare at Sea, p  154-158
66 Ibid., p 43
67 Ibid., p 179
68 Paul W. Bamford, Fighting Ships and Prisons: The Mediterranean Galleys of France in the Age of  
Louis XIV (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1973) p 99
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following chapters. In effect, predatory activities of Algerian corsairs served as a naval 
school in training seamen.69 
But this course did not run forward in a linear fashion. As Imber notes, even 
though these predatory attacks provided training for corsairs, it would be misleading to 
assume that the corsairs were unconditionally loyal to the Ottoman navy, and to describe 
the maritime structure of corsairs as a quasi-Ottoman naval school. Without doubt, a 
symbiotic  relationship  between  the  Ottoman  court  and  the  corsairs  did  exist.  The 
corsairs were providing maritime information, and some were enlisted, and in return 
they  made  good  use  of  the  Ottoman  logistics  and  ports,  and  were  protected. 
Additionally, for the corsair to serve the imperial navy as an officer, without a doubt, 
was less risky than being an independent pirate and offered a more luxurious life. It was 
within possibilities to rise to the very top like Barbarossa. Still, in this “trade”, on some 
occasions the wants of the two sides, the Ottoman court and corsairs, could clash. In 
these cases, either the Ottoman navy proclaiming the corsair as a bandit, began to hunt 
down the pirate; or made compromises and tolerated the corsair, to be able to use him 
again or because it simply did not want to clash with him. In short, it did not mean that a 
corsair would die as an officer if he were to enter the Ottoman Imperial Navy. It is 
sufficient  to  give  a  short  identification  of  this  process  here,  since  in  the  upcoming 
chapters  it  will  be  analyzed  in  detail  with  regards  to  Thomson's70 and  Barkey’s71 
framework.72 As to  Thomson's  work,  inside a  particular  territorial  space  violence  is 
legitimized and monopolized by the modern state. However, in the early modern era, 
interstate borders were not clear like in modern interstate systems. Sovereignty could 
not be established by states “in modern meaning” in this era so non-state violence like 
privateering -as well as mercenaries- was began authorizing by rulers. Thomson argues 
that was a transition process from early modern state to the modern state; “European 
69 Colin Imber, The Ottoman Empire , 1300-1650 (New York : Palgrave  Macmillan, 2002) p 299-300
70 Thomson,  Janice  E.,  Mercenaries,  pirates,  and  sovereigns.  State-building  and  Extraterritorial  
Violence in Early Modern Europe, (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1994)
71 Barkey, Karen, Bandits and Bureaucrats, The Ottoman Route to State Centralization, (Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca and London, 1994)
72 Importance of these  frameworks was emphasized by Berktay and Terzioğlu. op.cit 122
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state  rulers  first  encouraged  non-state  violence,  then delegitimated  it,  and  finally 
eliminated it.”73  
In early modern era as our research, borders between legal and illegal were not 
so clear. But in this process of transformation it did not work with the same efficiency 
and changes from privateering to piracy, from mercenaries to bandits and vice versa 
were seen. The process had a similar course for the Ottomans. According to Barkey, 
central authority followed a negotiation strategy with these bandits (celalis) during the 
celalis uprights in the beginning of 17th century. These bandits gained posts in Ottoman 
service.  Barkey analyzed this  practice as an alternative centralization process unlike 
Europeans.  This  analytical  framework  fits  for  Ottoman  corsairs  throughout  of  16th 
century.  Thus, annexation of corsairs to the Imperial  navy could be analyzed in this 
context.
Privateering and piracy was not peculiar to the 16th century Mediterranean; these 
notions continued their existence until 19th century. While it is not the intention of this 
essay to cover such a long period, in the following chapters it will be analyzed how this 
relationship was in the 16th century.
I.  3:  A Brief  History  of  the  Mediterranean  Corsairs  until  the  Era  of 
Ottomans Corsairs
It  is  not possible  to  conceptualize Mediterranean piracy and then use it  as  a 
common  notion  to  represent  all  periods  of  the  Mediterranean  in  a  linear  way.  As 
Braudel notes “piracy in the Mediterranean is as old as history”.74 Therefore even from 
the time when men has sailed Mediterranean until the 19th century, piracy has been an 
integral part of  “the middle sea”; there have been changes in its form and frequency 
from period to another period. Therefore before analyzing sixteenth-century Ottoman 
73 Janice, Thomson, op. cit. p.,19
74 Fernand Braudel,  The mediterranean and the Mediterranean world in the age of Philip II (London : 
Harper Collins 1992) p 627
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piracy, the stages of the piracy in Mediterranean until Ottomans came in 14th century, 
should be taken into consideration. 
Maritime  technologies  of  the  Ancient  Era  confined  maritime  exploits  to  sea 
shores.  The geographical  conditions of Mediterranean were also encouraging piracy. 
Numerous Aegean islands, indented Greece and Illyria shores, North Africa, Sardinia 
and Corsica offered shelter for pirates in different periods. Primitive examples to pirates 
serving governments were being seen in the Ancient Era. This practice, as opposed to 
the legalized version of privateering in the 17th century, was developed more or less as 
politics of vengeance. From 5th century BC, states were inviting pirates to undertake 
raids against their enemies. For example, in 421 BC, though they had signed a pact, 
Athens’ raids against Sparta were still continuing, and Sparta, without breaking the pact, 
proclaimed that its citizens were free to attack Athenians both on land and sea. But, 
after these corsairs started to raid neutral or allied ship, it was decided to sign an official 
treaty with them.75
Piracy activities in the Roman Empire were also frequent. Especially in the 1st 
century BC, the attacks grew even more frequent. An anecdote concerning this period 
belongs to Gaius Julius Caesar. In 75 BC, when Julius Caesar set sail to receive lessons 
of rhetoric from Apollonius Molon who had also taught Cicero, he was captured and 
was freed only his ransom was paid 40 days later.76 The senate was desperate against the 
pirate attacks. Because the large wheat cargo ships went consistently missing, Rome’s 
granary was  under  serious  threat.  In  this  situation,  in  67 BC,  the  Senate  appointed 
Pompey the  Great  to  cleanse  the  Mediterranean  of  pirates.  Starting  from Gibraltar, 
during a systematic nine month long operation, approximately thousands of ships (even 
the number looks exaggerated for the time) were destroyed,  a couple hundred ships 
brought to Rome and thousands of pirates were killed. After operation the grain prices 
gained stability and Mediterranean was clear of pirates for a long time.77 Piracy could 
75 Şenay Özdemir, Akdeniz Hakimiyetinde Osmanlı Devleti ve Korsanlık 1695-1789  Unpublished Ph. D. 
dissertation, Ankara Universitesi 2004, p 78
76 Philip de Souza,  “Ancient Rome and The Pirates”  History Today, Vol:51 / 7  (July 2001) p 48-53
77 Ernle Bradford, Akdeniz :Bir Denizin Portresi ; Translated by Ahmet Fethi ( Istanbul: Türkiye İş 
Bankası Kültür    Yayınları, 2004)  190-191
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only find a space to live beginning from 3rd century AD, after Rome’s authority in the 
Mediterranean grew weaker with its subsequent disintegration. 
In 649, the first Umayyad Caliph Muawiyah attacked Cyprus and started to pose 
a threat to Byzantine hegemony in the Mediterranean, and in 655 in Lycia Umayyad’s 
won  their  first  victory  against  the  Byzantines.  In  the  following  centuries,  Muslims 
captured most of the islands and some of the important areas and strongholds on the 
main routes. In the 9th and 10th centuries piracy gained a religious identity for the first 
time  in  Mediterranean  history.  In  this  century,  raids  by  Muslims  corsairs  against 
Christian ships and shores began to be seen as ghaza.  Because of the bases located in 
the Abbasid Caliphate, Umayyad’s in Cordoba, Aglebis in Tunis and Sicily, Fatimids in 
North Africa and Sicily, Balear Islands, Crete and other islands, this became the period 
in which the attacks against Christians were most frequent. From 10th century onward, 
the  Christians  were  recapturing  the  bases  on  the  main  routes.  This  also  laid  the 
groundwork for the future Western hegemony along these routes.78
In the 12th and 13th centuries the Islamic lands were between Granada, Valencia, 
Balear Islands and Antalya and Alanya. After the first Crusades, Christian princedoms 
were founded in Syria and Palestine, in 1091 Richard the Lionheart captured Cyrpus, 
after the fourth Crusade, the Venetians and Genoese settled in the Aegean and the Black 
Sea.  In  this  period,  Western  pirates  could  settle  in  the  Aegean islands,  because  the 
Byzantine navy was disbanding. Muslims lost the strategic bases of Valencia and Balear 
Islands in 1230.  As a consequence, losing all strategic bases to make raids, fleet of 
Muslims and corsairs had a limited area of operations. Therefore, the Mediterranean 
was now ruled by Christian fleets, but more importantly for commerce, by Christian 
corsairs.79 
The  last  centuries  of  the  Middle  Ages  were  times  in  which  the  difference 
between pirate and corsair started to be discernible. In the fragmented political structure 
of the 14th and 15th centuries, there were many, small and large, maritime powers in 
Mediterranean. Since there were no large fleets of great kingdoms or empires to speak 
78 Pryor, Geography, Technology, and War, p.102-111
79 Ibid., 158-159
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of,  and  also  that  the  Crusade  mentality  was  in  decline,  prepared  the  necessary 
conditions  for  the  re-emergence  of  piracy.  In  this  long and complex  transformation 
process initiative corsairs started slowly to become units of the central authority.80 This 
process was seen in the Northern seas in same way as well. English privateers were first 
seen in the 13th century and the king ordered the vessel on the shores to attack France. It 
was in 1295 that the first letters of marque were issued by the English monarchy against 
Portugal.81 
In Mediterranean, Venetians were the first ones to use this method. Venetians, 
even they are often portrayed as victims instead of perpetrators in academic works, 
incorporated pirates as corsairs into the central authority. In the 14th century, the Venice 
played an important role in the construction of new foundations for the professions of 
pirates and corsairs. The Republic wanted to be the greatest sovereign power in Adriatic 
against its enemies and planned to stop the piratical raids. Therefore, central authority 
defined “enemies” rather broadly. Venice deployed its own captains to attack and seize 
all the  armed vessels without any consent under the pretext of “defense purpose”. Even 
if this practice seems as a measure to prevent piratical attacks however ally and neutral 
merchant ships were armed to protect themselves. Later on, pirates started to apply to 
Venice  for  sailing  as  corsairs  and  joined  Venetian  captains.  In  final,  the  duties  of 
corsairs and the captains of the royal navy combined protection and aggression. Like 
the captain of the gulf, the corsair worked to defend Venice's security; like the corsairs 
the captain was to destroy the enemy as he chose. In this way, Venice, benefited from 
modifying the system instead of recruiting pirates or mercenaries as its contemporary 
adversaries. When charged with an improper attack, the Venetians could argue that their 
captains had been innocently engaged in guarding Venice’s interest. Defensive measures 
slipped easily into offensive maneuvers, and Venice was well prepared to incorporate 
plunder as a regular part of its naval operations.82 
80 Micheal Fontenay and Alberto Tenenti, “Course et piraterie méditerraneennes de la fin du moyen-âge 
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The 13th and 14th centuries were also the first centuries in which Turkish corsairs 
were seen in the Mediterranean.  In the late 13th and the early 14th century,  with the 
establishment  of  Turkish  emirates  in  Western  Anatolia,  Turkish  corsairs  started  to 
emerge. But, in this period, the most important event was, seeing it as an unnecessary 
expense, the Byzantine Emperor’s decision to disband the naval fleet in 1284. This way, 
burgeoning Turkish corsairs found a habitat and more importantly, unemployed Greek 
sailors defected to the Turks. In this period, Turkish maritime emirates, Aydın, Menteşe, 
Saruhan and Karasi, engaged in sea-borne raids. These corsair raids were most harmful 
to the Venetian and Latin  trade.83 Beginning from 1318, because of the cooperation 
between the Catalans under Don Alfonso Fadrique and Anatolian Turks of Aydın and 
Menteshe, Turks’ area of operation against Venetians was as far as Euboea and Crete. In 
this period, especially sea ghazis under the rule of Umur Bey became serious threats. 
Though Genoese and Rhodian allied fleet defeated fleet of Aydın emirate in 1319 this 
was not an end for the threat of Turkish corsairs. Following this, in 1334, a coalition of 
Venice, Rhodes, Cyprus, Byzantium, the Pope and the King of France clamped down on 
corsairs,  inflicting  disastrous  damage  and  defeating  the  fleet  of  Karasis  in 
Adramys(Edremit). After the death of Aydınoğlu Umur Bey in 1348, the attacks slowed 
down but corsair based Turcoman maritime principalities continued their attacks until 
the annexation of these emirates by Bayezid I in 1390.84 Even the threat against the 
Western ships was serious, Genoa, Venice and Rhodes could defend themselves with the 
help of Knights Hospitaller and Crusade alliances. Consequently, until swallowed by 
the Ottoman Empire they could not win any sea-battle against the Christian Western 
powers. Their ships, small oared galleys were suitable for predatory attacks but they 
could  not  hold  against  large  sizable  ships  like  gallia  sottile  of  Christians  in  naval 
battles.85
83 Pellat, “Kursan,” Encyclopedia of Islam,2 
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CHAPTER II
THE RISE OF OTTOMAN SEAPOWER
AND
THE FIRST PERIOD OF THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN THE IMPERIAL NAVY AND THE 
OTTOMAN CORSAIR UNTIL THE ERA OF THE 
KAPUDAN PASHA
II. 1: The Formative Period of Ottoman Seapower
Parallel to our limited knowledge regarding the formative years of the Ottoman 
policy, it is quite uncertain whether in the fourteenth century the Ottomans established 
their naval institutions and became a sea power in the region. İdris Bostan maintains 
that the first seeds of the Ottoman sea power were planted through the use of Karasi 
naval power after the annexation of the principality by the Ottoman forces in 1347-8 
and construction of shipyards in Edincik, Gemlik, Karamürsel and İzmit. He also refers 
to the small oared ship which named after its inventor, Karamürsel Bey and used in 
Ottoman seas for centuries, as an evidence of the fact that these first Ottomans efforts 
were quite permanent.86 However, Colin Imber says that a man named Kara Mürsel had 
not ever existed. To Imber, this man is a literary creation based on the toponym Kara 
Mürsel, a coastal town in the Gulf of İzmit; and it is difficult to talk about an effective 
86 Idris Bostan, Beylikten İmparatorluğa Osmanlı Denizciliği  (İstanbul; Kitap Yayınevi :2006) p 14
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Ottoman sea power during the reign of Orhan. Imber thinks that it is the absence of 
Ottoman ships that led Orhan to ask for help from the Byzantines for his son enslaved 
by the corsairs.87 This striking event is the first recorded encounter among the Ottomans 
and the Christian corsairs. In 1357, Orhan's eleven year old son Halil was kidnapped by 
the Greek corsairs of Old Phocaea. Orhan appealed to the Byzantine Emperor and made 
an agreement with him. Halil was brought to İstanbul a year later after the payment of 
the ransom fee. Nonetheless, the prince died the following year in İznik 88 
In 1352, the Ottomans settled in Tyzmpe, located to the north of Gallipoli, as 
Cantacuzenos's  allies.  Afterwards,  they  seized  the  entire  hinterland,  thereby 
disconnecting Gallipoli from Thrace. Right after the earthquake in 1354 that caused the 
demolition of the Gallipoli fortress, they took hold of the land. In 1366 the Duke of 
Savoy attacked Gallipoli with a Crusader fleet, captured it and handed it over to the 
Byzantines. In 1376, Gallipoli was captured for the second time by the Ottomans, and 
became the principal base for the Ottoman navy from this time onwards.89 
In 1390, Bayezid annexed the emirates of Western Anatolia. A maritime force 
was required to defend the coast and secure the safety of trade from its ports. Moreover, 
Bayezid was intending to close the strait. Hence, he began to establish an Ottoman fleet 
composed of  newly constructed vessels in Gallipoli along with the corsairs and their 
crafts.90  However, Bayezid's navy could not turn into a salient sea power. Although the 
vessels used Gallipoli as a naval base for attacks to Venetian territories and merchant 
ships, this became only possible in the absence of the Venetian navy at sea. The attacks 
of Ottoman vessels intensified between 1390 and 1402, and became a severe threat for 
Venetian  coasts  and merchant  ships.  Yet,  Venetian  merchant  ships  maintained  their 
transit along the strait under the warships' safeguarding. Although Ottoman naval power 
diminished during Interregnum in 1402-1413, it became again a threat for the northern 
Aegean from 1413 onwards. In 1415, the Venetian and Genoese merchant ships were in 
87 Colin Imber, “Before The Kapudan Pashas : Sea Power and The Emergence of the Ottoman Empire” 
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need of warships' safeguarding not only for transit along the strait but also the entire 
Marmara sea.  
Within  this  process,  the  number  of  Ottoman  vessels  increased,  though  the 
quality remained more or less the same. In this regard, in 1416, the Captain of the Gulf, 
Pietro  Loredan  assaulted  Gallipoli  and sank and/or  took possession of  the  Ottoman 
vessels there as a response towards the assaults of Mehmed I's vessels on Euboes in 
1415. The Ottomans no more  became a serious threat  in the Aegean following this 
attack. The siege of Thessaloniki by Murad II, which began in 1423 and lasted for seven 
years, could not be aided from the sea, for the Venetians closed the strait and hindered 
the Ottoman navy to  depart  from the  straits.91 As a  result,  despite  the fact  that  the 
shipyard constructed in Gallipoli in 1390 laid the foundations of the Ottoman navy, the 
Ottoman  navy  could  not  be  effective  except  1390-1402  and  1414-1416.  In  fact,  it 
became effective not as an alternative naval power against Genoese and Venetians but 
rather by sudden attacks and corsair activities. Until the reign of Mehmed II, it did not 
have a range beyond the Northern Aegean. 
That's why, maybe, Katip Çelebi began his account on the Ottoman sea wars by 
the reign of the Conqueror. In his own words:
Be it known that before the time of the late illustrious and victorious 
Sultan Mehmet II, the Ottomans had not ventured to undertake naval 
expeditions, or to engage with European nations. It is indeed related 
that in the time of Sultan Murat the Second, they occasionally made 
excursions  to  the  neighboring  shores  and  islands;  but  these 
expeditions  are  not  worth  enumerating.  After  the  taking  of 
Constantinople, when they spread their conquests over land and sea, 
it became necessary to build ships and make armaments, in order to 
subdue the  fortresses  and castles  on  the  Rumelian  and Anatolian 
shores, and in the islands of the Mediterranean.92
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Even  though  Katip  Çelebi  was  inattentive  to  the  Ottoman  navy  established 
before Mehmed II's reign, he seems quite apposite about the level of its effectiveness. 
During  the siege  of  Constantinople,  there  are  numbers  of  stories  about  the navy of 
Mehmed the Conqueror.  The story of the  hauling of the vessels over the land  to the 
Golden Horn is central to all conquest narratives. However, this  haul cannot produce 
evidence  about  the  strength  of  the  Ottoman  navy.  With  regard  to  the  evaluations 
pertaining to the strength of the navy, the battle between the Ottoman vessels and the 
Genoese galleons that came to the city to help the Byzantines can provide more insights 
about the Ottoman sea power in the middle of the fifteenth century. Among these four 
galleons, one that owned by the Emperor was carrying food, wine and war equipments 
whereas each of the remaining ships which were owned by the Genoese, were carrying 
400 soldiers. When these galleons, which found no resistance along their trip through 
Gallipoli93, reached Constantinople, they became motionless, for the wind had stopped. 
Although each galleon was besieged by several Ottoman vessels, these  Ottoman vessels 
were not able to board the large Genoese galleons had high broadsides. During this 
battle that happened in the vicinity of Yenikapı, the Ottoman navy lost thousands of 
men, and the Genoese galleons entered by the evening the Golden Horn without having 
lost any of their manpower. Upon this event, the captain of the Ottoman navy, Baltaoğlu 
Süleyman  Bey,  who  had  been  assigned  to  stop  the  potential  assistance  to  the 
Byzantines, was dismissed.94 
Even though the idea of haulage of ships over land was a brilliant idea,  this 
could not produce a substantial outcome for the siege.  The only remarkable outcome 
was to weaken the Byzantine defense in land walls by leading some of those soldiers to 
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go the ramparts in seaside. These vessels were not for attacking; instead they were used 
as a bridge as being tied together. Cannons and militias were loaded this vessels and 
these vessels used as mobile bastions.95
After  the  conquest  of  the  city,  the  functions  of  the  navy  expanded.  Two 
important requirements were to manage the sea trade for provisioning the population, 
and to protect the sea routes. From the conquest of Constantinople onwards, the navy 
aided by the land(ed) troops, captured several castles and islands in the coasts of Black 
Sea and Aegean Sea, all of which were important to keep the sea routes to Istanbul 
secure. Although the Ottomans embarked on open sea in Black Sea and Aegean, it is of 
great difficulty to speak of a great Ottoman sea power vis-a-vis the Genoese and the 
Venetians.  Nevertheless,  the Ottoman navy was developing in  both quantitative and 
qualitative terms. Yet, keeping sea routes under security became true not through short-
term open sea warfare; but rather through long-term warfare for obtaining the islands 
and the bases on the sea routes. This warfare began right after the conquest of Istanbul, 
and the Ottoman navy first captured Tenedos(Bozcaada) in the Aegean Sea by 1456. In 
his Künhü'l-Ahbar, Mustafa Âli of Gelibolu says that Tenedos and Samos were the first 
islands the Ottomans decided to conquer, since these two islands were hosts for the 
corsairs  who  were  attacking  and  destroying  the  ships  of  pilgrims  and  merchants.96 
Another piece of evidence for the conquest of Tenedos and its significance for keeping 
sea routes under security comes from Piri Reis in his  Kitab-ı Bahriye.  When talking 
about the history of the island, Piri Reis says: " ...Frequently too, pirate ships would 
come and conceal themselves in the sheltered places of Tenedos and when ships passing 
that  way  in  commerce  arrived  they  would  attack  them,  seizing  their  goods  and 
commodities;...” With regard to seizure of the island during the reign of Mehmed the 
Conqueror and the construction of a castle there, Piri adds: 
....When the late sultan Mehmet the conqueror ascended the throne and 
began  busying  himself  with  the  affairs  of  state,  he  considered  it 
reasonable and appropriate for a fortress to be constructed on Bozcaada 
95 Feridun Emecen, İstanbul'un fethi olayı ve meseleleri, (İstanbul: Kitabevi 2003) p 38-43
96 Gelibolulu Mustafa Âli, Künh'ul-Ahbar: c.II, Fatih Sultan Mehmet devri (Ankara: TTK 2003) p173
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so  that  those  engaged  in  maritime  commerce  might  enjoy  safety  and 
security when in passage here. For that reason, he issued orders and had a 
fortress built on the island. In this way he prevented foreign ships from 
entering the harbor...97
After  the  conquest  of  Imbros(Gökçeada),  Samothrace(Semadirek), 
Thasos(Taşoz) and  Samos(Sisam)  in  1455-6,  the  Ottomans  began  to  dominate  the 
northern Aegean. It was equally important to keep safe the sea routes in the Black Sea. 
In this regard, along with capturing the islands near Gallipoli, the same strategy was put 
in order for the Black Sea, thus the coastal regions, which could become a threat for the 
safety of the sea routes, were occupied. For this reason, first Sinop was invaded in 1458. 
Then, a year later, another campaign set forth towards Amasra. About this campaign 
Aşıkpaşazade  reads:  "All  those  captives  running  away from all  over  Anatolia  were 
seeking refuge in the castle of Amasra. In addition to this, these infidels of Amasra were 
often  involved  in  piracy.  When  they  were  questioned,  they  said  'they  were  foreign 
ships.'"98 In  those  campaigns  towards  Amasra,  Sinop,  Kastamonu  and  Trabzon, 
Mehmed II took part as the commander of the land troops. These campaigns, which 
happened as a cooperation of the land troops and the navy, brought victory owing to the 
siege from both sea and land. Following these conquests, Sultan Mehmed II attempted 
to construct a greater ship, though this first attempt was a failure.99 
After two campaigns in 1458 and 1460 to the Morea, Mehmed the Conqueror 
annexed this  region,  and  thereby came face  to  face  with  the  Venetians.100 In  1462, 
Mytilene was taken by the Ottomans. Opposed to the Venetian sea empire, which had 
been strengthened by the end of the Byzantium through the Venetians' seizure of islands 
in  the  southern  and  western  Aegean,  the  Ottoman  navy became  a  threat  by  taking 
possession of various islands of strategic importance. The same Ottoman threat was also 
true for the Genoese in the Black Sea.
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The long Ottoman-Venetian war of 1462 and 1479 is a turning point with regard 
to the wars of supremacy in Mediterranean. During this combat, the Ottoman galleys 
could  not  triumph  in  any battle  against  the  Venetian  galleys,  though the  Ottomans 
seized  several  important  locations  thanks  to  the  amphibian  campaigns  that  the  land 
troops accompanied.101 One of the most important bases was Euboea. By the conquest of 
Euboea in 1470, the Venetian ships lost one of the largest harbors in the Aegean Sea. 
Moreover,  the  Ottomans  acquired  a  stepping  stone  for  their  further  attacks  towards 
minor neighboring colonies. In addition to these, the Venetian merchants that had been 
operating between mainland Greece and the Dardanelles, were forced to go to Modon 
and  Coron  at  the  end  of  south-western  Peloponnesia  in  order  to  manage  their 
business.102 According to the peace settlement between the Ottomans and the Venetians, 
the  latter  renounced  their  claims  of  lost  territory  and  recognized  the  Ottoman 
sovereignty over these lands, whereas the Ottomans took possession of major harbors 
facing islands and Adriatic like Vlöre. Vlöre, locating counter to Otranto in the mouth 
of Adriatic, was an important harbor whose seizure by the Ottomans paved the way to 
the Ottoman presence in Adriatic. Yet, the Venetians were still holding pivotal places in 
the coasts of Peloponnesia and Albania.
The number of galleys in the Ottoman navy by the 1470s is said to have been 
more than ninety103. In 1475, an Ottoman fleet led by Gedik Ahmed Pasha captured the 
Genoese colonies of Kefe and Azak. By 1480, Mehmed II had such an important sea 
power that he could send Mesih Pasha to Rhodes, and Gedik Ahmed Pasha to Otranto 
together with their own fleet.  
II. 2 : The Simultaneous Rise of Ottoman Corsairs and the Seapower
At the beginning of the reign of Bayezid II, the Ottomans had crucial ports and 
islands  in  the  Aegean  and  the  Adriatic.  Even  if  Ottoman  naval  power  debatable 
qualitatively,  Imperial  navy had a  great  power  quantitatively and its  efficiency rose 
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gradually in region. Conquest of these islands provided important bases for not only 
Ottoman Imperial navy but also Ottoman corsairs. Ottoman corsairs started to plunder 
the Adriatic coasts  of Italy.  Grottomare(1479),  Montemarciano,  Marzocca,  Mondolfo 
(1485) and Sinigallia (1488) came under attack.104 Raids of Ottoman corsairs increased 
around Euboea(Eğriboz), Chios(Sakız),  Anatolian coasts around Milet and Seferihisar 
in Aegean sea. Guerre de course105 was seen throughout the entire reign of Bayezid II; 
however it was limited because of the captivity of Cem Sultan by Rhodes at the hands 
of St John Knights and then in Europe. After death of Cem Sultan in 1495, raids became 
intensified in Aegean.106 
Bayezid II led a new naval policy. Beginning from 1492, he followed a new 
strategy to improve Ottoman naval power. The Venetian balio prepared a report about 
these activities and sent it to the Venice to warn against the rising danger.107 Bayezid II 
increased the number of ships in the navy; the construction of new type of ships was 
undertaken; and as the most important innovation of this era, he created a model to 
make up for the insufficient numbers of skilled seamen by the employment of corsairs. 
In 1495, Kemal Reis, an experienced corsair, was engaged by the Imperial navy. After 
this time, pardoned corsairs were enlisted among the regulars of the Imperial Navy.108 In 
1470 Kemal Reis had participated in the Euboea expedition as a corsair in collaboration 
with the navy; then returned to his predatory attacks with his own ship109 Kemal Reis 
had  also  received  some  other  missions  from  the  Ottoman  government  before  his 
assignment  to  the  Imperial  Navy.  In  1487,  Bayezid  II  sent  him  to  the  western 
Mediterranean in  reply to  help  request  of  Muslims  who lived  in  Granada.  Bayezid 
provided ships and equipment to Kemal Reis and  shipped off him as a reconnaissance 
party  to  collect  information  about  the  region.  Kemal  Reis  and  his  crew made  first 
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contact with Hispano-muslims of Granada. In this period, Kemal Reis and other corsairs 
made successful attacks on the Spanish coasts and ships. They used North African ports 
for these raids. These ports provided some possibilities to them to maintain their ships. 
They could spend winter there with their ships and they could sell their loot in North 
African markets easily. After familiarization with the region, these facilities attracted 
Ottoman corsairs to this region and these region the became principal base for Ottoman 
corsairs in the first decades of 16th century.110 Following years of this mission, in 1495 
Kemal Reis was “officially” put into Ottoman naval service. That was the milestone of 
Ottoman naval history. Role of Ottoman corsairs in Navy rose gradually during the 16th 
century.
Who were these Ottoman corsairs? Nicola Vatin has taken an inventory of some 
prominent corsairs emerged at the end of 15th century and the beginning of 16th century 
in Aegean sea.111 One of the most important corsairs, Kemal Reis was from Karaburun, 
located in İzmir province and he sailed with his nephew, another famous-to-be seaman, 
Piri Reis. The Barbarossas,  Aruj ve Hızır brothers were natives of Mytilene, ancient 
Lesbos, a Greek island in the Aegean. Kara Hasan and Kara Durmuş brothers, took part 
in  the  battle  of  Zonchio  in  1501  between  Ottomans  and  Venetians,  were  from 
Seferihisar,  another  town around  Izmir.  Muslihiddin  Kurdoğlu  used  Seferihisar  and 
Milet,  coastal  towns in  Aydın province,  as  a  base for  his  corsair  activities  with his 
cousin and nephew.  Sinan the Jew was a convert from Izmir and Turgut Reis was born 
in a town of Muğla. Even if it seems that the origins of a major part of these corsairs 
were “Turkish” and “Muslim,” Tenenti and Fontenay emphasizes that the roots of the 
rising  corsairs  in  this  period  were  Greeks,  Dalmatians  and  Albanians.112 As  Hess 
mentions, the major part of the coastal Aegean population in the second half of the 15th 
century  consisted  of  Christians  who  had  the  technical  knowledge  of  navigation.113 
Therefore, the ethnic origins of the Ottoman corsairs in the beginning of the 16th century 
is  not  a  promising  debate.  This  seafarer  community should  be  defined  as  Ottoman 
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corsairs based on the legacy of the Christians with a naval history who had lived in the 
coastal Anatolia for centuries, thus ethnic-confessional markers like Christian, Muslim-
Turk, convert Greek, are redundant. 
 As  we  have  seen  in  several  examples  above,  there  was  a  kinship  between 
corsairs. This kinship between Aegean corsairs, like brotherhood or uncle-nephew, gives 
us some clues about this “profession”. Even if we cannot reach a clear judgment, we 
assume that piracy was a family business. Members of a family sailed with a small boat 
for piracy and they strengthened with their skills and their chance. After a while, they 
became powerful seamen. After this time, they have several paths; being a captain in 
Ottoman Imperial Navy,  privateering or illegal piracy. Mustafa Âli of Gelibolu gives us 
the thorough information about roots and career stages of corsairs. As he wrote; 
Adventurers at sea, the sailors from Tripoli in Libya, Tunis, and Algerias 
who are fond of plunder, are mostly Turks from the Kaz Mountain region. 
After laboring to learn to art of shooting arrows, they become skilled at it 
and rather well known. First they gather five or ten men together. They 
attack a little boat owned by haraç-paying infidel, board it, and take it to 
the  islands.  With  that  one  boat,  they  launch  their  important  career  in 
plundering, severing family lineages, capturing men, filling out their stores 
of  articles  of  war.  They  tie  up  the  non-muslim  sailor  subjects  of  the 
Ottoman state and put them to working the oars. At first, they think they 
have  but  acquired  galley  slaves,  then  they   attack  whatever  vessels 
transporting day laborers that strike their fancy, they set off on the pursuit 
of wealth.114
As Mustafa Âli mentions, in the first period of their sea life, corsairs sailed with 
a small boat captured in an attack or a ship granted by a patron. Aruj Reis constructed 
his first ship with his own money in Antalya. However, this ship was captured by the 
Rhodes  Knights.  Then he requested support  from Sultan  Korkut  and Sultan Korkut 
provided  a  new ship  to  him.  During  this  process,  Piyale  bey,  treasurer  of  Korkut, 
114 Gelibolu'lu Mustafa Âli , The Ottoman gentleman of the sixteenth century : Mustafa Âli's Mev'aidu'n-
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ordered another new ship for himself. He assigned a captain named Yahya Reis to his 
ship and sent him with Aruj Reis to plunder.115 Adventure of Aruj started with these two 
ships,  then  new corsairs  joined  this  group  and  number  of  ships  increased  with  the 
addition of captured boats to this fleet. 
This case shows us different ways of sailing process for corsairs. Patronage was 
one of the essential ways for pirates and corsairs.  For instance, in 1496, Bayezid II 
launched an operation against pirates. In this operation, four rich Turks were convicted 
because of patronage to the pirates. Besides, Venetians claimed that the  Sanjakbey of 
Euboea supported pirates.116 Kara Durmuş continued his  predatory attacks under the 
patronage of Celal Bey, sanjakbey of Manisa.117 In this era, the most prominent patron 
of corsairs was Sultan Korkut, son of Bayezid II. Korkut supported not only Aruj Reis 
but also several corsairs and involved closely to the sea. Korkut has a small corsair fleet 
thanks to his patronage. Apart from the ships of corsairs, he had his own ships; in 1509, 
he journeyed to Egypt with his own five ships.118 Ottomans could counteract Rhodes 
Knight's raids flexibly with this local fleet. Selim I, son of Bayezid II, gained the fight 
for the throne against Bayezid in 1512. Following this incident, lots of Ottoman corsairs 
under the patronage of Korkut sailed to North Africa for fear of Selim I. This new base 
had already been used by Kemal Reis and corsairs around him.119 This migration was the 
turning point for the Ottoman corsairs based west coast of Anatolia.
Apart  from patronage system, corsairs could obtain their  own sizable galleys 
when they acquired sufficient wealth. Mustafa Âli explains that how corsairs laid hands 
on their galleys;
Sometimes, on the coast of the Morea and Levkas (Ayamavra) with the 
collusion of one of the sea captains there, they build the kind of boat they 
want. Or they find one already built and buy it. But sometimes they don't 
trust those captains, and when the captains give safe quarter they do not 
believe the agreement is truthful, so they  up anchor and head for Samos 
115 Seyyid Muradi, Gazavat-ı Hayrettin Paşa (Tercüman Yayınları 1970) p 73-77
116 Vatin, Rodos şövalyeleri  p 81
117 Palmira Brummet, Ottoman Seapower and Levantine Diplomacy in the Age of Discovery, (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 1994) p 94
118 Vatin, Rodos Şövalyeleri, p 296
119 Brummet, Ottoman Seapower, p 105
36
island.  Or  they  conceal  themselves  on  some  similarly  wooded  island. 
Incorporating within it a thousand fears and precautions, they construct a 
ship.120
Similar  informations  in  the  Gazavatname about  the  emergence  process  of 
corsairs/pirates in justifies Mustafa Âli's explication. Hızır Reis decided to buy a ship 
following the ascend of Selim for migration to Djerba (Cerbe) and to join Aruj as a 
corsair.  Then he bought a ship in Santa Maura (Aya Mavra).121 Three years later, he 
returned to Mytilene and spent that winter there. He was a richer corsair compared to 
what he had been three years ago, and he could order there new ships to a shipwright 
who had constructed Hızır's old ship in Santa Maura.122
To sum up with a citation from Gelibolu'lu Âli; “They all came from one of the 
villages or towns on the Anatolian straits and rose up the ladder first through banditry, 
secondly  through  piracy,  and  thirdly  through  ownership  outright  of  a  galiot,  and 
supremacy over others in what is known as being a reis.”123
If we would return to our main theme, naval strategies of Beyazıt II and rising 
Ottoman seapower, we should stress that the Ottomans continued to advance their naval 
technology and to increase the total number of ships the navy might use. It seems that 
technical skills were acquired through outsourcing to Venetian shipwrights. When the 
Ottoman government decided to attempt the construction of  two124 new type of ships 
never  experienced  before  called  göke,  they  assigned  this  mission  to  a  Venetian 
shipwright named Gianni. Kemal Reis and Burak Reis became masters of these ships 
and the 1499-1502 Venice – Ottoman war was an important test for the Ottoman naval 
power.  The mission  of  the Imperial  Navy was to  stop aid by the  Venetian navy to 
Lepanto fortress besieged from land by the Ottoman troops. In other side, Venetians 
aimed to prevent this amphibian siege by intercepting with the Ottoman Imperial navy 
before the harbor.  In Zonchio island  (Burak Reis  adası) region around Lepanto,  the 
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Ottoman navy  defeated Venetians thanks to its defensive strategy. At the end of this 
battle, the Ottoman navy reached Lepanto and landed cannons at the entrance to the 
harbor. In this way, communication between the fortress and the Venetian Navy was cut, 
that is to say, the mission was accomplished. The defeat of the Venetian navy can be 
explained by its complicated command structure, financial problems and difficulties of 
co-ordinating sailing and oared ships in offensive actions.125 Furthermore, the Ottomans' 
formidable firepower could be consequential upon the result of the war. The usage of 
superior  siege-craft  enabled  the  conquest  of  major  fortresses  located  on  the  Greek 
coastline, in a short time.126 
As  a  result,  the  Ottomans  won  a  victory  over  their  main  enemy  in  the 
Mediterranean and captured Lepanto, Modon and Coron at the beginning of the 16th 
century. The recruitment of corsairs as naval commanders was one of the crucial factors 
of  this  victory.  This  practice  quickly advanced the  technical  competence  of  the  the 
navy.127 In this process, supported corsairs gained power. After the war, one part of this 
group remained engaged in the Navy or returned to sea as privateer. Another part of 
these corsairs used their power against Ottoman ships and coasts as pirates.128 During 
the important sea wars like 1499-1502 Ottoman-Venetian wars, 1515-1517 conquest of 
Egypt and 1521 conquest of Rhodes, corsairs supported by government and they were 
unleashed categorically. However, later on, Ottoman central authority was confronted 
with control of these supported corsairs.
Among these pirates, the most powerful one was Kara Durmuş. Following the 
engagement of his brother, Kara Hasan, into the Imperial Navy as an officer in 1498, 
Kara Durmuş joined the Navy with the starting of Venetian-Ottoman war. In 1499, his 
brother Kara Hasan died in the Zonchio naval battle and Kara Durmuş left battlefield 
with his own ship. He returned to Seferihisar, his previous base, and constructed new 
ships.  He gathered hundreds of  levends among coastline people and started piratical 
125 Jan Glete, Warfare at Sea , p 94
126 John F. Guilmartin, Ideology and Conflict: The Wars of the Ottoman Empire, 1453-1606, Journal of 
Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 18, No. 4, The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars (Spring, 1988) p 
739
127 Hess, The Evolution of the Ottoman Seaborne, p 1905
128 Vatin, Rodos Şövalyeleri, p 282
38
raids. He assaulted Anatolian coasts and Ottoman ships. Whereupon, Bayezid II sent 
Kemal Reis with 10 galleys and 500 janissaries against Kara Durmuş in 1504. They 
attacked the home of Kara Durmuş in Seferihisar, seized his ships and armaments. Even 
if Kara Durmuş could save his skin on this occasion, the Sanjakbey of Aydın captured 
and sent him to Istanbul.129 Kara Durmuş was surely not a unique example. Besides, 
Hoca Saadettin Efendi writes that just two years after this operation, pirates (harami 
levends)  were  seen  again  in  the  Ottoman  seas.130 Ottoman  pirates  always  attacked 
Ottoman ships, Aegean islands or Anatolian coasts. In some cases, these pirates were 
forgiven by central authority and coopted. Otherwise, like in this case, “old” corsairs 
previously recruited were set upon these bandits.
Destruction  of  piracy/privateering  throughout  the  Ottoman  waters  was 
impossible.  Those  pirates/corsairs  could  provide  their  needs  from local  populations. 
Relations between local people and pirates were based not only on voluntariness but 
also on coercion. For instance, Piri Reis wrote about the peninsula of Athos Mountain 
situated in Northern Greece: ”Monks never give information to Turkish pirates about 
infidel ones or to infidel pirates about Turkish ships, nor do ever hesitate to provender 
either.”131 Furthermore, there were thousands of convenient bases in countless islands 
and coastline  for  this  seamen.  Disposal  of  piratical  activities  for  ever  could  not  be 
possible in this geography considering the naval technology of the 16th  century, even if 
a state had a permanent navy to secure its seaways,.
Struggle against piracy was the common problem of Venetians, Ottomans and 
the Rhodians Knights having permanent navies.  These states tried to prevent hostile 
piracy  with  treaties;  however,  they  could  not  succeed.  In  this  struggle,  pirates  had 
always found a niche thanks to geographical advantage and local support/extortion.
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II.3: Ottoman Corsairs: Holy Warriors of Islam?
The description of corsairs in historical context is a controversial topic among 
historians. Conceptualization of corsair activities had different approaches by several 
historians. Andrew Hess and İdris Bostan suggest that the corsairs were equivalent to 
the fifteenth century Balkan ghazis, and that they were stimulated by religious duty and 
the military traditions of Holy War.  According to Hess, the incorporation of Muslim 
corsairs to the Ottoman navy which was an important factor in the rise of its technical 
competence, took its roots from the Jihadist literature.132 During the reign of Bayezid II, 
the Holy War against the infidel was carried from land to sea. In Hess’s terms, “The 
Ottoman Empire expanded along the shores of the Mediterranean, as Muslim warriors 
on the sea frontiers responded to the call of the Holy War in increasing numbers”.133 
Bostan has similar thinks alike. In Bostan's view, the corsairs acted in accordance with 
the Islamic law.  The legal status of the corsairs was sea  ghazi  and the corsairs were 
engaged in a war of faith between dar’ül islam and dar’ül harb.  For Bostan, the fact 
that  they handed to the Sultan one fifth of the booty and of the war prisoners they 
captured, validates the argument that the corsairs acted in the spirit of gaza and that they 
served the religion of Islam.134  
In The Forgotten Frontier,  A History of  the Sixteenth  Century Ibero-African 
Frontier, Hess focuses on the frontier that divided the 16th century Mediterranean world. 
According  to  him,  the  rivalry  and  interaction  on  the  frontier  between  two  distinct 
civilizations, namely Latin Christian and Turco-Muslim, shaped Mediterranean history. 
The former was characterized by radicalism whereas the later by conservatism.  In the 
16th century,  with  the  rise  of  the  state  power  and  increasingly  defensive  attitudes 
adopted by empires, the old zone of mixed cultures was replaced by a thin line between 
well-organized  societies.135 Under  differing  social  and  cultural  forces,  Iberian  and 
Ottoman civilizations  followed distinctly different  paths,  and particularly after  1580, 
132 Hess, Evolution of the Ottoman Seaborne, p 1905-1906
133 Op.cit. p1906
134 Idris Bostan, Adriyatik’te Korsanlık, p 19-21
135 Hess, Forgotten Frontier, p 207
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both of them contributed to the formalization of a border structure which reduced the 
level of exchange and conflict.136
Another military historian, John F. Guilmartin suggests that the ideology of this 
era  was  principally  based  on religion.  He argues  that  wars  of  the  Ottoman  Empire 
against  Christendom between  mid-fifteenth  and  early  seventeenth  centuries  derived 
from pre-Islamic Arab and Turco-Mongol traditions, and relied on the rhetoric of Holy 
War.  Guilmartin  insists that  religion was a causal  factor in the Ottoman wars, even 
though its influence should be examined within the overall social fabric and operational 
context.  According to Islam, only Jihad, war against the infidels aiming to expand the 
Muslim territory, was recognized as lawful. Based on the Koran and elaborated in the 
sharia, this concept of Holy War created a permanent state of war between dar’ül islam 
(land of Islam) and dar’ül harb (land of infidels).  In the Ottoman case, two kinds of 
war were waged in this framework: Imperial campaigns and  gaza warfare, perpetual 
war of raid and counter-raid on the borders.  The main purpose of Ottoman wars against 
Christian states was to expand and defend the  dar’ül islam.  In this  respect, a major 
difference occurs between Ottoman state and Christendom: “The concept of perpetual 
war to defend the faith and expand its boundaries was inherently compatible with the 
Ottoman world view, it was not, however, consonant with the outlook of their Christian 
enemies.”137 
Kafadar presents an alternative approach to views on  gazis. In  Between Two 
Worlds,  he challenges the ‘gazi thesis’ of Köprülü and Wittek, arguing that the raiders 
were not guided by religious animosity, even though in the religion-based worldview of 
the time they were ready to see and present themselves as fighting for a religious cause. 
They were, before all, a socially unstable element fighting for its lofty and untarnished 
ideals, finding itself a legitimation, and a chance for mobility through military activity 
in the frontier regions sanctioned meaningful within the framework of a higher cause.138 
Material returns of  gaza warfare was an essential point. ‘Gaza’ was a way of gaining 
136 Op.cit p 211
137 John F. Guilmartin, Ideology and conflict, p 727
138 Cemal Kafadar, Between Two Worlds: Th e Construction of the Ottoman State (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1995) p 56
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one’s livelihood, and the pursuit of wealth and glory was a principal motivation for the 
raiders.139
Kafadar underlines the role of shifting boundaries, loyalties, and identities on the 
frontiers.  At any given moment, some of the populace on either side of the frontier 
warriors  and  others,  would  have  been  recent  arrivals  –converts,  slaves,  or  recently 
subjugated people- who were steeped in the cultural traditions of the other side but were 
now in a position to contribute, voluntarily or forcibly, to this one. 140 There was always 
the possibility that individuals from the other side would join you and fight for the same 
cause.  Cooperation  with  or  toleration  of  ‘infidels’  and  symbiosis  were  common 
phenomenon.  The  ethnic  mixture  was  an  important  element  contributing  to  this 
environment  of  intermingling.  In  brief,  there  were  complex  relations  between  the 
peoples of the frontier, which cannot be reduced simply to a war of religion.141
In opposition to Hess, Brummet has similar arguments with Kafadar. She argues 
that the ways in which territory, peoples, identity, exchange, sovereignty, and borders 
were  imagined  in  the  early  modern  era  were  radically  different  from  the  modern 
counterparts of these notions.  In the discussion of space in the early modern era, neither 
the  ‘state’  nor  large  isolated  socio-spatial  groupings  around  a  common  history  and 
culture should be taken as departing points, because they do not coincide with early 
modern representations.142 Projecting of national boundaries and identities back upon 
the 16th century historical space is an anachronistic attitude. In this respect, it would be 
inappropriate  to  speak of  a  definitive  border  between Europe  and Ottoman  Empire, 
since  this  border  was  broad,  porous  and  impermanent.   Similarly,  a  relatively 
homogeneous citizenry or identity did not exist in the 16th century.  Islam was not the 
definitive cultural element that has shaped the Ottoman world, and separated it from 
“Europe”.143 Instead, identities crossed state lines in many ways and mixing of cultures, 
porous borders, and the circulation of ideas and goods characterized the early modern 
139 Op.cit. P 86
140 Op.cit p 81
141 Op.cit 82-83
142 Palmira Brummet,”Imagining the Early Modern Ottoman Space from Piri Reis to World History,” in 
Virginia Aksan and Daniel Goffman, eds. The Early Modern Ottomans: Remapping the Empire, 
Cambridge U. Press, p 56
143 Palmira Brumett, The Ottomans as a World Power, p 8
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Mediterranean world.144 Besides, border formation in the early modern era concerned 
mainly the division of the territory into administrative units and it did not mark the 
Ottomans off from “Europe”.145                  
In this context, historians are confronted with a problem of drawing lines; with a 
question of multiple allegiances: “The men who traveled the sea, merchants and corsairs 
did not confine themselves to one state, one nation, or even one religion.” It was not a 
question of identity. They acted over multiple allegiances and did not hesitate to violate 
them whenever they saw necessary.146 As a matter of fact, pirate and corsair crews were 
cosmopolitan.  Captains of all ethnic groups roved the seas in the service of anyone who 
would  pay  or  license  them.  Examples  are  numerous:  Genoese,  Pisan,  Frank,  and 
Muslim corsairs were in the service of Byzantium in the 13th century; Greeks serving 
gazi emirs in Aydın in the 14th century,  renegade Christians in the ranks of Barbary 
corsairs in the 16th century.147 Besides, Pryor suggests that even though the interreligious 
character of the guerre de course was emphasized, at certain times and at certain zones 
the intra-religious framework has dominated while religion provided only a very limited 
degree of protection.   Christian pirates and corsairs  did not hesitate to plunder their 
Christian  competitors’  ships,  as  well  as  those  of  Muslims.   There  is  evidence  that 
Muslim corsairs also attacked Muslim ships.148
Several  kinds  of  motivations  stimulated  the  corsairs,  and  religious  duty  was 
obviously not the most significant among them. Therefore, the rhetorical use of Jihad 
for the purpose of legitimization should not be taken for granted.149 If guerre de course 
has often appeared as an interreligious struggle between Christians and Muslims, it is 
because capturing slaves was one of the main objectives of corsair activities, and selling 
co-religionist  slaves  was  difficult  and  rare  in  practice.   This  shows  that  the  main 
motivation was not religious, and that the corsairs acted out of practical concerns.150  
144 Brummet, “Imagining the early modern Ottoman” pp 56-57
145 Brumett, op.cit , pp.23-24
146 Brumett, Ottomans as a world power, p 8
147 Pryor, Geography,Technology and War, pp 153-154
148 Ibid., p. 155.
149 Brummet, The Ottomans as a world power, p 9
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Especially,  interborder  seafarer  community  has  a  mixed  structure  regarding 
seafarer's origins. Casale emphasizes the ‘Mediterranean origin’ of the seafarers of both 
Ottoman and Portuguese fleets during the sixteenth century confrontation in the Indian 
Ocean.  The  Ottomans’  self-confident  cosmopolitanism was  manifested  through  the 
composition  of  the  manpower  of  the  Ottomans’  Indian  Ocean fleet.   The  group of 
‘Turkish-speaking Muslims from Anatolia’ formed only a small minority of the whole. 
The same was true  for  the Portuguese fleet.   Yet,  commanders  and highest-ranking 
officers  were  always  recruited  among  the  Portuguese  nobles  whereas  no  such  rule 
applied in the Ottoman case.  He argues therefore, this struggle cannot be described as a 
struggle between “indigenous Muslims” and “European intruders”.151  
Concerning  frontiersmen  like  frontier  raiders  or  corsairs,  there  were  not 
reducible to a certain identity,  obviously.  Those groups could be integrated easily to 
different  types  of  structures.  Bracewell  mentions  that  several  Christian  groups  in 
Ottoman military service were put in charge of a variety of tasks from internal security 
to guarding of the frontier garrisons. Beginning from the first conquests in the Balkans, 
Ottomans integrated raider gangs of frontier region to their military systems. Martoloses 
were the  prominent  group among those  groups.  Their  mission  was harassing the  in 
enemy defenses and providing proper conditions for new conquests.  Martoloses were 
consisted  irregular  Christians  and  migrant  Ulah populations.  This  mission  provided 
them with an opportunity to gain wealth.  Organizations and operation technics were 
similar  with  the  raider  gangs  of  other  side  of  frontier  so  they  were  called  Turkish 
Uskoks.152
151 Casale, Giancarlo. "The Ethnic Composition of Ottoman Ship Crews and the 'Rumi Challenge' to 
Portuguese Identity." Medieval Encounters 13 (2007
152 Catherine Wendy Bracewell,  16.yy'da Adriyatikte korsanlık ve eşkiyalık,( İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi 
yayınları, 2009) pp 48-54 Uskoks used as a term to define armed refugee gangs emerged in Christian 
part  of  frontier  between  Ottoman  and  Habsburg  in  Croatia.  Following  period  of  conquest  of 
Herzegovina by Ottomans in 1480, refugees that had migrated to Dubrovnik and Venice started to 
attack Ottoman lands with the aim of booty. Their main motivations were booty and avenging. They 
attended  the  regular   Venetian  army  during  the  Ottoman-Venetian  wars.  Refugees'  raids  were 
institutionalized  under  the  Hungary-Croatia  kingdom  and  Habsburg  monarchy.  Commanders  of 
frontiers and land-owners used this military potential and they tried to creat an institutional defense 
organization against Ottomans. 
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After the battle of Mohacs (1526), the frontier of Bosnia became relatively stable 
and  the  Ottoman  government  decided  to  reduce  the  privileges  of  frontier  raiders 
composed  of  Christians  and  converts  who  lived  in  the  frontier  region.  They  were 
obliged to pay the same tax with peasants. They lost their social status and incomes. In 
response,  they migrated to the Habsburg lands.  They transferred their  traditions and 
expectations, and they involved in the Habsburg military system in the same way. They 
started to fight against Ottomans in this time for the same purposes. Institutional frontier 
organizations of Ottomans and Habsburgs came to resemble each other under the effect 
of these mutual refugee's raids.153  
Needless to say, those raiders and converts were not just Christians. Bracewell 
gives us some examples of Muslims who joined the Uskoks. Rising taxes and other 
economic pressures drove some Muslim peasants to the other side of the frontier. Even 
if  conversion  came  to  be  religious  terminology,  in  Bracewell's  view,  escape  from 
Ottoman lands and participation in the Uskok resistance based on principally material 
causes.  “In 1599, a Muslim prisoner, captured in a raid, converted to Christianity and 
became Uskok and –apparently because of tradition rather than beliefs- was baptised 
instantly.”154  Muslim  roots  and  connections  were  not  a  barrier  to  acceptance  or 
promotion among the Uskoks.  For instance,  this  convert  got a quick promotion and 
became the leader of a raiding gang.  
Friedman, like Guilmartin, explains the confrontation between the Ottomans and 
the  Europeans   in  the  16th century  Balkans  and  Mediterranean   in  religious  terms. 
Within this general framework, privateering becomes a religious activity. The situation 
in North Africa aided the Ottomans in their struggle against Spain.  From the late 14th 
century pirates of the coastal regions of North Africa had stepped up their organized 
privateering against Christian vessels and coastlines.  The chief motivation behind this 
privateering was religion.  The Barbary corsairs regarded themselves as soldiers in the 
holy war against Christendom.155  According to Friedman, the defeat of the Moors in 
153 Bracewell, 16. yy'da Adriyatik'te korsanlık, pp 55-59
154 Bracewell, ibid, pp 96-97
155 Ellen G. Friedman, The Exercise of Religion by Spanish captives in North Africa,The Sixteenth 
Century Journal, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Apr., 1975) p19
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Granada  in  1492 consolidated  the  anti-Christian  and  anti-Spanish  feelings  in  North 
Africa.   Many Moors  leaving  Spain  took  refuge  in  the  Barbary  states  and  became 
corsairs.  These exiles reinforced the ranks of the ‘Moslem side’ at the moment when the 
intensity of Spanish-Islamic confrontation heightened in the Mediterranean.  With the 
establishment  of  Turkish  suzerainty  in  the  eastern  Maghreb,  these  alliances  gained 
importance. 
 On the other hand, she emphasizes the wide variety of privileges of captives in 
North Africa. Prisons named bano were constructed in Algiers for captives in the 16th 
century.  In these “comfortable”  prisons, captives had several  facilities.   There were 
taverns managed by Turks and Moors in the open areas of these prisons, and captives 
could purchase  wine and brandy here.  These  taverns  served captives  who were not 
residents of the prisons as well.156 During the second half of the 16th century -first time 
in 1551-, churches were established in many of these prisons.157 Clerics served  in these 
churches as well; “they held daily masses, organized the processions for Holy Week and 
other feast days, and buried the dead.“ In 1579, forty or more clerics served in  bano 
grand. Especially,  religious celebrations reached peak in holy weeks. In general,  the 
Turks and Moors of North Africa showed great respect for the Spanish friars and their 
faith.158 The attitude of the North Africans was based on practical reasons. They wanted 
their  slaves to  remain  in  Christian faith.  The governor  of  Tunisia  would not  accept 
conversion of slaves. In Algeria, conversion of Christians were discouraged.159 This was 
not a general rule for all Christians. Seamen, artisans or some militias were encouraged 
to apostatize. Women whose masters wanted to marry them and young boys as good 
candidates for the janissary corps were another convert group.  However, slaves were 
broadly  seen  as  investments  by their  masters  and  churches  did  not  pay ransom for 
Muslim slaves so masters' aim was possession slaves in their own religion rather than 
diffusion of Islamic  faiths among infidels.
156 Op. cit p 22
157 Op.citp 23
158 Op.cit. p25-30
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To sum up, there were no alternative way to legitimize their raids for corsairs or 
ghazis  except religious war. They had to use this rhetoric as a tool even if they were 
devoutly religious or nonreligious. Besides, this rhetoric presents several occasions to 
the  corsairs.  For  instance,  as  we mentioned  before,  Aruj  obtained  his  first  ship  for 
predatory attacks thanks to this rhetoric from Şehzade Korkut. Piyale Bey, treasurer of 
Korkut,  who  knew  Aruj  Reis,  described  his  relationship  to  Sultan  Korkut  in  the 
following way:   “A fighter of Islam is your humble servant.  The assistance of your 
Majesty,  with a ship is  demanded.”  Korkut who accepts  the demand of Piyale  bey, 
orders to Kadı of Izmir: “Make build a ship to our son Ghazi Aruj Reis, as he wishes for 
him to take revenge in the name of religion. Our fathers rest in peace.”160
As Mustafa Âli notes, corsairs did not acted like ghazis in accordance with the 
Islamic law until they had acquired their own galiot. As pirates, they attacked not only 
“infidels” but also Muslim towns, Ottoman merchants and ships of vassals. However 
after they had gained sufficient power and a suitable boat, they joined to North African 
corsairs as ghazis and they swore to give up surely piratical attacks.161 Mustafa Âli trusts 
their adjure and their sincerity. Clearly, this was a purely pragmatic practice. Being an 
Algerian corsair provides not only social status and relatively security but also material 
facilities  of  corsairs.  In  his  chronic,  Naima  Mustafa  Efendi  mentions  this  material 
contribution  concerning  Algerian  corsairs“…in  the  western  coasts  of  Algeria,  the 
corsairs  are  protected.   Powder,  bullets,  canvas,  and  similar  means  are  given  to 
them...”162 
In conclusion, ghazi ethos was surely used as rhetoric and it was a part of war at 
sea. However, this rhetoric should be assessed together with other variables in the 16th 
century context. Corsairs  fought for one side and apparently for one religion but this 
should be kept in mind that those sides, those identities could change easily depending 
on conjuncture like economic or political developments so this rhetoric need not to be 
accepted verbatim as an absolute truth of that era.
160 Seyyid Muradi, Gazavatame, p 75-79
161 Gelibolu'lu Mustafa Ali, Mevaidün Nefais, p 288
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II.4: Ottomans as “a Seaborne Empire”
The Ottomans continued to benefit from sea power after their early victory over 
Venice at the beginning of the 16th century.   After the battle, in 1502 the navy was 
renewed.  The ships were repaired, new ones were built, and sailors and oars men were 
recruited.   Bayezid  charged  his  sons  and  some  sanjakbeys  with  financing  such 
construction.  Besides a supplementary tax was collected from the merchants. As before 
the  war,  Venetian  craftsmen  were  responsible  of  the  construction  work.163 The 
assistance brought by Kemal Reis to Memluks in 1507 and 1510 was both a measure 
against the Portuguese threat over the trade and a strategy to establish a naval base in 
the Africa.164 However,  the  real  breakthrough in  the empire’s  sea power took place 
during Selim’s reign.  In the aftermath of Çaldıran, Selim was aware of the necessity of 
a navy to provide logistical support in his Egyptian expedition.  According to the report 
of the Venetian balio, on the first of April, a great navy were ready. 165             
In  the  spring  of  1516,  Selim did  not  hesitate  to  recruit  experienced  Muslim 
corsairs  with their  ships.   The most  important  was Kurdoğlu Muslihiddin.166  Selim 
conquered Egypt with the logistic support this navy provided.  The duty of the navy 
during the expedition was limited to transportation and logistics. It did not play any 
offensive  role.  With  this  conquest  the  East  Mediterranean  passed  under  Ottoman 
control.  Ottomans established themselves in the Red Sea, and thus acquired a passage 
to Indian Ocean.  As a result, the Ottoman-Portuguese rivalry began.  Next target for the 
Mediterranean security was Rhodes. 167      
In 1519, Selim ordered for the preparation of the navy for an expedition against 
Rhodes.  Yet, upon his sudden death, his son Süleiman chose to attack Belgrade at first. 
Next year, in 1522, he besieged Rhodes.  The Rhodes expedition took place under the 
guidance of Kurdoğlu Muslihiddin.  The castle of Haraki (Harke) on the east shore of 
the island was taken by Kara Mahmud, an ancient corsair who had entered service in the 
163 Brummet, Ottoman Seapower, p 92-93
164 Palmira Brumett, Kemal Reis and Ottoman Gunpowder Diplomacy, p 1
165 Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, Soutien Logistic et Présence naval Ottoman en Mediterranée en 1517, 
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navy  a  year  ago.   While  some  of  the  heavy  ships  were  left  behind  to  defend  the 
Bosphorus,   with  the  other  ships  the  castle  of  Rhodes  was  besieged.   Soldiers  and 
cannons were disembarked.  After a long siege, the island was conquered.  The Knights 
of Rhodes left the island and were relocated by Charles V to Malta.      
In this way, the last threat in the eastern Mediterranean was destroyed.  Whether 
Rhodes was conceived by the Ottomans as a real threat or a secondary danger is matter 
of debate.  According to Vatin, the Knights of Rhodes together with Venice and the 
Ottoman Empire were one of the three important  actors in the Mediterranean.  Even 
during the siege, despite the Ottomans’ numerical superiority, the Knights dominated at 
sea.  All through the siege, the assisting forces managed to enter the port until the last 
minute.  The conquest of Rhodes following a siege of five months was a great military 
success  after  the  conquest  of  Belgrade  had lasted  just  one  month.168  According  to 
Brummet, Rhodes was an “overrated” enemy. While Ottomans were in a competition 
with Safavides and Memluks in order to control the Eastern Mediterranean and to enter 
the Indian  Ocean,  Rhodes  was struggling  for  survival.  At  the  beginning  of  the 16th 
century, the Ottomans were already dominating the eastern Mediterranean.  Rhodes had 
no means to challenge the Ottoman navy without assistance. 169 No matter how powerful 
Rhodes was,  it  was no more than a corsair  base and a Christian outpost.   Thus,  its 
conquest reduced the risk of Christian corsairs’ attacks on Ottoman ships and shores.     
We have mentioned before that the navy was covering its need for experienced 
mariners through the recruitment of corsairs. Another advantage the corsairs brought to 
the  navy  was  their  knowledge  about  long  distance  areas.  Corsairs’  wide  raiding 
activities provided Ottoman navigation a sound knowledge about the Mediterranean.170 
Corsairs by attacking the regions where it was impossible for the navy to attack, gained 
information about that region. Captured slaves and maps were other channels for the 
circulation of information.  Certainly, the center had many information channels; yet, 
first hand knowledge provided by the corsairs was the healthiest. In the first quarter of 
168 Vatin, p 337 - 345
169 Palmira Brummet, The Overrated Adversary Rhodes, p 520
170 Hess, Ottoman seaborne, p 1905
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the 16th century For an empire  intending  to dominate  the world,  the significance of 
information was indisputable,.         
On 1517, when the Egyptian expedition was completed, a corsair in the service 
of the navy, Piri Reis, had presented Selim I the world map he had prepared in 1513. 
Even though, we have today only the parts displaying Atlantic and American shores, 
this map is the oldest available world map.  How the map was drawn by Piri Reis is a 
question of discussion among the historians.  The entry by Piri Reis is enlightening: 
I have used twenty (regional) maps and world maps. I have used eight 
ca'feriyes,171 an Arab map of the Indian Ocean, as well as maps made by 
four Portuguese who applied mathematical  methods to  represent India 
and China;  I  have also used a  map of the Western regions  drawn by 
Columbus.172
With his uncle Kemal Reis, Piri Reis had plundered Spanish shores and ships for 
a long time. The Columbus map that he used in his own map was found by him in a ship 
they captured in Valencia.173 In addition to this, in his book named Kitab-ı Bahriye, Piri 
Reis states that one of the Spanish slaves of Kemal Reis had participated in the third trip 
of Columbus to America. Piri Reis probably made use of the knowledge of this slave 
too, in making of his map.174 Portuguese maps also passed hand to hand throughout the 
Mediterranean in this era. Apart from these factors, Piri Reis wrote that he had a chance 
to seek a globe created by a priest. That globe was probably a model globe made in 
1492 by Martin Behaim from Nurnberg.175 
The Kitab-ı Bahriye that was presented by Piri Reis to Sultan Suleiman in 1526 
includes  216  maps.  This  book  includes  not  only  technical  naval  information  about 
islands,  coasts  throughout  of  Mediterranean  but  also  socio-economic  situation  of 
171 World maps made by the Arab geographers of the classical Islamic period which were partly inspired 
by Ptolemy
172 Svat Soucek, Piri Reis and Süleyman the Magnificent, in Studies in Ottoman Naval History and 
Maritime Geography, (Istanbul, ISIS Press, 2008)p 33
173 Svat Soucek, Piri Reis, Ottoman Discovery of the Great Discoveries, in Studies in Ottoman Naval 
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regions,  their  floras,  rivers,  borders  and  historical  informations  as  well.  Then  he 
prepared his second  world map in 1528.
Those maps and knowledge was registered by Piri Reis and thus, reached today. 
Even we do not have documentation, we may suppose that Piri Reis was not the only 
example.  Many corsairs must have gathered information by the maps and the slaves 
they have captured.  This supposition is justified by the fact that the maps ordered from 
Venice in later periods, those produced in the Ottoman  nakkaşhane, book of maps of 
Ali Macar Reis dating 1560, and the map of Menemenli Mehmet Reis were all maps 
used by the corsairs.  Even though they were not produced by the corsairs themselves, 
they have become a chain of the corsairs’ circulation of knowledge.  
Another document that has reached today from the period in which Piri Reis 
presented Kitab-ı Bahriye to Suleiman, is a report of a corsair about a different region. 
Giving information about the Red Sea, this report was presented by Selman Reis to 
Grand Vizier İbrahim Pasha on 1525. Selman Reis, against the wishes of Selim I, had 
entered  in  Memluk  service,  commanded  their  army,  and  defended  Jiddah  against 
Portuguese attack on 1517.  He was imprisoned after the conquest of Egypt with the 
crime of disloyalty. He was set free after the death of Selim and returned to Yemen.  He 
came to the attention of İbrahim Pasha with his experience as a corsair.  He was sent to 
the  region  by  İbrahim Pasha  on  1524,  in  order  to  prepare  a  report  on  the  present 
situation in the Indian Ocean and the Portuguese force. 176 
The report present by Selman Reis to İbrahim Pasha in 1525 is crucial.  Before 
all, it was prepared by a mariner knowing the region at first hand.  Besides, this report 
was not limited to the developments in the Indian ocean.  It included information about 
Ottoman ships and arms, as well as information about the geographies around the Red 
Sea.  Advice for the future also took place in this report.177 Another important report 
about  the Indian Ocean,  Red Sea,  and the region belonged to  Sefer Reis,  who was 
preparing corsair attacks under the service of the navy.  The report included information 
176 Casale, The Ottoman Age of Exploration, p 74
177 Salih Özbaran, “A Turkish Report on the Red Sea and the Portugese in the Indian Ocean” in The 
Ottoman Response to European Expansion (Istanbul, ISIS press, 1994) p 100 - 109
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about the region between Ceylon and Hormuz. The political developments in the Indian 
Ocean were also given place.178       
In brief, in the Age of Discoveries, the Ottoman administration was collecting 
information about the regions it can not directly intervene, through the corsairs.  Thus, 
the corsairs were serving the center as explorers and providing information.  
II. 5) Barbary Corsairs the Barbarossas
The long life  story of Hayrettin  Pasha,  one of most important  figures of the 
Ottoman naval history, is an interesting subject not only for the evolution of relationship 
between state and corsairs but also as the biography of a pirate.  His career at sea began 
as  a  little  pirate.  Then he  became ruler  of  Algeria  and his  life  ended as  the Grand 
Admiral of the biggest navy of the Mediterranean.
According to Gazavatname, Barbaros Hayrettin's father was a fortress guard in 
Lesbos Island, named Yakup and his mother was a Greek.  Hayrettin or Hızır, was one 
of  the four  sons  of  the family.   In  the beginning,  these  brothers  have sailed in  the 
Mediterranean for commercial purposes. Hızır Reis started to trade between Euboea and 
Thessaloniki , his older brother Aruj and younger brother Ilyas sailed to Damascus with 
the same purpose. During one of these journeys, the Knights of Rhodes attacked to the 
Aruj's boat, they captured him and murdered his brother, Ilyas. After this incident, Aruj 
ran away from the knights and became a corsair. After a while, Hızır gave up  trade and 
joined  his  older  brother  as  a  corsair.179 However,  this  information  based  on 
Gazavatname is unreliable.  The story of trade, instead of illegitimate piratical activities 
or that of a heroic Aruj Reis escaping from the Rhodes Knights on his own might be 
reconstructed retrospectively.  Though, the first pages of Gazavatname show us that the 
Barbarossas had a deep knowledge and experience about navigation and that they had a 
reputation among other seafarers before their corsair career.
178 Giancarlo Casale, An Ottoman Inteligence report from the mid-sixteenth century Indian Ocean, 
Journal of Turkish Studies, vol:31 issue:1  p 181-186
179 Seyyid Muradi, Gazavatname, p 56-70
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We do not know exactly when the Barbarossas started raiding in the Western 
Mediterranean. This is a controversial subject. Some western sources indicate that the 
Barbarossas' corsair activities in North Africa began in 1504. However, Soucek notes 
that the last journey of Piri Reis to North Africa with his uncle Kemal Reis was in 1510. 
Piri  Reis gives details  about the political  and military structure of the region in  his 
masterpiece,  Kitab-ı  Bahriye.   The  fact  that  he  does  not  mention  Barbarossas  is 
suspicious.  According  to  Soucek,  Gazavatname  is  confidential  about  Barbarossas 
migration  season  to  North  Africa.  Consequently,  they  migrated  to  North  Africa  in 
1513.180
Following his accession to the throne, Selim I prohibited the entrance and the 
exit of the ships to the Ottoman ports, in order to prevent his brother şehzade Korkut’s 
escape.   Corsairs  under  the  patronage  of  Korkut  could  not  anymore  shelter  in  the 
regions  of  Aegean  and  the  Levant,  thus  they  migrated  to  North  Africa.181 The 
Barbarossas were among those corsairs. Even though no immediate threat was oriented 
to them, they must have not feel safe in the region.182
Barbarossas reached Tunisia and got in contact with the Ruler of Tunisia to use 
his ports.  According to the agreement, they would give one eighth of their booty as 
pencik and one fifty as the rent of port. In this way, they started to use the port of La 
Goletta (Halk-ul Vad), located around Tunisia, as a base for their corsair attacks. During 
the 16th century, there was a similar practice on the other side of the Mediterranean. The 
Maltese corsairs had to share one tenth of their booty with the master of the port.183 
Uskoks of Segna grew strong in the last quarter of century, paid one out tenth of their 
booty to two churches, a Franciscan and a Dominican. In the post-1580 era, this rate 
increased  in  the  region  after  the  direct  participation  of  Kings  of  Naples  and Sicily 
directly to corsair raids.  The ship was equipped by these kings in exchange of half of 
180 Svat Soucek, Rise of Barbarossa, in Studies in Ottoman Naval History and Maritime Geography, 
(Istanbul, Isis Press, Istanbul, 2008) p  67-74
181 Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Tarihi, p 366
182 Seyyid Muradi, Gazavatname, p 82- 91
183 Peter Earle, Corsairs of Malta and Barbary,  p 11
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the total booty. If  the ship was owned by a corsair, kings took one quarter of the total 
amount.184 
The  Barbarossas  got  established  in  La  Goletta  and  they  gained  strength 
gradually. Number of their ships and the  levends who fought for them rose.  After an 
unsuccessful siege of Bougie in 1514, this fortress was besieged next year for a second 
time. Even if the Barbarossas defeated the outer defenses, they could not conquer the 
inner  fortress.  However,  Aruj  became  a  powerful  actor  in  the  region  and  hold  on 
Djidjelli185  The  first  contact  between  Barbarossas  and  Selim  I  took  place  at  this 
moment.  The following year,  Aruj  captured Cherchel  and  strengthened his  position. 
Leader of a local tribe, Salim, was executed under the pretext of acting against jihad and 
the Barbarossas took the port under his control. Finally, Aruj's last target was Algiers. 
He attacked, captured it and became the king of the Algiers in 1516. The Barbarossas 
conquered Tlemsen, old capital city of central Maghrib in 1517. In this process, Aruj 
and Hızır made advantage of fragmented political structure of the region as well as the 
insufficiency of the Spanish naval force. In this political landscape, they could clear a 
field of mines. 
The  Spaniards  besieged  Tlemsen  in  1518  with  the  purpose  of  expelling 
Barbarossas  from  the  region.   During  the  siege,  Aruj  Reis  was  killed  and  the 
Barbarossas  lost  Tlemsen.  However,  Hızır  kept  his  sovereignty  in  Algeria.  In  this 
period, Hızır had limited warriors and equipment and his position was in danger.186 In 
the east Mediterranean, Selim I conquered Egypt, became the new protector of Holy 
cities, Mecca and Medina. This made him the most prestigious Sultan in the Islamic 
world. In 1519, Hızır sent gifts to Selim I and he announced that he wants to enter under 
Ottoman sovereignty. Selim met this request with pleasure. In this way, following the 
conquest of Egypt, Selim’s zone of influence extended to the Western Mediterranean. 
Selim gained a base far from the Levant and the Aegean Sea. This frontier was shortly 
transformed into a refuge for Ottoman corsairs. On the other hand, the contact between 
184 Aymard Maurice, “16 yy sonunda Akdeniz'de korsanlık ve Venedik” İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat  
Fakültesi Dergisi, 23/1-2, p 226
185 Katip Çelebi, Tuhfetü'l-Kibâr, p 46
186 Andrew Hess, The Forgotten Frontier, p 61-65, Seyyid Muradi, Gazavatname,p 140-150
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the  government  and  corsairs  was  officialized.  Muslihiddin  Kurdoğlu,  an  Ottoman 
corsair migrated to the North Africa after ascendant of Selim I, had already been put 
into  the  service  of  the  Imperial  navy  during  the  expedition  of  Egypt.   After  this 
annexation,  commissioning  of  corsairs  like  Kurdoğlu  to  the  Imperial  Navy became 
easier.  On the other side of this relation, Hayrettin could legitimize his position in the 
region thanks to the patronage of the Sultan. While he was just a brave and bold corsair 
leader, he was promoted to the post of Ottoman governor. Besides, he took the Ottoman 
support against the rising Spanish menace. Selim sent 2000 janissaries with artillery and 
he gave Hayrettin the authority to enroll levends from the Anatolian coasts.187 
Nevertheless,  political  conditions  turned  against  Hayrettin  and  under  new 
circumstances he was obliged to retreat to Djidjelli in 1520. Between 1520 and 1525, he 
continued his  corsair  attacks  from this  port.  In a couple of years,  he reinforced his 
position thanks to the help of refugees and adventurers, both Christian and native. Five 
years later, he re-conquered Algeria.188 In this process, other important corsairs gathered 
around him. He constructed a powerful fleet  with these corsairs.  There were Turgut 
Reis, Sinan Reis the Jew, Aydın Reis among them.189 After the reconquest of Algeria, 
Hayrettin  captured  Penon  of  Algeria  from the  Spaniards  in  1529.  The  conquest  of 
important ports provided a more safe seaway between Istanbul and Algeria and corsairs 
obtained a key base in the central Maghrib. Spanish pressure on Algiers was reduced 
with this conquest.  Even though the Spanish fleets organized attacks on Algeria under 
the command of Andrea Doria in 1530 and Alvaro de Bazan in 1531, they could not be 
successful.  Following  these  events,  Barbaros  Hayrettin  became  one  of  the  most 
important actors in the Mediterranean. He beat a path to the post of Grand Admiral of 
Ottoman Imperial navy with his own struggle. He fought twenty years as a corsair and 
finally gained a powerful position.
Changes  in  the  balance  of  the  Mediterranean  at  the  end  of  1520's,  brought 
Barbaros to a more important position for the Ottoman Mediterranean strategy. In 1521, 
187 Khayr al-din, IE
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the King of France, Francis I invaded Navarre and Low Countries belonging to the Holy 
Roman Empire. After a series of wars lasting four years, Francis I was captured by the 
Imperial forces following a serious defeat at the Battle of Pavesa in 1525.  He signed the 
treaty of Madrid. According to this treaty, he gave up his claims over Italy, Flanders and 
Burgundy. However, following the year of his release, he founded the League of Cognac 
and included Pope Clement VII, and Republic of Venice.  Subsequently, he attacked 
again.  As a result of several wars, France accepted the conditions of Madrid treaty and 
quit the war in 1529. This was the final scene of a long conflict started in 1521.
In this period, another crucial incident was the appointment of Andrea Doria as 
the  Grand  Admiral  of  the  Spanish  Armada.  Andrea  Doria,  member  of  an  ancient 
Genoese noble family, was on the French side at the beginning of the wars; however, 
Charles V proposed a better contract to him in 1528 and he passed to the other side. 
According  to  the  contract,  independence  of  Genoa  was  guaranteed  by the  force  of 
Imperial Arms and Andrea Doria joined the Spanish Navy with his own fleet. In the 
light of these developments, long conflict between Habsburg Empire and France was 
over and the Habsburgs had a powerful navy at the end of 1520's.  Thereby, a danger 
rose at  sea against  the Ottomans in the beginnings of the 1530s. For the first time, 
Charles V had a powerful and professional navy to follow a stable and long term naval 
policy.190
Charles V used this navy against Ottomans for the first time -except assaults on 
Algeria- in 1532. As a consequence of Suleiman's Austrian campaign, King of Austria, 
Ferdinand appealed to his brother Charles V for help, and Charles sent his navy to the 
Adriatic  under  the  command  of  Andrea  Doria.  Andrea  Doria  captured  Modon  and 
Coron.  Then his navy defeated Suleiman's navy which tried to resist, yet, was obliged 
to return Istanbul. Following this development, Barbaros was appointed as the Grand 
Admiral of the Imperial Navy as Kapudan Pasha upon the suggestion of Grand Vizier 
İbrahim Pasha in 1534.  The reorganization of the Imperial Navy began.
190 Miguel Angel de Buenes Ibarra, “Yavuz ve Kanuni devirlerinde Osmanlı-İspanya  deniz savaşları, in 
Türkler , Cilt 9  p 601,
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The rise of Barbaros Hayrettin was not an exceptional case in the early modern 
world. Legal act and illegal acts of a pirate and a Grand Admiral were not at the two 
opposite poles as in the modern world. There was nothing more than a thin line between 
these two figures and this line was often crossed. Kılıç Ali Pasha was promoted to the 
position of Grand Admiral  like Barbaros Hayrettin,  seafarers raised among Algerian 
corsairs were appointed as beylerbeyi of Algeria during the century.  In the 16th and 17th 
centuries,  there  was  not  a  maritime  school  in  the  modern  meaning.  Thus,  Grand 
admirals  and  captains  were  often  assigned  from  among  seagoing  experienced 
seafarers.191 For instance, Elizabethan privateering heroes, John Hawkins and Francis 
Drake  were  commissioned  to  the  Royal  Navy  as  Grand  Admirals,  like  Barbaros. 
Interestingly, the stories of Drake and Barbaros show parallelism with each other.  The 
similarity  goes  beyond  their  biographies.   They  are  both  symbolic  figures  who 
contributed to the institutionalization of privateering in the seas.
Francis  Drake  grew  up  in  the  household  of  the  Hawkins  family,  who  was 
occupied with sea trade and piracy in Plymouth. William Hawkins and his sons were 
successful  merchants  and  part-time  pirates.192 As  mentioned  in  Gazavatname,  
Barbarossas became corsairs while trading with their ships.  If this case is compared 
with Drake's case, it will be obvious that piratical activities and trade were not separate 
career paths in the context of the 16th century. Trade and piracy went hand in hand and 
due to this familiarity, the Barbarossas and the Drakes turned into corsairs at a certain 
point. 
Francis Drake was enrolled in one of the ships of this family, which sailed to the 
Guinea coast of West Africa for trading. His next journey was to South America with 
Hawkins' ships.  After a while, he was promoted to the position of captain in their ships 
and rose as an important corsair in a short time. In 1571, after about ten years of his first 
sea voyage, Francis Drake and his brothers were regarded by the Spaniards, as among 
the most dangerous English pirates.193 In 1572, the younger brother of Francis Drake, 
191 Jan Glete, Warfare at Sea, p 53
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John  Drake  was  killed  by the  Spaniards  in  his  unsuccessful  predatory  attack  on  a 
Spanish  trade  ship  in  Cartagena.  Common  enemy  of  Barbarossas  and  Drakes,  the 
Spaniards managed to kill one member of these corsair families.  However, they could 
not prevent the promotion of other brothers,  Hızır  and Francis  Drake.  They became 
Grand Admiral of English and Ottoman Navies.
In 1577, Francis Drake sailed for the purpose of plunder, as a captain of a mixed 
fleet composed of Queen's and some private investors' ships. This journey lasted three 
years and he returned to England as one of the richest men in the country and the most 
prestigious  corsair  who  had  sailed  around  the  world.  This  corsair  had  a  chair  in 
Parliament in 1581 and he organized a Navy composed of privateer ships as an Admiral 
of the Queen for plundering the West Indies in 1584.194 As mentioned by John Hooker 
(quoted in Kenneth Andrews) “Drake's voyage inflamed the whole country with a desire 
to adventure unto the seas, in hope of the like good success, so that a great number 
prepared ships, mariners and soldiers and traveled every place where any profit might 
be  had”195Ports  of  Weymouth  and  Southampton became principal  bases  for  English 
privateers after Drakes. These ports had the same mission of Algeria and Djidjeli. All of 
these ports were transformed into shelters for corsairs, after legendary corsairs like the 
Barbarossas and the Drakes. 
The Drakes and the Barbarossas differentiated from other English and Ottoman 
corsairs  thanks  to  their  good  chance  and  strategically  correct  gambits.  Apart  from 
successful stories of Barbaros and Drake in different geographies, there were lots of 
similar stories among corsairs hired by the naval service and rose to different ranks in 
the Imperial Navy.  After all, corsairs had a risky occupation.  Death in raids or being 
captured by enemy navies was a part of the story. In brief, Ottoman corsair settlement 
was not a unique case in the early modern era and the rise of Barbarossas was not an 
exceptional story among other corsairs' career. 
194 Op. cit. p 236-239
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CHAPTER III
THE INCORPORATION OF CORSAIRS AND THE 
INSTITUTIONALIZATION PROCESS: 
THE KAPUDAN PASHA ERA
III.1) The Formation of the Kapudan Pasha's Navy 
Barbaros Hayrettin arrives in Istanbul upon Suleiman's invitation in 1533. with 
10 captains who had accompanied him. After coming together with Suleiman there, he 
goes to Aleppo in order to meet İbrahim Pasha, who is in Aleppo by then.196 Thus, 
Barbaros Hayrettin is appointed as the head of the navy and the navy is re-organized. 
Whereas  sanjak  of  Kapudan  Pasha  used  to  be  Gallipoli,  with  a  new  arrangement, 
Cezayir-i Bahr-i Sefid (Islands of Mediterranean) province was founded in 1534 and it 
was  given  to  Kapudan  Pasha’s  affiliation.  Barbaros  is  appointed  beylerbeyi of  this 
province.  The  sanjaks  appertaining  to  the  province  were  Gallipoli,Euboea,  Lepanto, 
Karlıili (situated in western coasts of Greece), Mytilene, and Rhodes.  During Selim II 
period, Algeria (Cezayir-i Mağrip)  and Chios were also attached to  Cezayir-i Bahr-i  
Sefid province.  All  the  revenues  of  these  islands  were  left  to  Kapudan  Pasha.197 
Confusion between Cezayir-i Bahr-i Sefid province and Algeria should be avoided. First 
one is province of Kapudan Pasha which embraces Mediterranean islands of which the 
center was Gallipoli, while the second one is North African Algeria, known as “Western 
Algeria”, governed by a beylerbeyi. Barbaros started to re-organize his navy right after 
the  nomination  as  Kapudan  Pasha  to  his  mission.   Barbaros  and  the  captains  who 
participated in navy service with him also organized the shipbuilding. Northern African 
196 İdris Bostan,  Cezayir-i Bahri Sefid'in Kuruluşu, in Beylikten İmparatorluğa Osmanlı denizciliği  p 
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coasts, which had previously been used by them as bases, helped them have knowledge 
about shipbuilding on the other coasts of Mediterranean Sea, and the naval tradition of 
Atlantic coast. Before Barbaros’ arrival in the region, Algerian coasts had already met 
Iberian naval tradition. In 1505, Portuguese captives had constructed a boat at Mers-el-
Kebir.198 Also, Barbaros Hayrettin has run into a shipwright among the captives in a 
Majorcan boat he seized, and had him construct two ships; one with 26 thwarts, and the 
other with 12 thwarts.199 Barbaros structured his navy with the experience he gained in 
Algeria and with his acquirements from the period where he used to be a corsair. The 
most  important  consequence  of  this  fact  was  that  the  galleys  are  decided  to  be the 
striking force of the Ottoman navy and remained in that position for a long time200. 
In May 1534, Barbaros set his first sail with 100 ships and took Coron back. 
Although he conquered Tunisia in 1535, he drew away into Algeria because of Spain’s 
landing of  soldiers,  and went  back to  Istanbul  while  looting Majorcan Islands.201 In 
consequence of extensive capitulations that Ottomans provided to France and following 
that, the re-starting of the war between Charles and Francis; the long-lasting Ottoman- 
French alliance against Spain was to start, thus the navies of Barbaros and Andrea Doria 
were coming against each other as a reflection of this struggle in the seas.
Barbaros’ winning of the battle of Prevesa in 1538 had strengthened Ottoman 
superiority at sea.202  The Ottoman-Venetian war was of value to the Ottoman navy on 
south  coasts;  with  the  Ottoman  Empire’s  war  declaration  against  Venice,  Hadım 
Suleiman Pasha was confiscating Venetian merchant vessels and taking ship’s crew in 
Ottoman employ. Thus, another Ottoman navy strengthened by hundreds of Venetian 
198 Dorothy M. Vaughan, Europe and the Turk, A pattern of Alliances (Liverpool: Liverpool university 
press; 1954) p 120
199 Seyyid Muradi, p 274-275
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202 Barbaros kept his navy inside Prevesa harbor and stood on the defensive. On the third week of 
besieging, navy of the Holy League of Spain, Venice and Papal states under the command of Andrea 
Doria attacked in order to enter the harbor early in the morning; however the order between sailor 
ships and ships with oars in Doria’s navy was disarranged due to the lull in the wind. Profiting from 
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League did not have an important loss, it had to withdraw. For further technical information about 
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gunners, pilots and skilled craftsmen was standing out to India under the command of 
Hadım Suleiman Pasha the same year.203
Prevesa  Sea  War  was  one  of  the  three  open  sea  wars  –  others  Djerba  and 
Lepanto- in the Mediterranean in the 16th century, and was the proof of Ottoman marine 
force becoming a dominant power in Central Mediterranean.  It was almost 40 years 
after the first defeat of Venice by Ottoman navy during the period of Bayezid II, and in 
the meanwhile,  during Selim II  and Suleiman periods,  the navy was developed and 
became the sole power in Eastern Mediterranean. Also, naval forces were being used as 
an important  instrument  in Ottoman foreign policy,  alliance with France,  as well  as 
policies pursued against Venice.
Prevesa naval battle was an important example of 16th century Mediterranean 
naval battles. It was not very easy to overcome a combined defense system composed of 
war galleys and shore batteries in the Mediterranean. It was possible to defeat a stronger 
enemy navy if this defensive combination was used correctly.  These battles were not 
open sea wars with the classical definition. Conflicts were usually taking place in the 
regions close to the land. Thus, “Mediterranean naval warfare was not purely naval, but 
amphibious in nature.” as Guilmartin explains. It was not possible for galleys to sustain 
a long-term siege from sea due to their logistic restrictions.  It was not only difficult and 
dangerous to try to defeat an enemy fleet in the sea, but also inefficient.  Consequently, 
seizure of the bases of enemy fleet was necessary.204
In  consequence,  some  premises  should  be  reviewed  while  evaluating  16th 
century Ottoman naval force. Generally admitted “Ottoman Empire was a land-based 
military empire and Ottoman regime was not interested at sea” premise seems to be 
defective when Mediterranean system is considered. This results from the evaluation of 
marine force usage in the 16th century independently from its historical context. At this 
point, it would be reasonable to consider alternative premises presented by Brummet. 
203 Casale, The Ottoman Age of Exploration, p 98-99
204 Guilmartin, Gunpowder and Galleys, p 56 -57
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It is necessary to evaluate Ottoman naval force in accordance with the period 
and the region it functioned in, which is, the Mediterranean. Firstly, it is to be admitted 
that at any period, Ottoman Empire has never turned into a thalassocracy like Venice; 
however  it  was  an  assertive  State  in  terms  of  naval  force  beginning  from the  16th 
century, in accordance with its economical and political status. It had a naval culture 
which was developed accordingly with local conditions, adopted, and inherited. As an 
ineluctable  consequence  of  Ottoman  Empire’s  rising  as  a  world  power  in  the  first 
quarter  of  the  16th century,  its  sea  power  was  developed  as  an  important  and 
indispensable component of the Empire’s power. Thus, it would be a more adequate 
statement to qualify Ottomans as an amphibian power instead of a sea power or a land-
based  empire.  Ottoman  conquests  of  Egypt  and  Syria,  gaining  ascendancy all  over 
Black Sea coasts as well as Adriatic Sea obligated them to have a powerful naval force. 
It was not possible for an Empire branching out into a large area from Indian Ocean to 
Central Mediterranean not to be committed to naval force or implement naval politics. It 
was an obligation more than a luxury to provide the security of maritime routes between 
Alexandria and Istanbul and those that reach from Istanbul to the Adriatic and the Black 
Sea, to contend with Portugal in order to keep spice trade vibrant, to pacify the enemy 
fleets in the Mediterranean, as well as to secure Ottoman expeditions on land.205 The 
Ottoman Empire’s coasts on the Mediterranean had important bases for the navy and 
corsairs. As of 1453, the range of naval force was increased as new ports and islands 
were conquered. 
One of the arguments that take an important place in historiography and that is 
addressed by the discourse based on Ottoman administration’s neglecting of seas and 
non-development  of  naval  policies  is  that,  persons  nominated  as  Kapudan  Pashas, 
except for Barbaros Hayrettin and Kılıc Ali Pasha, were not knowledgeable about seas 
and they only had a background from the palace. Without a deeper look and thinking on 
the reasons of this choice of Ottoman administration, this argument might be considered 
as acceptable. As a matter of fact, it is understandable that those who are not historians 
205 Palmira Brummet, The Ottomans as a World Power: What We Don’t Know about Ottoman 
Seapower,” Oriente Moderno,XX (LXXX1) n.s., no. 1 (2001) p 7-9. I am grateful to Palmira Brummet 
who kindly responded to my request and sent her article to me.
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among serious researchers come to this conclusion206.  However,  some examples  and 
functioning of the system demonstrate that this was a conscious choice. 
It  is  an  exceptional  situation  that  Barbaros  Hayrettin  and  Kılıç  Ali  Pashas 
achieved this post with their corsair background.  Both of these two captains achieved 
this  post  within  extraordinary  conditions.  Barbaros  Hayrettin  became  an  important 
political actor at the beginning of  1530s207 and it was not possible to nominate one of 
the important actors of the Mediterranean such as Barbaros Hayrettin to a simple post 
while recruiting him in the state service for the re-establishment of the navy. Regarding 
Kılıç Ali Pasha, he was inducted in extraordinary circumstances right after  Ottoman 
Empire faced its biggest defeat in the 16th century including all  war terrestrial  wars. 
Apart from these, after Barbaros death, Sokullu Mehmet Pasha was nominated to the 
post of Kapudan Pasha, and following that,  Sinan Pasha, brother of Kanuni’s Grand 
Vizier Rüstem Pasha between 1550 and 1553, Piyale Pasha between 1553 and 1568, 
and Müezzinzade Ali Pasha in the period between 1568 and Lepanto naval battle were 
appointed to this post.   After Kılıç Ali Pasha’s death in 1587, for a very short period of 
time,  Uluç Hasan Pasha  who came from Algeria  occupied  this  post  and  after  him, 
Cağaloğlu Sinan Pasha who was raised in the palace became Kapudan Pasha. All other 
Kapudan Pashas except Barbaros Hayrettin and Kılıç Ali Pasha were persons raised in 
the  palace,  which  are  acquainted  with  governmental  issues,  knowledgeable  about 
Empire’s opportunities and systems, and educated in the enderun.  
Approached  from  Ottoman  administration  side,  Kapudan  Pasha  was  to  be 
knowledgeable about navy’s arrangement, organization of ship construction, as well as 
ship crew’s composition. This was considered as the reason for which persons with an 
educational background from enderun were nominated to this post instead of sea men 
who used to be corsairs. Those who had a keen knowledge about the imperial system 
used to profit from experiences of corsairs while preparing the navy to expeditions and 
during  expeditions.  In  other  words,  while  Kapudan  Pashas  were  involved  in 
administration, corsairs were playing an important role in decision making in the field. 
206 Murat Belge, Osmanlıda kurumlar, (İstanbul : Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları : 2005) p 203 
207 See pages 55-56
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Its most well-known example is the talk between Sokullu Mehmet Pasha,Grand Vizier 
of  the  period,  and  Kılıç  Ali  Pasha,  nominated  as  Kapudan  Pasha,  upon  the  re-
construction of the navy after Lepanto Sea War.
Kılıç Ali Pasha sees reconstruction tasks difficult  and tells Sadrazam Sokullu 
Mehmet Pasha: “It is easy to build hulls, but to prepare five or six hundred anchors for 
two hundred ships and corresponding amounts  of rigging sails  and other  equipment 
does not seem possible.”  Sokullu responds Kılıç Ali with his famous words: “Pasha, 
you have not experienced about Empire's affairs yet. The power of this Exalted State is 
such, that if a fleet were to be ordered with anchors of silver, ropes of silk thread and 
sails  of  velvet,  it  could  be  easily  built.”208 Here,  it  would  be  explanatory  to  skip 
Sokullu’s rhetoric and assess the talk between Sokullu Mehmet Paşa, raised in enderun 
and previously occupied Kapudan Pasha post and another Kapudan Pasha, not raised 
through government service but through experience gained in the seas. While Sokullu 
speaks  with  his  knowledge  on  ample  human  resource  and  material  source  that  the 
Empire  has,  Kılıç  Ali  Pasha  spoke  with  the  misgivings  of  a  practical  mariner.209 
Problems that Kılıç Ali Paşa had never faced before such as construction of the navy, 
assurance of oarsmen, recruitment of paid soldiers to replace thousands of militias lost 
in Lepanto were overcome with Sokullu’s support.  Also Sokullu clearly emphasizes the 
insufficiency of Kılıç Ali’s knowledge on the Empire.  However Kılıç Ali Paşa was 
nominated to the Kapudan Pasha Post being the unique captain who succeeded to come 
back to Istanbul with his fleet after the defeat in Lepanto.
The fact that Turgut Reis, who was better known than Kılıç Ali Paşa, was not 
nominated as Kapudan Pasha has always been the subject of  speculation. Katip Çelebi 
related this to the fact that Kapudan-ı Derya Sinan Paşa did not like Turgut Reis.  With 
the help of his brother Grand Vizier Rüstem Paşa, Sinan Paşa was able to keep Turgut 
Reis,  whom  he  considered  as  a  competitor,  away  from  the  central  administration. 
Certainly, it is possible that there might be personal rivalry; however, instead of taking 
208 Katip Çelebi, Tuhfetü'l-Kibâr p 118, Peçevi İbrahim, Peçevi Tarihi (Ankara :Kültür Bakanlığı 
Yayınları, 1992) p352
209 Colin Imber, “The Reconstruction of the Ottoman Fleet after the Battle of Lepanto. 1571-1572." in 
Studies in Ottoman History and Law ( Istanbul. 1996) p 87
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Katip Çelebi's ideas verbatim, it would be more useful to analyze the justification with 
which  Rüstem Pasha convinced Sultan  Suleiman for seeing  the motives  behind this 
choice. In order to justify Turgut Reis' non-promotion, Rüstem Paşa declares to Sultan 
Suleiman that he was raised in the country side and has never been promoted in civil 
service.210 When  Turgut  Reis'  situation  is  considered  along  with  the  talk  between 
Sokullu and Kılıç Ali Pasha,  it would be easy to realize the reason for which a person 
raised in enderun who knows the governmental mechanism is preferred for the Kapudan 
Pasha post. Moreover, Sinan Pasha died in 1553 and Piyale Pasha was preferred for his 
post instead of Turgut Reis. Thus, it does not seem enough to suggest a personal rivalry 
in order to explain this choice. 
We can  say  that  the  Kapudan Pasha  occupies  that  post  as  an  administrator. 
However, we also need to explain the verity of Kapudan Pashas going on expeditions 
leading  the  fleet  as  fleet  commander.  How  were  the  Kapudans  who  were  not 
experienced  in  the  sea able  to  command  the  navy on  expedition?  Decisions  during 
besieging and war were usually made by consulting corsairs. Also with provisions sent 
by the palace, Kapudan Pashas were told many times to consult corsairs during war. In a 
firman that Sultan Suleiman wrote to Kapudan Piyale Paşa in 1555, he declares; 
Turgut Reis knows every condition and affair of the sea; do not abstain from 
consulting him. Be in good livelihood and complete solidarity with sensual 
and  intentional  engagement,  and  accomplish  all  that  assiduity  requires. 
Participation of volunteer  levent ships in the navy is ordered. Turgut Reis 
knows about them; fulfill  the need of volunteer  levents. Render the State 
triumphant with Turgut Reis’s ingeniousness and by consulting him.211
Expedition decisions made at Divan-ı Hümayun were enunciated to the Kapudan 
Pasha  and  the  corsairs  in  his  service.  Feasibility  of  expedition  decision’s 
implementation and number of ships needed for the expedition was learned.  According 
to  this  information,  preparations  were  started.  Political  decisions,  relating  to  naval 
strategy were taken at Divan.  In the 16th century, only Barbaros Hayrettin had a place at 
Divan as a Kapudan Pasha. It  is obvious that Barbaros has an important role in the 
210 Katip Çelebi, Tuhfetü'l-Kibâr , p 90
211 Katip Çelebi, Tuhfetü'l-Kibâr , p 92-my translation 
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formation of naval strategy and decision making in Ottoman Empire.  However, after 
Barbaros period,  Kapudan Pashas were not present at Divan-ı Hümayun.  Expedition 
decisions were taken at Divan-ı Hümayun, and preparations needed to implement the 
decision were agreed upon between Kapudan Pasha and corsairs in navy yard. The most 
important guides were ex-corsairs and volunteer captains when the preparations were 
completed  and expedition  was  started.  Information  that  Selaniki  provides  about  the 
decision-making process and preparation of Malta’s besieging is enlightening. Upon the 
attack of Maltese corsairs on the  Bostancıbaşı’s ship,  “the ministers of the Grace and 
Might, together with the venerable viziers have discussed the siege of Malta fortress.” 
212 In the official letter sent to Grand Vizier Ali Pasha upon the decision of expedition, 
he is asked to negotiate with Kapudan Piyale Pasha and captains at the Divan. Another 
firman is sent to Kapudan Piyale Pasha where he was ordered to completely fulfill all 
preparations  needed  for  the  expedition  on  time.213 Ex-corsairs  were  consulted  and 
requirements for besieging were determined. Expedition was conducted by consulting 
corsairs, foremost Turgut Reis, as usual.  For Malta expedition, like previous maritime 
expeditions, Sultan ordered Kapudan Pasha to consult Turgut Reis. Katip Çelebi cites 
the late  participation of Turgut Reis in the navy and, Kapudan Pasha’s strategically 
wrong decision making about the conquest of the island during this one-week delay.214
It was not a disjunctive fact about Turgut Reis that corsairs provide a sort of 
consultancy to Kapudan Pasha. In the periods after Turgut Pasha’s death during Malta’s 
besieging, this practice was continued.  Sultan Selim II, as he clearly points out within 
his provision he sent to Kapudan Pasha, assured also for upcoming periods that “in his 
holy  navy,  eminent  seamen  and  captains,  as  well  as  other  knowledgeable  corsair 
captains go on expeditions along with good alliance and unity.”215 
Therefore, Barbaros Hayrettin had an exceptional situation as “super” kapudan. 
He was a main actor in decision-making process of naval expeditions, he managed the 
212 “vükela-i devlet ü saltanat, vüzera-i izam hazretleriyle kal'ai Malta müzakere olur”
213 Mustafa Selaniki, Tarihi Selaniki (İstanbul : İstanbul üniversitesi edebiyat fakültesi yayınları 1989) 
v:1, p 5-7
214 Katip  Çelebi, Tuhfetü'l-Kibâr , p101-102
215 12 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri (978-979/1570-1572) (Ankara : T.C. Başbakanlık, Devlet Arşivleri 
Genel Müdürlüğü, Osmanlı Arşivi Daire Başkanlığı) hüküm no : 84
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preparations for expeditions and leaded those expeditions in field. Because the post of 
Kapudan  Pasha  identified  with  Barbaros  Hayrettin’s  identity,  this  “super”  Kapudan 
Pasha  example  which  is  an  exception  in  fact,  is  considered  as  a  regular  situation 
However this was not a usual case in Ottoman naval history and Kapudan Pashas were 
generally not “super” kapudans like Barbaros as mentioned above. In general, decisions 
of  naval  expeditions  were taken by the central  authority,  Kapudan pashas  raised in 
enderun completed the preparations for expedition according to these decisions with 
consultancy of ex-corsairs in the service of navy. As well, ex-corsairs were consultants 
of Kapudan Pashas in battle field.
As the most important corsair of the Mediterranean, Barbaros’s  engagement in 
Ottoman service and his nomination as Kapudan Pasha started a new period in Ottoman 
navy as a consequence of the establishment of  Cezayir-i Bahr-i Sefid province and its 
attachment  to  Kapudan  Pasha.  Following  this  date,  the  nature  of  relations  between 
Imperial navy and Ottoman corsairs changed. How did corsairs affect Ottoman naval 
force starting with this period? How were the relations with corsairs engaged with naval 
service and ghazis who privateer out of the navy settled? 
III.2)  The Relationship between the  Ottoman Corsairs  and the Imperial 
Navy after the Kapudan Pasha
III.2.i) Corsairs Recruited for Naval Service
As mentioned in the previous section, starting from the employment of Kemal 
Reis  by  Bayezid  II  in  the  navy,  corsairs  commenced  to  be  recruited  by  Ottoman 
Imperial navy.  Also, we have mentioned the symbiotic relationship between corsairs 
and  Ottoman  administration.  Beginning  from  Barbaros’  nomination  as  Kapudan-ı 
Derya, relations between central government and corsairs was strengthened.  Barbaros 
and important captains around him took positions in Ottoman navy and also corsairs in 
Barbaros’s service advanced their relations in a semi-official way with the navy.  The 
most important reason for that is the integration of the corsairs personally attached to 
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Barbaros  who  gathered  them  in  Algeria  into  Ottoman  navy  with  Barbaros.  It  is 
considered  as  an  inaccurate  approach  to  describe  relations  between  corsairs  and 
Ottoman navy throughout institutional ties. Reification of the State, namely the central 
authority and the corsairs complicates the analysis of this relation. Thus, it seems more 
rational to identify this relation through persons instead of abstract institutions.
Before observing this relation in details, it would provide us with an agenda to 
assess  the  situation  in  the  European  navies.  In  early  modern  Europe,  private 
entrepreneurs in warfare at sea had a market, as states could hardly find skilled seafarers 
while establishing their navies and private entrepreneurs were the first agents to address 
in this process. This was preferred because private ship owners were naturally in close 
relationship  with  seafaring  communities.  These  persons  had  important  positions  for 
finding  skilled  and  experienced  masters,  pilots,  boatswains  and  quartermaster  and 
composing crews.  Through networks of ship owners, states were being able to involve 
seamen  of  good  reputation  in  the  seafaring  community  into  ships  and  navies. 
Accordingly, states looking for captains and crews for war ships preferred private ship 
owners who had developed networks within maritime communities.216
In Europe, seafarers were already present as a social group before the emergence 
of  royal  navies.  When states  were  to  establish  navies,  they  used  to  recruit  talented 
seamen among this social group and they used to be re-engaged with the civilian market 
when the navy was de-mobilized. Leaders of these crews, namely commanders of ships, 
were generally composed of noblemen. Belonging of these persons to the nobility group 
provided them with military training. Besides, being members of an elite group assured 
them a partial protection for those who fight for him. If this commander had not only 
patronage and skills but also courage and success, he gained more power. Even if their 
commitment to the State was not always strong, over long-term, they turned into navy 
officers from military leaders.217
Regarding the Ottoman naval force again,  the Ottomans had established their 
permanent imperial navy much earlier than their contemporaries. Also, there was not a 
216 Jan Glete, Warfare at sea,  p 43
217 Op. cit 44
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private ship owner group equivalent of those in Europe.  However, the problem of need 
for skilled, experienced seamen necessary for the navy was also present for the Ottoman 
administration.  While  Europeans  addressed  themselves  to  ship  owners  in  order  to 
overcome  this  problem,  Ottomans  addressed  themselves  to  corsairs.  Starting  with 
captains to look over the situation in Ottoman navy, ship captains in Ottoman Empire 
did not belong to noble groups; because of this, corsairs had to obtain force on their own 
in order to become ship captains. In this process, the one who is strong survived, these 
sea warriors usually owned their ships in some time and settled authority over other 
warriors and seamen through this power. As an example of the domination of a ship 
fleet by a corsair, Turgut Reis’ career can be analyzed. In his book’s section entitled as 
“Emergence and some holy wars of Turgut Bey”, Peçevi brings out the promotion of an 
Ottoman corsair. As he mentions; 
Turgut Bey is from Menteşe. He joined sea levents and to put a bold front 
on, he became master in maritime sciences. While he was sailing with his 
levent boat, he obtained a galley, then he increased the number of his ships, 
made them five when he had one, and finally he was ascended in rank as a 
levent captain.218 
In this period, once the strength of a corsair who commands a ship increased, the 
number of ships he owns increased accordingly, and as a matter more important than the 
latter, he expanded his authority and area of influence along with captains and warriors 
attached to him. Similarly, after the rise of Barbaros and his group, other seven corsairs 
including Kurdoğlu Muslihiddin and Piri Reis, nephew of Kemal Reis, joined them.219 
Thus, it  was possible  to consider a hierarchy based upon the power,  and a network 
structured  upon this  hierarchy.  Also,  keeping  in  mind  that  privateering  started  as  a 
family  enterprise220,  we  can  tell  that  this  network  expanded  by  means  of  relations 
through consanguinity.
Beginning  from  the  recruitment  of  Kemal  Reis  and  his  nephew  Piri  Reis, 
relation  between present  network  and central  navy was settled.  After  Kemal  Reis’s 
218 Peçevi İbrahim, peçevi tarihi, p 245
219 Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı tarihi, p  366
220 See footnote 111
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death in 1510, Piri Reis quitted naval service and started to privateering around Aruj 
Reis.  It is not a coincidence that Barbaros and his group first sent Piri Reis in order to 
commence communication with Selim II.  They got closer to Selim II with Piri Reis’s 
mediation.221 Also,  Barbaros introduced Piri  Reis as a  “knowledgeable  person about 
administrative bodies’ procedures and rules.”222 We can consider that together with the 
state  experience he gained in  the naval  service with Kemal  Reis,  social  network he 
developed from people of palace was effective on this preference.
We  cannot  talk  about  a  modern  state  structure  in  the  16th century.  Even  if 
bureaucracy becomes more intense during Suleiman's period, the system could not work 
efficiently like modern states. In the first  mühimme  records, we find one of the most 
important proofs of this bureaucracy loses its operability in a grey area like piracy, and 
personal connections stand out. Three captains; Şaban Reis, Yusuf Reis and Köse Musa 
dock in Lepanto harbor, and on account of being considered as pirates, they are arrested 
and  put  in  prison  by  the  sanjakbey  of  Lepanto.  Barbaros  Hayrettin,  having  been 
informed about this, wrote a letter to the Palace indicating that those captains are not 
pirates; on the contrary they are volunteer captains who fight infidel pirates and bandit 
levents, and asked for their  release,  implying that  he is  being a guarantor for them. 
Thereupon, the Palace sent an order to the sanjakbey of Lepanto affirming that those 
captains are seamen in service of the Sultan, and that they should not be aggrieved, they 
should be allowed stay in the port and, in case of need, to cut trees from the forest.223 It 
is understandable in an early modern state that other units within the state do not have 
acquaintance with the network developed and expanded by Barbaros.  
In order to use ports, construct ships, obtain supplies, shortly benefit from the 
state’s patronage, corsairs needed to have guarantors, in other words to have a good 
reputation  within  the  seafarer  community,  similar  to  the  system  in  Europe.   This 
practice was even present in Bayezid II period. With a provision he sent, Bayezid II 
declared that he gave permission to privateer to a seaman named Deli Yusuf Reis, and 
221 Ann Williams, Mediterranean conflict, in Süleyman the Magnificent and His Age, The Ottoman 
Empire in the Early Modern World, edited by Metin Kunt and Christine Woodhead(London and New 
York, Longman, 1995) p 45
222 Seyyid Muradi, Gazavatname, p 126
223 Mühimme Defteri, H951-952 tarihli (1544-1545) E 12321 hüküm no:380
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ordered that, if he appoints a guarantor upon redelivery, the supplies he needs for his 
ship should be provided to him.224 With another order sent from the Palace in 1568, it 
was ordered that as a precaution against the possible disturbance of people caused by 
the levent ships that dock in Santa Maura port to winter, they should appoint guarantors, 
and if not, they should not be allowed to dock in the port.225 In an order sent in 1565 to 
the sanjakbeys of Rhodes and Menteşe, it  was indicated that a naval expedition was 
decided for next spring and a great navy was started to prepare for this purpuse. For this 
reason, it was announced that  levends who can construct ships and appoint a reliable 
guarantor were permitted to construct ships with 18 to 25 thwarts, and they were asked 
to provide Palace with a name list of persons who started to construct ships.226 By this 
means, even if it  seems different in terms of techniques, a system that has the same 
mission with European system was being installed in terms of function. Thereby if not 
corsairs were totally placed under control, a pool of seamen was being developed in 
order to recruit in the navy when needed.
Before, it was necessary to render service in the navy for a long time and to 
seize an enemy ship in order to become captain to hassa ships (ships subordinate to the 
navy)  in  Ottoman Imperial  Navy.  However,  later  on the post  of  hassa  captain  was 
given  to  prominent  captains  participated  to  naval  expeditions.227 There  was  not  a 
standard practice for being promoted and becoming  hassa captain in the navy. It was 
possible to be promoted with the recommendation of Grand Admiral, the kethüda of the 
arsenal, or any beylerbeyi or sanjakbeyi serving in the fleet.228 This practice explains the 
increase in the number of corsairs serving in the navy beginning from the Kapudan 
Pashas period starting with Barbaros, as well as the system in which this increase took 
place.  For example, Turgut Reis was recruited to Ottoman service in 1551 and he was 
appointed as  sanjakbey  of Karlıili. Among captains around him, Gazi Mustafa, Uluç 
Ali,  Hasan  Gülle,  Mehmet  Reis,  Sancaktar  Reis,  Deli  Cafer  and  Kara  Kadı  were 
224 Osmanlılarda divan-bürokrasi-ahkam: II. Beyazıt Dönemine ait 906/1501 tarihli ahkam defteri , İlhan 
Şahin, Feridun Emecen (İstanbul: Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı; 1994) Hüküm no:326, p 91
225 Mühimme Defteri 7, Hüküm no: 2310
226 Mühimme Defteri 5, Hüküm no 499
227 İdris Bostan, Osmanlı bahriye teşkilatı : 17. yy'da tersane-i Amire (Anlara :TTK yayınları ;1992) p 54 
228 Colin Imber, The Navy of Suleyman the Magnificent," Archivum Ottomanicum VI/1980, 211-282,in 
Studies in ottoman history and law,  p 41
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appointed as hassa captains with a salary of 70-80 akçe ulufe229. Within the order sent to 
Cezayir-i Garb beylerbeyi in 1556, it was indicated that Muhyiddin Reis, who had been 
efficacious, was nominated as the Kapudan to the ships in Algeria, and the same year, 
appointment of Uluç Ali and Haydar Reis to the posts of hassa captain with a salary of 
40 akçe each  was ordered. While Kara Halil Reis, one of the volunteer captains coming 
from Western Algeria, was setting out to sea with his galiot in 1572,  the same year he 
was promoted from volunteer captain post to hassa captain post with a per diem of 15 
akçe by the order of Kapudan Pasha.230
However,  this  limited  picture  is  not explanatory enough neither  for relations 
between corsairs  and kapudans  in  naval  service,  nor  for  relations  among  kapudans. 
Were there households that corsairs promoted to Kapudan Pasha Post such as Barbaros 
Hayrettin and Kılıç Ali Pasha composed right after they came into Ottoman service? 
Were there any seamen raised in these households and then recruited in the navy? If 
there were seamen raised in this way and then recruited in the navy, how active were 
they within the navy?  There is not any study about this issue and it is not possible to 
answer these questions in the light of foregoing studies. However, we know that there is 
a slave population owned by these corsair captains before they were recruited to the 
navy,  as well  as  important  Muslim seamen who set  out  to  sea among these slaves. 
Barbaros Hayrettin, when he set out to Istanbul in 1534, he left his post to his adoptee, 
Hasan Agha. Hasan Ağa, was 9 years old when he was captured during an incursion 
Barbaros set  to  Sardinian Island.  Later  on he was converted  to  Islam and raised in 
Barbaros’s household.  Between years  1534-1543, he served as  governor  in  Western 
Algeria, and then called summoned to Istanbul.231 Uluç Ali was born in Calabria, and 
enslaved by Ali Hasan Reis. He was converted to Islam and he rose among corsairs. 
After joining Ottoman navy, he was firstly nominated as İzmir sandjak beyi, and then as 
Algeria  beylerbeyi. Following Lepanto sea war, he was appointed to Kapudan Pasha 
Post. Ramazan pasha was born in Sardinian Island, enslaved at an early age by corsairs 
229 Katip Çelebi,  Tuhfetü'l-Kibâr, p 88 , Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Tarihi, p 385 and  Merkez ve Bahriye 
Teşkilatı p 433
230 İdris Bostan, Adriyatikte korsanlık, p 37 and p 65
231 Jacques Heers, Les barbaresques - la course et la guerre en méditerranée XIVe et XVIe siècle,( Edition 
Perrin, Paris, Août 2001) p 92 and 317
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of Algeria,  converted to Islam and raised as a seaman.  He was assigned as Tunisia 
beylerbeyi in 1570 and as Algeria beylerbeyi in 1574. Hasan Pasha, from Venice, used 
to work as scribe in a commercial ship in Dubrovnik when he was captured by Turgut 
Reis in Tripoli.  Later on, he became Kılıç Ali Pasha's treasurer. He became Algeria 
beylerbeyi twice in periods between 1577 and 1580, and 1582 and 1583.232 Frenk Cafer 
Pasha233, Hadım Hasan Pasha234, Sencivan Hasan Pasha235 have followed similar paths, 
from slavery to galley captain. Even if it is not possible to make a certain statement 
departing from these particular examples, a structure similar to the household system in 
central  organization  was  also  being  practiced  by  corsair  captains  and  a  household 
composing of captured Christian slaves was formed.  These slaves used to be converts 
to Islam and deliberated, and later on, rise to high positions by seniority. It is necessary 
to  make  a  differentiation  between  young  slaves  serving  corsairs,  who  rise  to  high 
positions after being converted and seamen who arrived in North African coasts after 
1580 in order to use this region as piracy bases. Most of British and Dutch corsairs who 
arrived  in  Algeria  with  their  ships  were  also  convert  to  Islam.236 However,  what  is 
emphasized here is, seamen raised from kapudans’ household. 
Besides the transition from corsair to hassa captains and corsairs raised around 
ex-corsairs, another significant point is that those who are from Kapudans’ families also 
serve in the navy and they can be promoted up to posts of navy kapudan or beylerbeyi. 
Between  years  1568  and  1569,  Sokullu  Mehmet  Pasha  appointed  the  admiral  of 
Alexandria, Kurdoğlu Hızır Reis to be head of the fleet he sent to Indian Ocean for the 
expedition in Sumatra.  Kurdoğlu Hızır  Reis237 is the son of an ex-corsair,  Kurdoğlu 
muslihiddin Reis, who was assigned as bey to Rhodes when the island was conquered. 
The other son of Kurdoğlu Muslihiddin, Kurdoğlu Ahmet Bey joined in Djerba war in 
1560 as Rhodes’s  bey.238 Barbaros Hayrettin's son, Hasan Pasha239 served as Algeria 
232 Op. cit 173
233 Sicil-i Osmani, Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, v:2 p 631, 
234 Op. cit,  p 639
235 Op. cit,  p 642
236 Salvatore Bono, “Corsairs, slaves and converts in the history of Mediterranean” in Individual,  
Ideologies, and Society, ed. Kirsi Virtanen (Tampere: Tampere Peace Research Center, 2000)  p 47-55
237 Giancarlo, the Ottoman age of exploration, p 197-200
238 Katip Çelebi, Tuhfetü'l-Kibâr p 95
239 Should not be confused with Hasan Agha. Hasan Agha, Western Algeria’s beylerbeyi between 1533 
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beylerbeyi between  years  1544  and  1551.  Sefer  Reis,  who  made  predatory  attacks 
against Portuguese in Indian Ocean beginning from the 1550s, and afterwards recruited 
in the navy by grand vizier  Sokullu Mehmet Pasha, is probably the son of “Sinan the 
Jew”, who participated in corsair attacks in North Africa with Barbaros and his group.240 
When Piri Reis sailed in order to lay siege to Hormuz in 1552, his son Mehmet Bey 
joined in this fleet together with five galleys under his command.241 Son of Sencuvan 
Hasan Pasha became the bey of Alexandria. Apparently, these examples do not provide 
us with the whole picture, but a seafarer class that has a network among members and 
has connections with the Palace is present in the 16th century in Ottoman Empire. 
Was not there any kapudans raised in naval docks in Ottoman navy except those 
who  were  raised  through  piracy?  Definitely,  number  and  qualifications  of  captains 
raised in naval docks was important for the navy. The most well-known seaman who 
was  promoted  to  high  positions  through  traditional  procedures  is  Seydi  Ali  Reis.242 
Nonetheless, in  Mir’at-ül Memalik, in order to prove that he is a good seaman and to 
make the reader respect him, Seydi Ali Reis repeats several times that he was around 
Barbaros Hayrettin. He appoints Hayrettin and other captains as references.243 We have 
already mentioned that the word “corsair” is used for persons who are knowledgeable 
about seamanship due to their acquirements and experience. Seydi Ali Reis identifies 
himself  as  a  corsair  in  that  sense.244 Another  interesting  point  is  that,  seamen  call 
themselves  as  “Hayrettinli” (from/with  Hayrettin  or Hayrettinist);  “We walk on the 
sea / we look for and find the enemy / we take or revenge / they call us Hayrettinli”245 
and 1543 is Barbaros Hayrettin's adopted son. Regarding Hasan Pasha who became beylerbeyi in 
1544, he is Barbaros’s son.
240 Giancarlo Casale, Ottoman guerre de course and the Indian Ocean Spice Trade; The career of Sefer 
Reis ,Itinerario vol:xxxii (2008) no:1 
241 Salih Özbaran, “The Ottoman Turks and the Portugese” in The Ottoman response to European 
expansion : studies on Ottoman-Portuguese relations in the Indian Ocean and Ottoman 
administration in the Arab lands during the sixteenth century( Istanbul ,ISIS 1994) p 131
242 Brummet, Ottoman Seapower, p 104
243 “I had fought under Hayrettin Pasha, Sinan Pasha, and other captains, and had cruised about on the 
Mediterranean, so that I knew every nook and the corner of it ” Mir'at-ül Memalik  p 74, for 
translation;  The Travels and Adventures of the Turkish Admiral Sidi Ali Reis, translated by A. 
Vambery ( Kessinger publishing 2000) p 5
“God is our withness,I was with Hayrettin Pasha and fought against to Andrea Doria and Cend Dal.” 
Mir'at-ül Memalik, p 82
244 See footnote 36-37
245 Seydi Ali Reis, Mirat-ül Memalik, p 96 “Deniz üstünde yürürüz / düşmanı arar buluruz/ öcümüz 
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This rhyme that Seydi Ali Reis used in Miratül Memalik was probably a well-known 
and anonymous one among seamen.  A similar practice to seamen calling themselves 
Hayrettinli is observed within akinci’s organization.  Akinci's beys and akincis fighting 
with them, who used to be semi-independent frontiersmen before Mehmet II period, 
were totally integrated into the central army with the influence of centralization and 
bureaucratization commenced by Mehmet II, and they lost their autonomies. During the 
Mehmet II period, names, occupations, and habitations of akincis called for army at war 
time were enlisted. Akinci troops were divided in two regions; right and left wings. Left 
wing was under the command of sanjakbey of Lepanto, and right wing was under the 
command  of  sanjakbey of  Çirmen.  During  war  time,  they  participated  in  the  war 
according to their determined positions and missions in the army. Regarding the matter 
that interests us, previously,  these territorial divisions used to have the names of old 
beys of  the  ghazis of  the  region.  Left  wing was  called  Turhanlı  after  the  name  of 
Turahan Bey, whereas Mihallu was the name of the right wing, named after a member 
of the Mihaloğulları family246 Even if overestimated statements can not be excerpted 
through  this  similarity,  it  is  an  interesting  common  point  that  akincis  evolved  into 
bureaucratic structure that used to be called after the names of ghazi beys, and corsairs 
and seamen who render service in the navy with the influence of centralization call 
themselves as Hayrettinli. Besides, when it is considered that Seydi Ali Reis had fought 
around Hayrettin, it becomes meaningful that a seaman raised in naval docks like him 
calls himself Hayrettinli.
In summary,  if we try to draw up a framework in light of this information, a 
society  composed  of  corsairs  based  in  North  Africa  before  Barbaros  Hayrettin's 
nomination  as  Kapudan-ı  Derya  was  already  present.  Starting  with  Kemal  Reis, 
relations  between  corsairs  and  central  navy gained  a  new dimension  with  Barbaros 
Hayrettin's nomination as Kapudan-ı Derya. Nomination of hassa captains to the navy 
upon  suggestions  of  persons  at  positions  such  as  Kapudan  Pasha,  Beylerbeyi  or 
sancakbeyi, enabled assignment of corsairs to the navy throughout these relations. On 
komaz alırız /bize Hayrettinli derler”
246 Mariya Kiprovska, The military organization of the akıncıs in Ottoman Rumelia, unpublished M.A. 
Thesis p 79-80
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one hand, slaves recruited by kapudans when they were corsairs became Muslims and 
rose to captain positions and higher, and on the other hand, other seamen raised through 
these  kapudans’  families  held  positions  in  the  navy  and  these  facts  provided  the 
sustainability of seamen elite.  Also, until 1587, instead of nominating as  beylerbeyi 
somebody from the center, Ottomans nominated corsairs raised in Algeria who were 
known in  the  region.   Thereby,  continuous  communication  between  corsairs  in  the 
region and the center was established. Regarding seamen who rose through traditional 
means  within  Ottoman  navy,  they  were  able  to  integrate  themselves  into  this  elite 
society of seamen if they could join this circle.
In  order  to  render  more  meaningful  the  relations  between navy and corsairs 
mentioned  above,  a  deeper  research  upon  this  frame  is  necessary.  Obviously,  it  is 
difficult  to  construct  a  structure  based  on  individuals.   However,  instead  of 
conceptualizing  the  relations  between corsairs  and  the  State  throughout  institutions, 
bringing out a network throughout persons on an indefinite issue like corsair would lead 
us to a more robust conclusion. 
III.2.ii) The Employment of Volunteer Captains by the Imperial Navy
Like  corsairs  who get  on  privateering  recruited  in  the  navy and assigned as 
hassa captains,  seamen  who  contribute  to  Ottoman  naval  force  as  being  volunteer 
captains  also  occupy  an  important  place  within  this  structure.  Usage  of  volunteer 
captains  by  the  center,  their  connections  with  the  center  and  their  contribution to 
Ottoman naval force constitute another dimension of piratical activities.  
These volunteer corsairs used to support the navy in the expeditions. Navy ships 
under Barbaros Hayrettin’s command were accompanied by 70 pieces of corsair ships 
for Prevesa.  7 galleys and 20 galliots from Algeria participated in the siege of Malta.247 
During Cyprus expedition,  this number was around 100.248 During expeditions, these 
247 Guilmartin, Gunpowder and galleys, p 185
248 İdris Bostan, Kıbrıs seferi günlüğü ve osmanlı donanmasının sefer güzergahı, in Beylikten 
İmparatorluğa Osmanlı denizciliği, p 91
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volunteer corsairs joined raids. Before Prevesa, Barbaros ordered these volunteer ships 
to raid Astypalea (Istanbolya) Island.249 After the war, volunteers who joined the navy 
were also allowed to sack Kefalonia Island.250 
These  volunteer  captains  were  sometimes  asked  to  be  vanguards  to  collect 
information for expeditions. 251 If there was not any expedition, volunteer captains were 
sent to enemy coasts for collection of information.  For example in 1567, Memi and 
Abdulgaffar Captains who were volunteer captains wintering in Modon were sent to 
enemy coasts in order to gather intelligence.252 Orders like this sent from the Center are 
frequently  observed  in  mühimme records.  These  orders  also  provide  important 
information to  us  about  relations  between  central  authority  and  volunteer  captains. 
These orders were written by the Center, sent to the related port, and announced the 
corsairs to be used for that mission by name.  This situation indicates that corsairs were 
known by the Center and the Center had information about the port  they winter at. 
Among  those  who  winter  at  ports,  selection  of  certain  corsairs  for  missions  is  an 
indicator to the presence of seamen trusted by the Center among these corsairs.  This 
practice  continued  in  the  following  periods  and  volunteer  corsairs  were  utilizes 
advantage of for intelligence activities (“dil almak”).  
Ships,  galliots,  and  fustas designed suitably for predatory attacks  were more 
useful compared to galleys due to their speed, and ability to maneuver. However, even 
if these galiots were convenient for raiding and vanguard, they were not successful at 
head-on engagement with galleys.253 Nonetheless, they were used in sea wars for their 
ability to maneuver and speed. Prior to Lepanto, Uluç Ali Pasha planned to use these 
galliots for breaking the order of enemy ships instead of putting them into direct clash 
against galleys.254
Out of expedition time, these corsair ships used to attack both commercial and 
war ships, and at times raid coasts, and pillage. Apart from naval expeditions, attacks of 
249 Katip, Tuhef'ül Kibar,  p 71
250 Katip , Tuhfet'ül Kibar, p 75
251 Katip, Tuhfet'ül Kibar, p 72
252 MD 7, hüküm no : 1431
253 Guilmartin, Gunpowder and Galleys, p 47
254 Guilmartin, Gunpowder and Galleys p 246
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Ottoman corsairs were also a serious threat.  Confronted with this growing menace after 
1538, construction of city walls and watchtowers was started on the coasts of Naples 
and Sicily.  These works were expanded towards west because of the growing menace 
along  the  coast.255 Following  Djerba  War  in  1560,  Algeria-based  privateering  was 
intensified  in  Mediterranean.256 Apart  from Algerian  based attacks,  usage of  middle 
Mediterranean's  ports  by  Ottoman  corsairs  contributed  to  Ottoman  sovereignty  in 
Middle and East Mediterranean. Privateering was fortified especially in Modon, Santa 
Maura/ Levkas, Lepanto, Vlöre, Navarino/Zonchio, Durazzo and Prevesa ports. These 
corsairs were influent on shifting hands of commerce. Western Christian powers’ loss of 
important  bases  and these maritime  powers’ lacking of security in  the seas  through 
Ottoman corsair attacks changed balances in long-term.  Commerce was passed into the 
hands of Ottomans; Jews first, then Greeks and Turks, and finally Armenians.257
Corsairs provided sources for the navy out of wartime, as well. First of all, big 
numbers of oarsmen were needed for Ottoman navy’s galleys with oars. There were 
alternative ways for assurance of oarsmen for the navy. Among oarsmen, there were 
galley slaves, oarsmen taken from families in exchange of avarız (extraordinary taxes), 
and  oarsmen  hired  with  wage.258 In  case  where  oarsmen  are  insufficient,  slaves 
purchased from slave markets  were made work.259  Therefore,  also out  of  wartime, 
corsairs bringing slaves to the slave markets were important at this point. According to 
Gazavatname, when he wintered in Mtylienne while privateering, Barbaros also sold 
captives he seized to the captains of ships with oars.260
One of the other advantages brought by volunteer captains during peace times 
was supply of appropriate ships in a short time when needed by the navy. Corsairs used 
to  sell  the  ships  they  seized  to  the  navy from time  to  time.  With  an  order  Sultan 
Suleiman sent to Barbaros, he wanted three ships to be sent to Kavala, and one of these 
255 Braudel, Mediterranean, p 850
256 Brauldel, Mediterranean, p 880
257 Pryor, Geography, Technology, and War, p 187 - 192 
258 İdris Bostan, Osmanlı Donanmasında Kürekçi Temini meselesi ve 958 (1551) tarihli kürekçi 
defterleri, in Beylikten İmparatorlupa Osmanlı Denizciliği, p 68-69
259 İdris Bostan, Osmanli Bahriye Teşkilatı, p.12
260 Seyyid Muradi, Gazavatname, p.116
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ships was purchased from  levents.261 In a similar  order, it  was ordered to supply the 
needs for ships to protect Kavala with those purchased from levents. Because one of the 
two ships in Kavala was not compatible for sailing, and also other ships were needed, 
purchase of one ship from levents,  and its transmission was ordered. Transmission of 
two  more  ships  if  there  are  any  among  those  purchased  from  levents,  and  if  not, 
attachment of two ships among other ships that would be equivalent of the first one in 
order to keep ready four ships in Kavala was demanded.262
To summarize, we have already explained in the previous section that volunteer 
captains (privateers) outside the navy were recognized by the Center, and disclosed the 
channels through which these seamen communicate with the Center. Even if some of 
these corsairs were recruited in the navy, most of them were privateering in the sea and 
establishing external relations with the navy. Although these corsairs were not profited 
much during wars in  terms of the usage of their  ships,  they were being helpful  for 
disarranging enemy ships’  order,  and they were driven forward for  intelligence  and 
marauding.  Besides,  captives needed for assurance of oarsmen and ships needed for 
short  periods  were  purchased  from  these  corsairs.  Thereby  volunteer  corsairs,  as 
supplementary forces, supplied needs of the navy. 
III.3) The Central Authority over Privateers and Piracy
Process of Ottoman centralization did not run in the same paths with that of 
contemporary European states.  Different experiences that shaped these two processes 
became an obstacle before an examination of this first within the conceptual framework 
prepared for the later.  However, Karen Barkey presented an alternative framework to 
centralization  of  Ottoman  Empire.   As  a  fact,  unlike  Europe  rural  rebellions  as  a 
reaction  to  centralization  were  not  seen  in  the  Ottoman  Empire.  Instead,  banditry 
became  a  crucial  notion  against  centralization  in  this  process.  On  the  other  hand, 
Ottoman central authority, as a strategy, tried to integrate these bandits to the system. 
261 Mühimme defteri 951, hüküm no:116
262 Mühimme defteri 951, hüküm no: 140
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Traditional classes, like peasants, did not stand against central authority and they did 
not fight for their land. They preferred to quit their lands and adapted themselves to the 
new system.  As a  result,  they transformed into bandit/mercenaries.  Ottoman central 
authority tried to convict  these rising powers to engage in the system.  This was an 
alternative  but  also  a  comparable  centralization  process,  in  relation  to  European 
system.263 Barkey has analyzed this process in the context of celali uprights. However, 
we should argue that the source of mercenaries/banditry and privateering/piracy was the 
same fountain; çift-bozan reaya.
People who left their land were called çift-bozan, some became mercenaries and 
these mercenaries  started to  attack  and raid properties  of  Ottoman  reaya  as bandits 
when they could not find jobs. Some people among these groups grew stronger and 
became powerful bandit leaders. Central authority sometimes crashed these celalis, and 
in other cases, it gave them place in the ranks of the Ottoman army to struggle against 
other celalis. The aim of this study is not to examine the celali uprisings. Yet, we can 
argue  that  there  were  some significant  similarities  between mercenaries/bandits  and 
privateers/pirates, that would allow us to use Barkey’s framework for the 16th century 
corsairs.
As Akdağ argues, the way of the robbery by  çiftbozans  who lived in coastal 
areas was piracy. Rising number of çiftbozans in the Aegean region contributed to the 
rise of piracy.  Çiftbozans  gathering around galley captains formed the crew of pirate 
ships. After 1550's, increase of  çiftbozans affected the rising of piratical activities in 
East Mediterranean.264 For instance, 20,000  çiftbozan reaya sent to Algeria from the 
western Anatolian coasts had joined to corsair ship's crew.265 In this sense, the fact that 
the Palace, at the end of the 16th century, called the pirates as “celalis at sea”, is quite 
interesting.266
263 Karen Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats, The Ottoman Route to State Centralization,(Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca and London, 1994) p 8-11
264 Mustafa Akdağ, Türk halkının dirlik ve düzenlik kavgası, celali isyanları, (İstanbul, Barış Yayınevi, 
1999) p 146-147
265 Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Tarihi,  p 294
266 Bostan, Adriyatik'te korsanlık, p 19
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Apart from the similar origins of the warriors groups, the strategy of the central 
authority vis-à-vis the pirates in the second half of 16th century can be compared to its 
strategy against the celali's gangs. Even though, Barkey constructed this framework for 
Celali's uprights which occurred at the end of the 16th century, the strategy of taking the 
anti-center  forces  under  Ottoman service was already put  in  practice  by the central 
authority  against  the  pirates  throughout  the  16th century.   It  seems  that  this  was  a 
traditional method of centralization applied by the Ottoman government. It should be 
emphasized that the thin line between legal and illegal could be passed quite easily. A 
pirate could become an officer of the Imperial Navy and after a short time he could 
return to his piratical life.  The general tendency of the government was to accept the 
pirates  to  the  state  service.  The  central  authority  could  provide  its  authority  at  sea 
partially through this practice.
For instance, as mentioned above, Kara Durmuş was one of the corsairs who 
joined  Ottoman  Imperial  navy as  a  captain  of  Hassa  galley,  during  the  1499-1502 
Ottoman-Venice war. After the Zonchio sea war (1501), he returned to the sea as a 
powerful pirate and started to attack Ottoman coasts and ships. That's to say, an “old” 
corsair engaged in Imperial Navy as an officer transformed into a pirate. Then he was 
punished  by  another  “old”  corsair  Kemal  Reis  with  the  order  of  the  Ottoman 
government. However, pirates were not suppressed in every case. Some pirates were 
forgiven  by the  central  authority  and they  could  be  promoted  to  high  ranks  in  the 
Ottoman service. From the beginning of the 16th century, several important figures of 
Ottoman naval history have risen in this way.
In October 1516, the Venetian  bailo complained about the raids of Kurdoğlu 
Muslihiddin to the Ottoman court. Grand Vizier Piri Pasha announced that this pirate 
was harmful for Ottomans too. Thus, he replied to the Venetian  Balio that Venetians 
could catch this pirate if they could.267 After the death of Prince Korkut, he migrated to 
North Africa like Barbarossas and continued with his  predatory attacks  not only on 
“infidels” but on the Ottomans as well. Besides, Kurdoğlu sacked the Ottoman islands, 
Mytilene and Naksos.  Another seaman who was seen as the peak point of the science 
267 Vatin, Rodos Şövalyeleri , p 123 and 296
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of Ottoman navigation, Piri Reis was a pirate too. After the death of his uncle Kemal 
Reis,  he  left  the  Ottoman  service  and  returned  to  the  seas  as  a  pirate.  Venetian 
ambassador Mocenigo left Istanbul with the escort of two Ottoman fustas(small oared 
galley) in order to go Sporades. Piri Reis and other pirates were standing on the route 
for  raid.  One  of  Ottoman  fustas  was  under  attack  and  Mocenigo  found  shelter  in 
Chalci.268 As seen in this chapter in detail, individual relations were determinant in this 
process.  When  corsairs  lost  their  main  relation  or  felt  themselves  in  danger,  they 
followed alternative options like privateering or piracy, instead of being an officer in 
the Imperial Navy. However, this was not a one way path, this process was reversible. 
These pirates could become again the most influential captains of Imperial Navy in a 
following  period.  Kurdoğlu  Muslihiddin  became  the  sanjakbey  of  Rhodes  after  its 
conquest,  and his sons were also promoted to important ranks. Piri Reis returned to 
Ottoman  service  in  1517.  When  he  was  executed,  he  was  in  charge  as  the  Grand 
Admiral of  the Alexandria fleet.
There is no evidence justifying piratical activities of Barbarossas. We can not 
argue  that  Barbarossas  attacked  Ottomans  coasts  or  ships  of  Muslims  and  vessels. 
However,  we  know  that  Muslihiddin  Kurdoğlu  and  Piri  Reis  were  close  to  the 
Barbarossas in this period. We can assume that Barbarossas has been informed about 
these  piratical  attacks.  Another  interesting  anecdote  takes  place  in  Gazavatname.  3 
years  later  than  the  migration  of  Barbarossas  to  North  Africa,  they  returned  their 
homeland, Mytilene to spend that winter. They hired a broker (tellal) and announced 
that:
One whose property is taken by force by Levends in the market shall 
come to me. I shall compensate for their loss. We came here for your 
good wishes. We shall not allow harm to anyone's property or chastity. 
One who does so is not one of us.269
Did this  practice  really  happen?  If  it  happened,  why did Hızır  Reis  need to 
announce  his  “side”?  This  practice  might  have  been  reconstructed  retrospectively. 
268 Vatin, Ibid, p 119
269 Seyyid Muradi, Gazavatname, p 114 -my translation
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Probably,  Barbaros wanted to clear  his name in the last  part  of his  life as a Grand 
Admiral  of  the  Ottomans.  However,  Mustafa  Âli  notes  the  opposite  of  Barbaros' 
claims.  According to him,  Barbaros followed the same path with other corsairs.  He 
started  his  career  as  a  pirate  like  others.270 Barbaros'  own  memory  includes  some 
question marks  as  well.  Mytilene  was his  mainland and he was brought  up in  that 
island. We could assume that the people of the island had known Hızır Reis, and his 
brothers as well. On the other hand, he became one of the most famous seamen in the 
Mediterranean at that time and it seems unreasonable to imagine that the people have 
not heard of Barbarossas’ fame and “their side”.  Thus, this incident seems unreliable. 
Otherwise, if this really happened, this practice can be interpreted in two different ways; 
1) this announcement was the turning point of Hızır Reis’ career; he has chosen his 
“side” and decided to be a “ghazi”, it means an Ottoman privateer acting in accordance 
to Islamic law and collaborating  with the central  authority or 2) some captains  and 
levends around him attacked Ottoman coasts and ships even if Hızır Reis did not attend 
(or even may be not approve) those raids  and he needed to stress his “side”. In all 
aspects, we can say that piracy and privateering were two brothers of sealife.
The  story  of  Turgut  Reis,  one  of  the  most  famous  corsairs,  was  such  an 
interesting case in this context. This was a characteristic example for the relationship 
between pirates and corsairs and state. Turgut Reis acted like a pirate, privateer and 
officer as well within a short time. About the transfer of Turgut Reis from privateering 
to the navy service, Katip Çelebi notes;
When Sinan Pasha sailed from Istanbul, Turgut Reis would come from 
North Africa and join Grand Admiral  Sinan Pasha's  fleet  as volunteer 
Reis. Sinan Pasha had an unrest due to Turgut's powerful fleet equipped 
with canons and armfires. He invited  Turgut Reis to engage in Imperial 
Navy in fear of turning him against to Ottoman State. Turgut Reis and his 
close  companions,  famous  corsairs,  have  been  put  into  service  of 
Imperial  Navy.  Besides,  Turgut  Reis  became  sanjakbey  of  Karlıili 
province.271
270 Mustafa Âli, Mevaid'ün Nefais, p 288
271 Katip Çelebi, Ibid, p 88 -my translation
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As Katip  Çelebi  mentions,  while  he  was  sanjakbey of  Karlıili  province,  he 
attacked a Venetian ship, killed all the crew of the ship then burned the Venetian vessel. 
Following this incident, Venetian bailo complained about Turgut Reis to the Ottoman 
court. Then, Turgut Reis was called to Istanbul. He did not obey this order, sailed to 
North Africa and in the Katip Çelebi's words; 
He has not obeyed the orders and become an outlaw for two years. Then, 
he  was  forgiven  by  the  Sultan  reluctantly  because  of  the  campaign  of 
Tripoli and Sultan sent to an invitation, a Koran and a golden sword and he 
promised  to  promote  of  Turgut  Reis  as  the  beylerbey of  Tripoli  after 
conquest until his death.272 
However, the first beylerbeyi of Tripoli was not Turgut Reis after the conquest. 
As a reply against this decision of Ottoman government, Turgut Reis sailed to North 
Africa again. In this time, some other galley captains of Navy joined him as well. Then 
they returned to the navy with the permission of Turgut Reis and continued to sail as 
Navy officers. After two years, Turgut came to Vlöre, an Ottoman port in the Adriatic, 
with  precious  gifts  and  slaves  for  the  Sultan.  He  declared  his  request  for  rank  of 
beylerbey of  Tripoli  and  this  time  his  request  was  accepted  and  he  remained  as 
beylerbey of Tripoli until his death.273
As seen in this case obviously,  a powerful corsair  was engaged in the Navy 
because of fear. Then this corsair left service and acted like pirate. However, Ottomans 
did not prefer to struggle against this powerful pirate. On the contrary, this pirate was 
invited one more time for navy service.  Nevertheless,  request of this  pirate was not 
accepted by the central authority. In the long term, pirate could succeed to become a 
beylerbey.  Furthermore,  he has been one of the most  important  seamen in  Ottoman 
naval history.  To sum up, relationship between corsairs and states was not based on 
absolute obeisance. This was a symbiotic relation.  When one of parties was not content 
of his position, the unofficial treaty was broken until display of tolerance by the central 
authority, or the death of the seaman -like in the case of Kara Durmuş-.
272 Katip Çelebi, ibid, p 89 -my translation
273 Katip Çelebi, ibid, p 91
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CHAPTER IV
THE END OF THE GREAT KAPUDANS' ERA
IV.1) The Imperial Navy As “A Corsair Fleet” and against the “Pirates’ 
Fleets”
Navy was a crucial element of the empire.   However, as we have mentioned 
previously, its principal mission was not to destroy the enemy navy by high sea battles. 
During the 16th century,  only two high sea battles,  Prevesa and Lepanto have been 
fought.    Except  these  wars,  the  naval  sieges  were  combined  with  the  land  army. 
Besides, supporting the land campaigns, and maintaining the security of the trade routes 
by fighting against the pirates were among the functions of the imperial navy.  In some 
seasons,  the navy was used to sail  for purposes other  than siege.  Considering these 
campaigns and the plunders on the way back from sieges/conquests, there was hardly a 
difference between these plunders and those by the corsairs.  The attack of the Ottoman 
navy was like that of a great corsair fleet.  On 1537, during the war against Venice, 
Hayrettin Pasha has sailed with the navy, conquered some of the Venetian islands, and 
has levied a tribute on some others.  During this campaign, the navy staff plundered 
some  of  the  islands  with  the  approval  of  Barbarossa.   The  next  year,  during  the 
campaign  over  Crete,  the  navy took more  than  15,000 prisoners  by  plundering  the 
villages for a week, instead of besieging the castles.  Voluntary reis were ordered for the 
plunder of some islands.  On 1557, Piyale Pasha has plundered Majorca, and turned to 
Istanbul  with booty.274  The plunders  on the way back were an integral  part  of  the 
campaigns.  The firsthand registers of Zekeriyazade Ferah, the scribe of the dockyard 
who was on the campaign with Piyale Pasha, tell about the plunders in detail.   On the 
274 Katip Çelebi, Tuhfet'ül Kibar, p 94
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way to  Djerba  War,  the  imperial  navy pillaged  Malta.   Zekeriyazade  notes,  “Their 
sheeps and lambs, their animals in the barns, their ox, their grain mills, farms, cheese, 
and their herders were plundered.  The infidels were left in a position of bareness.  And 
their horses were put into the vessels.” 275  When the corsair reis Divane Ali has passed 
with the Algerian ships, to the ‘side of the infidels’ for plunder following Djerba war, 
the corsair  fleet  was assumed to be the Ottoman imperial  navy by local  population. 
Besides,  Messina Island and the port  of Kalavri  was again pillaged  by the Imperial 
Navy on the way back. 276 
 As Zekeriyazade mentions, the real purpose of these plunders was to put “the 
infidels in a position of bareness”.  Since no clash did not rise during these plunders, 
there was no loss of vessel or soldier, and a substantial amount of booty was gained. 
Besides, the harm done to the other side was quite high.  Sale of the prisoners was 
another method applied by the Ottoman navy in case of necessity.  The corsairs were 
taking prisoners in their ship, sailed to open sea and run up a white flag and selling them 
to their family. By this way, they could sell them to higher prices than the market price 
and they did not have to feed them in their ships.   
This practice was also used by Barbarossa in the Toulon expedition.  France had 
demanded for assistance from Suleiman, against Spain.  Barbarossa sailed for the coasts 
of south France in the spring of 1543.  He was conquering castles with French and 
leaving them to France.  The navy passed the winter of 1543 in the port of Toulon. 
France had previously guaranteed to cover the logistic  needs during this expedition. 
However, France did not provide the order and salaries it had promised.  Thus, in 1544 
Barbarossa attacked the Italian coasts, took prisoners and sold them. 277   
For a peasant living on Sicily, Messina or Majorca, it did not matter whether the 
danger from the sea came from the Ottoman navy or the corsairs.  Besides, even though 
they were in the service of the imperial navy, the corsairs in the North Africa made 
275 Zekeriyazade Ferah, Cerbe Savaşı, yayına hazırlayan Orhan Şaik Gökyay, (IstanbuL Tercüman 
yayınları, 1980), p 47
276 Zekeriyazade, Cerbe Savaşı, p 101-104
277 Halil İnalcık, Haçlılar ve Osmanlılar, Barbaros Hayrettin Paşa Fransada in Türk Denizcilik TarihiTürk 
Denizcilik Tarihi  ed. Bülent Arı (Ankara : T.C. Başbakanlık Denizcilik Müsteşarlığı,2002) 
86
independent  attacks  with their  own ships in the West Mediterranean.278 Thus, in the 
perception of the other side, this threat was associated with the Turks.  The shores that 
have been previously plundered by the corsairs were plundered by the same seamen 
with the navy and the private ships after they entered navy’s service.  For Spain, the 
threat from the sea was identified with the person of Hayrettin Pasha, and with that of 
Turgut Reis, during the last years of Charles V’s reign.  From this point of view, the war 
on the sea was not against Suleiman, but against the North African corsairs. 279                
In some situations, the corsair attacks were utilized as a maritime strategy.  The 
Ottoman borders have been extended to Suez with the conquests of Egypt and Syria. 
With this base, the Ottomans conquered the first port opening into the Indian Ocean. 
During Suleiman's reign, the rivalry with the Portuguese started in the region.  On 1538, 
Hadım Suleiman Pasha, establishing an alliance in the region sailed to the Indian Ocean 
with a powerful navy, besieged Diu but failed.  Yet, he had managed to conquer Aden 
and Zebid. With these conquests, the Red Sea had passed totally to the Ottoman control, 
and Aden, an important naval base opening to the Indian Ocean had become Ottoman 
territory. 280 
The Ottomans had the intention to take the Indian trade under their control, by 
maintaining the security in the Indian Ocean through establishing naval bases, a strategy 
similar to that they applied in the Mediterranean. With this purpose, on 1552, Piri Reis 
besieged Hormuz but could not conquer, and retreated to Basra.281  On 1554, Seydi Ali 
Reis was sent to the region, to the take the navy out of the Basra Bay.  However, during 
the battle with the Portuguese the Ottoman navy was seriously endangered.  The navy of 
Seydi Ali Reis was destroyed off Muscat.  Ottomans were failing during the sieges and 
high sea battles in the Indian Ocean.  For Brumett, the main reasons of this failure are 
related  to  the  logistics  of  supply,  protection  and  the  conquest'.282  Besides,  high 
firepower  of  the  vessels  and  the  incompetence  of  the  galleys  constructed  for 
Mediterranean in the Indian Ocean were also determinant.   
278 Giancarlo Casale, Ottoman Course de Guerre  p 60
279 Ibarra, Kanuni döneminde deniz savaşları, in Türkler, V:9 p 603
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282 Palmira Brummet, The Ottomans as a world power, p 13
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Sefer Reis, who became the most important captain in the region after Seydi 
Reis, has been promoted to the position of commander of the Empire's Indian Fleet. 
From this date on, he left the Mediterranean strategy and developed a new one, realizing 
the new types of obstacles before the Ottoman navy. We have mentioned before that the 
Ottomans conquered important naval bases in the Mediterranean, in order to maintain 
the security of the trade routes.  Sefer Reis, replaced this strategy with that of corsair 
attacks with small fleets to block the Portuguese trade. 283
Portuguese merchant ships generally had a few artillery pieces aboard, but they 
were  usually  only  lightly  manned  and  consequently  lightly  armed.  Galleys  could 
capture such ships by first immobilizing them -either by attacking them in a place and 
time in which there was no wind to begin with, or by using their own cannons to destroy 
the  sails  of  the  vessel-  and  then  swarming  them and  boarding  them through  hand 
combat.284 The Portuguese fleets sent against Sefer Reis were inefficient. In the 1550s, 
Ottomans regained control over the Indian trade that had passed under the control of 
Portugal  in  the  first  quarter  of  the  century.   This  shift  was  due  to  the  Ottomans’ 
geographical  advantage  on the trade  routes  and the use of  the corsair  attacks  as  an 
official strategy.285   
The navy was an important tool served to the policies determined by Ottoman 
governance. After the amphibious attacks conquered the important islands and ports, 
these bases were used to accomplish the farther attacks. Especially the plunders of the 
navy in middle and west Mediterranean sea, were parallel to the image corsairs created 
in the opposite party by the predatory corsair attacks in Indian Ocean. However, the 
navy was an Imperial navy and its main objective was to maintain the safety in the sea 
routes  of  the  empire  rather  than  the  attacks.  After  the  important  naval  bases  were 
conquered by Ottomans, the activity of Christian corsairs were reduced but the attacks 
remained. In this period, more damage was given by the bandits levends rather than the 
Christian corsairs. The corsair threat grew by the increase of corsair activities at the end 
283 Giancarlo Casale, Ottoman course de guerre,  p 74
284 Casale, based e-mailed correspondences in 06.06.2009. I am grateful to Giancarlo Casale for his 
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of the century. Therefore, Ottoman navy was equipped to keep the trade routes open 
during the 16th century against the corsair threat.
The defensive network of small flotillas saved Ottoman shore against pirates and 
enemy attacks. There were two squadrons in the Aegean Sea. The center of the first 
squadron was Kavala, located on the Macedonian coast. The safety of the region to the 
Mytillene was under the responsibility of this flotilla. The center of the second squadron 
was Mytillene. The two fleets maintain the safety of Aegean Sea. The other two fleets 
centered in Alexandria and Rhodes were responsible of the safety of East Mediterranean 
Sea. 286 This defense system was changed in the 1590s. The center of the Northern or 
Aegean Wing was Chios. This squadron was responsible of the region from Modon and 
Coron to the Samos. The center of the Southern or Mediterranean Wing was Rhodes 
and  this  arm  was  responsible  of  the  East  Mediterranean  region  including  Rhodes, 
Alexandria, Syria and Cyprus.287
If the rise of the piratical activity in the east Mediterranean was a phenomena of 
the last quarter of the century, Ottoman coasts were attacked by the corsairs (harami 
levents) all through the century.   Even though Gelibolulu Âli  mentions that there were 
not  any  pirates  around  the  islands  of  Lesbos  and  Limnos  during  the  reign  of 
Suleiman288, he too admits the existence of pirates plundering the Aegean shores and 
ships.289  In 1545, as mentioned in a letter written in Balat (Miletos) and addressed to the 
Palace,  bandits  levends,  with  another  name  pirates,  were  wounding  people  and 
plundering the villages.  Besides, the Palace was informed that the plunders took place 
in the winter and that they may increase in the summer.  
A bandit reis named Saru Ali, returned back to sea in one hour upon plundering 
the houses in Balat  with more than 200 levends. It was informed in the letter that these 
pirates made new ships in the uninhabited islands in the Aegean Sea. It was guessed that 
they used Aydın province, Menteşe Region and Samos island with the small ships they 
286 Colin Imber, The navy of Suleyman, p 42-43
287 Pal Fodor, The organisation of the defence in the eastern Mediterranean(end of the 16th century) , in 
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used-most probably the galiots. It was ordered to sanjakbey of Menteşe by the Palace to 
capture  the  pirates  and  to  Hüseyin  subaşı who  was  defending  the  coastline,  to 
investigate those coastlines and islands. 290 It was also ordered to Barbaros Hayrettin to 
investigate the islands and the coastlines and to burn the ships that can not be used in 
the Navy. 291 However, by the orders given later, we see that the corsair could not have 
been captured and the cautions grew harder. Because the pirate named Karahisarlı Saru 
Ali  went into  the shore and the  kadıs  didn’t  let  this  pirate  to be captured  without 
permission by Hüseyin  Subaşı,  who was responsible  of the sea security,  ordered all 
kadıs to capture the so-called pirate.292 Moreover, in order to prevent the pirates from 
returning back to sea by getting a boat,  Sultan Suleiman ordered Cafer  bey (lala  of 
Prince Selim), not to let anyone in the coastline construct boats. 293
Saru Ali, being the most powerful pirate the later period of Barbarossa, was not 
the only example.  According to a letter written by Barbarossa to the Palace, two pirate 
ships had captured two ships.  A ship from the navy encountered these pirates, and freed 
the  ships.   Yet,  the  pirates  succeed  to  land  and  run  way.  The  Palace  ordered  the 
sanjakbeys to arrest these pirates and to informe their names to the center.294   Similarly, 
upon the complaint of Mehmed under the protectorate of Kavala,  Beylerbeyi of Algeria 
was informed for the arrest of the pirates named Köle Memi and Marmarişkor.  295  If the 
pirate levends were never absent in the Aegean Sea all through the century, in the last 
quarter of the century these attacks increased significantly.  Replacing the navies in the 
Mediterranean, the corsairs rose to the dominant position.   
290 951(1544/1545) tarihli mühimme defteri, hüküm no: 201
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IV. 2: What happened in the 1570s?
IV. 2. i: The Financial Limitations of the Imperial Navy 
Keeping  a  permanent  navy,  recovering  the  losses,  recruiting  mariners,  and 
launching  expeditions  were  costly  activities.   This  was  a  pressure  on  the  treasury. 
Ottomans have launched great sea expeditions by large navies, during an important part 
of the 16th century.   The burden of the navy over the treasury increased constantly 
through the century.    
The navy of Barbarossa which had gained a victory in Prevesa against the Holy 
League had important losses in the aftermath of the battle, because of the storm.  The 
navy had lost about 70 galleys and galliots near Albanian coast. Taking advantage of the 
situation,  Andrea Doria conquered Castelnuovo.  Next year,  Barbarossa re-conquered 
the castle with a new navy.  However, the cost of the reconstruction of the navy was 
high.  Imber shows that the navy formed for the expedition of Hercegnovi in 1539, cost 
12 million  akçes.296 This  cost  included  only the salaries  paid  to  the  sailors  and the 
craftsmen working in the construction of the navy.  The cost of the material  for the 
construction and the repair of the ships, as well as the costs of the munition boarded on 
the ships were not included in this amount. We should consider that the total amount 
was much higher than 12 million akçe. This amount was paid by the central treasury.297 
Out of the expedition seasons, the costs of the squadrons held for the security of 
the sea routes was more than half million gold ducats per year.  298  Under extraordinary 
conditions, mobilizations of the navy, at the strategically important moments of the 16th 
century necessitated  treasury’s  support.   However,  this  meant  in  the short  term,  the 
disappearance of the excess saved by the treasury.  For instance, in 1543 the cost of the 
equipment of the fleet sent to France was 1,2 million gold ducats, which was equal to 72 
296 Colin Imber, The Costs of Naval Warfare: The Accounts of Hayrettin Barbarossa's Herceg Novi 
Campaign in 1539," Archivum Ottomanicum 4 (1972)  in “studies in ottoman history and law” 
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million akçe. For the period, the expenditure was 112 million akçe, the regular income 
was 198,9 million akçe, thus leaving an excess of 86,9 million.299 Thus, a great amount 
of this excess of  87 million were spent for this expedition.         
The cost of the navy was not only due to the construction work.  The yearly cost 
of a galley was almost equal to its construction cost.  Between 1534 and 1573 the cost 
of the navy was multiplied by three. 300  The galleys in Prevesa were smaller than the 
half of the galleys in Lepanto.  This also meant a rise of the number of the oars, fighters 
and mariners.  As a matter of fact, the costs of staff and commodities also increased.301  
Beside the rise of the naval costs, the price revolution that influenced the whole 
Mediterranean in the last quarter of the 16th century became another important factor. 
In this period, the prices of commodities and services tripled and even quadrupled in 
Europe. Inflation started in the Western Europe, affected first Italy, than middle Europe. 
Later, this crisis reached the Ottoman Empire. Particularly, after 1585 the empire was 
affected by the crisis.  In 1606 the crisis reached its zenith. 302  
IV.2.  ii: “Geography is Destiny”303
One of the existing arguments on Ottoman navigation is that the Ottomans have 
lost their short term dominance in the Mediterranean as the result of their incapability to 
adapt  themselves  to  the developing sea technology.  For  Glete,  guns and gun-armed 
warships rested as characteristic of Europe and they were used on a very limited scale 
by  the  Asian  seamen.  This  situation  resulted  from the  fact  that  society  lacked  the 
dynamism needed to absorb the technological developments and the elasticity needed to 
make changes in the institutional framework.304  According to him, other Mediterranean 
empires like the Ottoman Empire lost their position in the sea for the same reasons.  305 
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Cipolla too characterizes the Mediterranean empires with conservatism and sees it as the 
underlying  reason of  the  technological  difference.   This  was  also the  reason of  the 
decline  of  Venice  and the  inadequacy of  Spain. 306 According  to  Cipolla,  Ottomans 
under the influence of ‘oriental’ culture could not adopt the technological changes.      
Considering that the environmental conditions were among the most significant 
factors determining the technological design, and that this is particularly true for the 
field  of  navigation,  this  approach  seems  problematic.  Sea  powers  dominating  the 
Mediterranean were not unaware of the sea technology.  Every navy had formed its own 
sea power in accordance with its strategic purposes.  Spanish galleys were designed as a 
tactical assault craft.  The galliots and the galleys of the North African corsairs were in 
the  form of  a  strategic  raiding  craft.   Venetian  galleys  were  shaped as  an  artillery 
platform.  The purpose of the Ottoman ships was principally to transport siege forces to 
their destination and cover their operations so they were constructed in accordance to 
this  purpose307  Thus,  geographical  conditions  and strategic  priorities  shaped the  sea 
technology.  
Technical  differences  existed  even  among  the  sea  powers  in  Mediterranean. 
Therefore,  it  was  inevitable  that  the  ships  sailing  into  the  ocean  and  those  in 
Mediterranean would follow different technological paths. When a significant change 
occurred, it was transferred from one shore of the Mediterranean to another in a short 
time.308  There were not insurmountable  obstacles before the circulation of technical 
knowledge, in the context of  fluidity of cultural borders.  For instance, from among the 
25 Portuguese slaves bestowed to Hadım Suleiman Pasha, the most knowledgeable and 
cooperative two slaves were sent to Istanbul in 1537. Gian Frencesco Giustiniani,  a 
Venetian  renegade  in  the  Sultan’s  service,  took one  of  these  slaves  under  Ottoman 
service by convincing him.   
This  Portuguese,  Diego  Martins  who  was  a  Jew  previously  converted  to 
Christianity, converted to Islam and assisted Hadım Suleiman Pasha with Giustiniani in 
306 Cipolla, p 45
307 Guilmartin, p 217-218
308 Braudel, p 840
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the campaign to the Indian Ocean. 309 The  firepower of the galleasses developed by the 
Venetians were effective in Lepanto, the most important Ottoman defeat in the sea.  Six 
galleasses modified from the galleys with high boards provided a great advantage to the 
Holy League on the battle  field.310  Besides, the Spanish soldiers disposing firearms 
against  infantries  (tımarlı  sipahis)311 constituting  the  heart  of  the  Ottoman  forces 
became another source of superiority.    
Even though the  Ottoman defeat in Lepanto was a crucial war, it is not possible 
to define it as the end of Ottoman domination in the sea.   The ships were reconstructed 
and in the next spring the navy sailed again.  Behind this, how was the deficiencies 
related to techniques and stuff were recovered?  The Grand Vizier's Council has ordered 
the chief shipwright of the Arsenal for the construction of similar galleasses.  During the 
winter,  in  the  Ottoman  dockyard  an  imitation  of  the  Venetian  galleasses  was 
constructed.  Five galleasses took their place in the navy that sailed in the spring.312  For 
the navy formed in 1572, new warriors were needed to replace the thousands of sipahis 
died in Lepanto. The government demanded that these new soldiers use musket and 
bow and  that the volunteers attending the navy should know to use firearms. Besides, it 
ordered to the sandjakbeys to buy the firearms of the civil people in order to give them 
to the troops. 313  
Guilmartin mentions that the seamen disappeared in Lepanto were much more 
important than the material losses, since the navy was renewed in a short time, while 
manpower deficiency could not be recovered.  This problem was overcome through the 
recruitment of the corsairs by the navy. Among the losses in Lepanto, there were not 
vessels from North Africa.  Under the commandment of Grand Admiral Kılıç Ali Pasha, 
who was also the former beylerbeyi of Algeria, Magribian sailors and ships constituted 
309 Casale, p 94-95
310 Guilmartin, p 240-241. For further technical information about lepanto seawar, see p Guilmartin, p 
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the core of the new navy. 314  Hence, contrary to the arguments we have mentioned 
above, the Ottoman government had a flexible structure.  It had the capacity to respond 
to the technological shifts occurring in the Mediterranean, and to imitate the novelties in 
a  short  time.  The  fact  that  the  galleons  were  not  appropriate  for  the  climatic  and 
geographical conditions of the Mediterranean,  underlay the use of the galleys by the 
Mediterranean sea powers.  Ottoman galleys managed to maintain the trade routes open 
–which was the priority of the Ottomans-, even though they were inefficient  vis-à-vis 
the Portuguese warship galleons 315  Portuguese vessels could not follow these galleys. 
In the Red sea which was similar to Mediterranean and the galleons were inefficient.  
Under these conditions, with the other Mediterranean sea powers, Ottomans who 
have chosen the most efficient technology for Mediterranean from among two different 
traditions, would be on the side of the losers in the long run.  From 1580 onwards, with 
the entrance of the vessels into Mediterranean a new era has been started.  Between 
1580 and 1620, Dutch and English corsairs became influential in whole Mediterranean. 
The  activities  of  the  northern  corsairs  establishing  in  North  Africa  had  destructive 
effects particularly for Venice.   
Venice tried to construct different types  of ships to cope with the pirates.  In 
order to increase the maneuverability of the galleasses used in Lepanto worked for a 
long time. However, these galleasses could only burn two  burtons (ships of northern 
corsairs) in  the  22  months  between  1602-1603.   The  first  galleon  as  a  warship 
constructed in 1608 was displaced from the navy 17 months later, because its speed was 
very low.316  On the other hand, the Spaniards tried to develop sailing ships that could be 
used in the Mediterranean.   Particularly,   Pedro Tellez Giron, the Duke of Osasuna, 
returning  from his  visit  to  Britain,  attempted  to  construct  galleons.  These  galleons 
launched after 1611 were efficient against the Turkish fleets.317  As to the Ottomans, 
they began their first attempts to build similar vessels on a later date, just before the 
campaign over Crete in 1644.  Following the closure of the Dardanelles strait by the 
314 Hess, The Battle of Lepanto, p 62
315 See footnote 284
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Venetian galleons rented from the Dutches during the siege of Crete, an imperial order 
has been given for the construction of 30 burtons in 1650. 318 In 1657, in the Ottoman 
navy there were 16 galleons fully constructed and 26  burtons brought from Algeria, 
Tunisia, and Tripoli.  Even though between 1661 and 1681 the galleys regained priority, 
after 1682 the galleons became the principal battle force. Hence, in the first half of the 
17th  century  galleys  constituted  the  major  element  of  the  battle  fleets  in  the 
Mediterranean.  This was true for Genoa, Venice and Malta, as well as the Ottomans. 319 
For the Ottomans there was the possibility to benefit from the experience of the North 
African corsairs who have begun to use the vessels in a very early date.  In 1581, from 
the 35 corsairs owning galleons, 22 were converts, 3 were son of converts and 10 were 
Turkish.320  In this period, Ottoman navy had the opportunity to shift to galleons with 
this support.  However, the question of the inclusion of the galleons to the navy was 
never raised.              
In  the  17th  century,  the  area  of  use  of  the  galleys  was  very  wide  in  the 
Mediterranean.  The  burtons were used more by the corsairs.  The galleys were more 
appropriate for the amphibian operations in the shallow seas such as the Aegean, the 
Adriatic  and  the  Tyrrhenian,  and  in  the  rocky and  island-strewn regions.   Through 
Danube, they could provide logistic support for the Ottoman land battles.  Due to the 
use  of  the  slaves  as  oarsman,  the  galleys  were  more  affordable  compared  to  the 
galleons.   
Their  construction  was  easy  and  less  timber  was  needed.   They  were  also 
appropriate for the maintaining of security on the shores. 321 Besides, in this period the 
principal danger in the sea did not came from the enemy navies, but from the Cossacks 
in the Black Sea.   These later were using small and fast galleys, called  shayka.  The 
transformation in the Ottoman navy was due to these factors.  Yet, these choices made 
by the empire resulted with the decline of its power in the sea.  In brief, the sea strategy 
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shaped  primarily  by  the  geographical  conditions  caused  the  decline  of  the 
Mediterranean sea powers.     
IV.2. iii: The Battle of Lepanto and the post-Lepanto Era
Consequences of the Lepanto war are an important debate for the Mediterranean 
history.  Andrew  Hess  handles  the  Lepanto  war  with  Spanish  conquest  of  Tunisia, 
Ottoman re-conquest, Alcatraz war of 1578, and Ottoman-Spanish peace of 1580.  At 
the end of this period, the differentiation in the Mediterranean between the Hapsburgs 
and the  Ottomans  was  completed.   According  to  him,  a  decisive  line  between  two 
radically different civilizations, European and Turco-Muslim has been formed. 322  For 
Brumette, Lepanto was not a breaking point for the Mediterranean history.  It is only a 
part  of  the overlapping,  and not  parallel  history,  of Ottoman Empire  and Europe.323 
After  1570-1573,  Cyprus  stayed  in  the  hand  of  the  Ottomans,  even  though  Spain 
conquered  Tunisia  in  1574,  it  was  re-conquered  by  the  Ottomans.  This  was  not 
envisaged to be the last campaign for the navy returning from Tunisia in October 1574. 
At the end of 1574, the bankruptcy of the Spanish treasury meant that the navy formed 
for the Lepanto war and Tunisian conquest would never be seen in the Mediterranean. 
With the conquest  of  Cyprus,  the East  Mediterranean totally  passed under Ottoman 
control.   With  the re-conquest  of  Tunisia,  Ottomans  were  establishing  in  the  North 
Africa.  However, the costs of both Lepanto war and Tunisian campaign appear as the 
principal reason of diappearence of the navies.  Except this reason, there were not any 
changes in the material conditions. Sokullu Mehmed Pasha and Grand Admiral  Kılıç 
Ali  Pasha,  who were shaping the Ottoman  policies  were still  alive.   The  navy had 
returned  with  success  from  Tunisia.  The  effects  of  the  economic  crisis  in  the 
Mediterranean had not yet reached the Empire. However, the experience of Malta siege 
(1565) had showed that dominance over the Middle Mediterranean would not be easy. 
322 Hess,, Lepanto, p 73
323 Palmira Brummet, The Lepanto Paradigm Revisited: Knowing the Ottomans in the Sixteenth 
Century,” in  Chong, A. and Contadini, A., (Eds.), Cultural Encounters: Europe, the Ottomans, and 
the Mediterranean World, Isabella Stewart Gardner Museum and Periscope Press, Boston, 
forthcoming. P 4. I am grateful to Palmira Brummet for allowing me to read her unpublished article
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As the Vienna being a natural frontier for the land army, and thus, its conquest being 
difficult, Malta was the frontier at the sea.  Even though with the retreat of Spain from 
the Mediterranean, no navy was left to threat the Ottomans, it did not seem possible that 
the  Ottoman  Empire  could  constitute  a  danger  for  the  west  Mediterranean  by 
conquering Malta. Thereby, dominance fields were formed for the Empire in a defacto 
way. 
 Including the Alcatzar war of 1578, and the entrance of the English into the 
Mediterranean to  the consequences  of  the Lepanto  war  is  an anachronistic  point  of 
view.  In 1574, neither the Alcatzar war, nor the rise of the Mediterranean privateering 
after 1580, was envisaged.   Thus, this was not a period of the two Empires in decline, 
but that of two empires who have determined their dominance fields.  It is not possible 
to situate exactly when the Ottomans lost control in the sea after 1580.  On the other 
hand, the idea of a total retreat of the Ottoman navy from the Mediterranean after 1580 
or that of a navy left to decay in the dockyard are misperceptions.  Even though, the 
navy did not sailed for campaign, it did it for maintaining the trade routes open, and to 
maintain the security of the shores.  From the early 17th century until the war of Crete 
in  1654,  between  60  and 70  ships  were  in  the  service  of  the  navy and  around 12 
thousand to 13 thousand crew were working on these ships.324  Construction work was 
limited.  Four to six ships were built a year. Yet, the ships in hand were renewed and 
repaired continuously. 325      
Alberto Tenenti, shows that the Venetians retreated from the sea as a result of 
the rising corsair attacks. 326  However, there is not a detailed research on the influence 
of these attacks on the Ottoman trade. Ottomans had geographical advantages.  They 
could keep the trade combined the maritime and land itineraries. As a matter of fact, as 
well as English and Dutch merchants, Ottoman merchants too have benefited from the 
reshaping  of  the  trade  resulting  from  the  retreat  of  the  Venetians  from  east 
Mediterranean.  Ottoman-Muslim export trade increased constantly during the period of 
324 Murat Çizakca, Ottomans and Mediterranean, 1981, p 786
325 Op.cit 774
326 Tenenti, Piracy and the decline of venice
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peace, which lasted from 1573 to the War of Crete in 1645.327 The rising transport costs 
of the Venetian trade due to the corsair threat, and the inflation in the Ottoman empire 
were influential on the rise of the Ottoman exports.  The commodities transported from 
land to the Adriatic  shores,  were transported from here to Venice.   As a result,  the 
number of Ottoman merchants in Venice rose in the last decades of the 16th century. 328 
After  the  loss  of  Cyprus,  an  important  naval  base,  Venetian  existence  in  the  east 
Mediterranean came to an end.  Shipmasters and ship-owners with 7-10 galleys who 
were engaged in overseas trade constituted the wealthiest group in Istanbul. 329  If the 
rising  corsair  activities  from  1570s  onwards  were  influential  in  the  whole 
Mediterranean,  we  do  not  know  for  sure  whether  it  had  destructive  effects  in  the 
Ottoman trade, similar to the those on the Venetian trade.  To be able to answer this 
question, we need further research.    
  
IV. 3: A New Era in the Relations of Ottoman Corsairs and the Imperial 
Navy
In 1580, in the aftermath of the Ottoman-Spanish peace, a new era has been 
started between the North African corsairs and the central bureaucracy.  At this date, the 
Sultan ordered financial  reorganization in the region.  North Africa was divided into 
three regions.  Three treasures had been formed and three defterdars were appointed for 
Algeria, Tunisia and Tripoli.  This was an attempt to increase bureaucratic control in the 
region.  However, people of the North African frontier were influenced by the economic 
crisis. This stimulated the conflict between the center and the periphery.  The corsairs 
captured an English commercial ship, given concession by the Sultan.  They did not 
return it despite the order from the center.   Subsequently,  another English ship was 
captured and the booty was sold in a Spanish port.  By this way,  the borders of the 
privateering have been passed for the first time. On the other hand, Algerian regional 
treasury has bankrupted.  The salaried paid to the janissaries did not cover the expenses 
327 Cemal Kafadar, “A Death in Venice (1575), Anatolian Muslim merchants trading in the Serenissima”, 
Journal of Turkish Studies, 10, p201
328 Op. cit 202
329 Halil İnalcık, Capital Formation, p 120
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of the janissaries. In 1593, Şaban Pasha, the beylerbey of Algeria informed the palace 
with a letter that the janissaries were wishing to attend the privateering venture with the 
corsairs. Murad III accepted the demand unwillingly.  The central government lost its 
political means to control the region.330
The rising janissary population in the region during the 75 years was another 
important  factor in North Africa in this  period.   At the end of the century,  through 
rebellions janissaries gained power, and became a part of local government.  Beginning 
from this date, the central power in the region was in decline. In Tunisia, at end of a 
similar  period of disturbance the janissaries  came to power İn 1587.  Starting from 
1591, the rule passed to the head of janissaries (yeniçeri ağası) in the local divan , with 
the title of “dayı”. 331
Even  though  the  Ottoman  governor  in  the  region  was  only  of  symbolic 
importance, the region has not broken its relations with the empire. From this date on, 
the Algerian Ottoman elite  emphasized its Turkish identity, and turned it to a strategy 
of  government.332 “The  term  "Turkishness"  signifies  a  variety  of  cultural  features 
connected  with  the  lifestyle,  language,  religion,  and  area  of  origin  of  the  elite's 
members. These created remarkable differences between the Algerian Ottoman elite and 
the indigenous population”.333 In my humble opinion,  we should use “Rumi” identity 
instead of Turkishness. This term is more appropriate for early modern era Ottomans. 334 
For the Algerian ocaks new soldiers were recruited from Anatolian shores.335 Janissaries 
marrying  local  woman  were alienated  from some of  their  rights.  This  practice  was 
established for the purpose of preventing these marriages.336  Another problem was the 
children born from these marriages, who were called kuloğlu.  When a child born from a 
marriage between a janissary and an European slave was considered as Turkish, the 
ruling elite perceived the  kuloğlus  as a threat, considering the local support they may 
330 Hess, The forgotten frontier, p 104-110
331 Op. cit 111
332 Tal Shuval, The Ottoma Algerian Elite and its Ideology, 2000, p 326
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provide. Besides, the children of  kuloğlus were conceived as local Algerians, and no 
more as  kuloğlus.  According to Shuval’s accounts:  "The kuloglus are excluded from 
the highest posts of the central government. They cannot be dey, or khaznaji (in charge 
of the treasury), or wakil al-kharj (in charge of the marine), or agha al-arab (commander 
of a local auxiliary army, in charge of local affairs), nor khoja-a1 khail (in charge of 
collecting  tax)...,and  of  course  not  agha  of  the  Janissaries  (head  ofthe  odjak 
[commander in chief of the army])."337 
Ottoman Algerian elite holding power in Algeria, consolidated its relations with 
the Ottoman center,  in order to keep its power and discard the local dangers, in the 
general  framework  of  this  policy.  In  Tunisia  and Tripoli  local  dynasties  seized  the 
power and controlled the region. On the other hand, the corsairs proceeded to use the 
Ottoman ports. Thus, the organic relationship between the corsairs and the center lasted. 
Strategy to  take  the corsairs  in  the  service  of  the  central  navy in  case of  necessity 
continued.  During the reign of Ahmed I, Murad Reis was called from Algeria and the 
sanjak  of  the  Morea  was  given  under  his  control. 338 Kapudan Pashas  continued  to 
benefit from the experience of the corsairs. Grown in the Palace and hold the position of 
Kapudan Pasha for 10 years,  Cağaloğlu Sinan Pasha used to consult Koca Hacı Reis, 
about the affairs of the navy. 339 In 1574, long after the Tunisian campaign, the fleet of 
Maghreb came to assistance of the navy during the  Crete expedition.340 Even though, 
corsairs sometimes attacked the foreign ships disobeying the concessions given by the 
Ottoman state to the third states, they have never broken their relation with the center. 
Hence, what was changing in this period was not the relationship between the imperial 
navy and the  corsairs.   Ottoman  state  changed its  strategy because  of  the  financial 
constraints  in  the  aftermath  of  the  Lepanto  war,  and  because  of  the  absence  of  a 
threatening  foreign  navy in  the  Mediterranean.  Maintaining  the  security  in  the  seas 
under it control gained priority vis-à-vis conquering new islands and ports.  As a matter 
of fact,  the period of ‘legendary’   kapudans of the 16th century,  such as  Barbaros, 
Turgut Reis, Kılıç Ali Reis came to an end.  On the other hand, Ottomans continued to 
337 Op.cit. P 332-334
338 Katip Çelebi, p 125
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use  the  galleys,  while  the  corsairs  shifted  from  galleys  to  galleons.  This  caused 
problems during operation in the fleets combined of corsair and navy ships. Not wishing 
to lose their ships, the corsairs with galleons were less voluntary to enter in conflict in 
the operations. 341 However, at the end of the 17th century when the navy had decided to 
shift  from  galleys  to  galleons,  the  corsairs  were  again  on  the  scene.   Mezamorto 
Hüseyin Pasha, an Algerian corsair, who prepared the Bahriye Kanunnamesi of 1701 
extended the use of galleons.  He held the position of Kapudan Pasha, between 1695 
and 1701.  Even if my research is limited with the 16th century, relationship between 
corsairs and Imperial navy lasted until the 19th century.
CONCLUSION
There  are  several  studies  about  Mediterranean  corsairs.  In  these  works 
mentioned  in  the  introduction,  corsairs  are  usually  handled  as  a  group  totally 
independent from navies. On the other hand, in the nationalistic rhetoric, corsairs are 
seen as heroic figures of Ottoman naval history, thanks to whom “Mediterranean turned 
into a Turkish lake”. Therefore, there is an obvious confusion about this topic. On the 
one hand, corsairs are handled as independent actors even if they are based on the port 
of a state. On the other hand, corsairs are illustrated as seamen serving the Ottoman 
Navy. Besides, it is not clear whether these corsairs served the Ottoman Empire as its 
naval officers or as semi-dependant corsairs.
All these approaches reflect a degree of truth. Corsairs could be independent as 
pirates,  semi-dependent  as  privateers  or  dependent  as  naval  officers.  However  the 
crucial point is the following: All these different figures of seamen could be aggregated 
in a single personage.  In this blurred area, constructing a framework about relationship 
between  corsairs  and  the  Ottoman  Imperial  Navy  is  obviously  a  formidable  and 
dangerous task. As I mentioned in the introduction, my main problematic is,  “What was 
341 Op.cit p 194
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the nature of the relationship between Ottoman corsairs and Ottoman Imperial Navy in 
the 16th century?” 
To analyze of this problematic, several parts of subject had to be explained;
1) two side of this relationship; corsairs and Imperial navy,
2) three different types of relationship ; pirates-Navy, corsairs-Navy and officers-
Navy, 
3) transitions between these types of relationships 
4) a historical explanation covering the whole 16th century 
I  tried  to  handle  these  four  points  simultaneously,  so  I  did  not  follow   a 
chronological  or  thematic  path  rigidly.  For  this  purpose,  conceptual  framework  of 
piracy/privateering  was  presented  in  the  first  chapter.  First  of  all,  there  is  a 
terminological problem of this subject and a terminological confusion in this grey area 
which  might  be  the  cause  of  a  series  of  misconceptions.  I  tried  to  overcome  this 
problem. The differences of legal bases among these concepts were presented in the 
first part of this chapter. To sum up, privateer ships were distinguished from the navy 
ships in that they were privately owned and were under the command of non-officer 
private individuals; but also from the pirates in that they took part in acts of pillaging 
with an official  permit.  Even if  this  was a superficial  definition and there is  not an 
absolute divergence among them, it was a clear definition. Then Turkish means of these 
terms  were  explained.  Later  parts  of  the  first  chapter,  a  general  framework  was 
presented for corsairs. Overall, piracy/privateering was not a practice identified with a 
unique geography or a specific period of time.  From the Antiquity to the modern era, 
piracy/privateering was a part of sea life and there are some preconditions to burgeon of 
it. The evolution of this “profession”  provided a broader view for my research.
In  the  light  of  this  framework,  I  focused  on  Ottoman  seapower.  I  made  a 
subjective periodization of 16th century Ottoman Empire history in accordance with the 
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subject of my study. Pre-Kapudan Pasha era – formation of Kapudan Pasha post – Post-
Lepanto Era. This was just a symbolic periodization. Except some parts, I did not follow 
naval incidents within these chapters. 
Ottoman Empire had not had a powerful navy until the reign of Mehmet II. In 
his reign, Ottomans conquered strategically important bases and the navy developed not 
only quantitatively but also qualitatively. Thanks to these developments, Ottoman navy 
transformed into a prominent power in the Mediterranean during Mehmet’s reign, even 
though Ottomans could not gain a sea battle against their main rival, Venice, during this 
period. Reign of Beyazıd II was the turning point in terms of the relationship between 
Ottoman corsairs and the Imperial Navy. Kemal Reis, a corsair, engaged with the Navy 
and became a  Kapudan of  Sultan's  Navy in  1495.  Following this,  Ottomans  won a 
victory over the Venetians at the beginning of the new century. In the first decades of 
the 16th century, Ottomans seapower and Ottoman corsairs rose simultaneously.  Even if 
several  crucial  corsairs  under  the  patronage  of  Korkut  migrated  to  North  Africa 
following the ascendance of Selim I, relation was never cut between corsairs and central 
authority.  Furthermore,  Ottoman  corsairs  based  on  the  ports  of  North  Africa  grew 
stronger and conquered some fortresses on the Algerian coastline.  First contact with 
these corsairs occurred in the reign of Selim I, but the milestone of the Ottoman naval 
history was the promotion of Barbaros Hayrettin to the post of Kapudan Pasha in 1534. 
After  this  time,  relationship  between  Ottoman  Imperial  Navy  and  corsairs  became 
intense. At this point, my main argument is the following: This relationship should be 
analyzed  in  terms  of  personal  attachments  rather  than  within  an  institutional 
relationship.  In  early  modern  states,  bureaucratic  structure  was  not  as  efficient  as 
modern states. Especially considering naval activities,  the maritime  savoir-faire could 
only  be  transferred  via  social  reproduction,  transfer  of  skills  and  lore  through 
apprenticeship in the lack of naval schools in the modern meaning. Therefore, these 
skills could only be gained through piratical activities or sea treading.  In the Ottoman 
case, major part of this seafarer community composed of pirates and privateers. There 
was  a  network  among  these  seamen  and  relationship  with  the  Imperial  Navy  was 
assured  thanks  to  this  network.  Ex-corsairs  serving  the  Imperial  Navy had contacts 
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among corsairs.  These corsairs had crews. Some among these crews gained power and 
became captains of their own galleys. These new galley captains were integrated to the 
available  network.  In this  way,  network extended gradually.  The most  powerful and 
skilled seamen among these corsairs hired to the Navy with the recommendation of 
Grand Admiral, the  kethüda of the arsenal, or any beylerbeyi or  sanjakbeyi serving in 
the fleet.  Besides,  beylerbeyi or  sanjakbeyis serving in fleet  like the  beylerbeyis  of  
Cezayir-i Garb(Algeria) or Trablusgarb (Tripoli) ,  sanjakbeys of Rhodes,  Lepanto or 
Karlıili were usually ex-corsairs. These ports were used by corsairs as bases, and they 
spent  the  winter  in  these  ports.  Therefore,  these  sanjakbeys and  beylerbeys  in  the 
Ottoman  service  could  keep  close  relations  with  corsairs.  Needless  to  say,  these 
networks were limited and they did not cover the whole community. For instance, one 
sanjakbey  arrested  some  captains  with  blame  of  being  pirate,  but  Kapudan  Pasha, 
Barbaros Hayrettin claimed that those were sea-ghazis and saved them as a guarantor.342 
It  must  also  be  emphasized  that  corsairs  were  granted  the  privilege  to  profit  from 
Ottoman ports and possibilities, only upon the reference of a guarantor. 
Some prominent corsairs  could be integrated to the Navy, while some others 
were used in naval expeditions in different missions. More or less this relationship was 
based on mutual profit. Yet, this relationship was not clear in every case. In some cases, 
corsairs  could  transform  into  pirates  if  they  were  not  content  of  this  unofficial 
partnership. That was a reversible process and this criminal could become a “good” 
corsair or a captain in Sultan's Navy again at a later point.
Next step of piracy/privateering started in 1580 for the Mediterranean. This date 
is also presented as the beginning of the decline of Ottoman seapower.  However,  it 
seems impossible to give a certain date such as 1571(date of Lepanto sea war) or 1580 
for this “decline” or for the rise of Mediterranean piracy. There is not a clear breaking 
point  in  the  relationship  between  corsairs  and  central  authority,  even  though  some 
radical changes occurred in the Mediterranean power balances throughout the time.
342 See footnote 223
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To sum up, naval power of the Ottoman Empire could not be comprehended 
without understanding the corsairs.  On the other hand, studies on the Ottoman corsairs 
should  consider  their  relations  with  the  Imperial  Navy.  I  tried  to  explain  the 
establishment  of this  relationship.  I  attempted to  construct  this  relation via  personal 
attachment. However, this study is limited to the 16th century. There are many missing 
points in Ottoman Naval history.  A further question might be posed, how and when was 
this relationship abolished? When did the central authority leave its strategy to recruit 
corsairs in the navy and to use them as a support force during the expeditions?
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APPENDIX
1.Naval Technology of 16th century
During  the  second  half  15th century,  Ottoman  naval  power  strengthened 
gradually. In this process, Ottomans advanced their naval technology obviously.  At the 
beginning of the 16th century, Ottomans could challenge their main rival, Venetians and 
they struggled against Habsburgs' navies throughout the century. Naval technology of 
16th century was shaped by the climatic and geographical conditions of Mediterranean. 
These  conditions  were  quite  different  in  relation  to  Atlantic  so  naval  technology 
followed two different paths in Atlantic and Mediterranean.  Related to thesis subject, 
conditions of Mediterranean will be focused in this part.
One of determinant factors affected naval system of Mediterranean was streams. 
Source  of  the  most  powerful  stream of  Mediterranean  was  the  Straits  of  Gibraltar. 
Mediterranean water flows out into the Atlantic  in a deep,  subsurface current  while 
lighter,  less saline,  Atlantic  water  flows into the Mediterranean in a surface current 
which averages about 6 knot (sea mile – 1852 m).343 The power of this surface current 
influences  the  entire  sea  in  different  speeds.  This  route  was  influential  over  the 
formation of trunk routes.
Another factor  was climate, especially unstable winds. External intercontinental 
pressure systems interacting with geographical features of Mediterranean basin shape 
weather systems of Mediterranean. Winter and summer patterns were quite different, 
there were several local regimes related to that region as well.
North coasts of Mediterranean are relatively safe in relation to south coasts in 
terms  of  geographical  conditions.  The  sea  bottom  generally  drops  away  quickly, 
providing deep waters to seamen however general character of Mediterranean is not like 
that. Offshore reefs, shoals, sandbanks, islands, rocky cliffs can be seen in every corner, 
especially south coasts, of Mediterranean.344
343 Pryor, Geography, Technology, and War ,p 13
344 Pryor, ibid, p 20-21
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These climatic and geographic features of Mediterranean obliged to seafarers to 
construct  oared ships.  Oared ships did not  depend relatively on weather  conditions. 
They could gather way in calm weathers. Besides, oared vessels were lower in the water 
so more suitable for shallows of Mediterranean. After all, sailing ships could be used for 
transportation limitedly as merchant ships in certain seaways. However, these sailing 
ships were inefficient as warships.
“Before  gunpowder,  the  only  decisive  maneuver  which  could  successfully 
terminate a naval engagement was boarding: the occupation of the enemy decks with 
your  your  own troops.”345 Sailing  ships  did  not  have  maneuverability  for  boarding. 
Oared ships were faster in short distance and maneuverable  in relation to sailing ships. 
Other alternative means of attack were fire and ramming below the waterline to sink. 
However, these alternative ways purposed  to destroy enemy vessels. Fire was always a 
possibility but it was used as a last resort. During the combats, vessels were so close  to 
each other so fire means destruction in both own ship and enemy ships. If ship was 
almost seized  by enemy, captains fired ships as a last alternative way – this practice 
was seen in Zonchio naval battle in 1501, two Venetian vessels boarded to one of the 
biggest ship of Ottoman navy,  göke of Burak Reis, and all these ships were fired by 
Ottomans.
As another way of attack,  ramming aimed to destroy enemy vessel. However, 
booty was the main purpose of naval combats in 16th century so ramming was not an 
attractive  way of  assault.   All  these factors  obliged the seafarers  to  construct  oared 
warships. Usage of oared vessels presented solutions to these problems, on the other 
hand it brought  new capacity issues.  The best sustained speed of a galley was  only 
about three knots or a little more for a long distance. In addition, the large crews of 
specialized  rowing  vessels  consumed  provisions  at  a  high  rate.  On  the  contrary, 
provision capacity was low unlike sailing ships. The requirement of supply, water and 
food,   carried  by the typical  war  galley no more  than two weeks.346 This  logistical 
limitation, in addition to their speed, limited the galleys’ cruising range to a maximum 
345 Guilmartin, Gunpowder and galley, p 59
346 Guilmartin, ibid, p 62-63
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of 960 sea miles.347 (see Fig. 1)  As a result, availability of provisioning and watering 
facilities  en  route  was  a  crucial  requirement  for  oared  ships  unlike  sailing  ships. 
Beginning from the 16th century, cannons were established on the bows, strongest part, 
of galleys.(see Fig. 2) These cannons were used at the beginning of  combats however 
these cannons were not decisive tools of naval combats. Cannons have not had quick 
fire ability yet and they were used just once before the beginning of combat. Even there 
space was so restricted that there was no platform to establish heavy guns. During the 
century,  number  of  cannons  and  their  efficiency advanced  relatively  however  main 
characteristic of naval battle was hand-to hand combat to the end of the century.  As a 
result,  engagement  between  several  galleys  were  quick  and  decisive  but  this 
engagements  were  not  decisive  for  navies  consist  of  numerous   ships.  Defensive 
strength of navies reinforced by artillery of coastline was more effective. It was not very 
easy  to  overcome a  combined  defense  system composed  of  war  galleys  and  shore 
batteries in the Mediterranean. Galleys could not sustain a long-term siege from sea due 
to their logistic restrictions and assault to a harbor or fortress was so dangerous because 
of heavy artillery positioned in land. It was possible to defeat a stronger enemy navy if 
this  defensive  combination  was  used  correctly.  Because  of  these  operational 
characteristic of Mediterranean system of naval warfare, seizure of conventional bases, 
ports or islands, was more important to defeat enemy navy. 
2.Certain types of Ships
As  we  mentioned  above,  Ottomans  used  oared  warships  like  other 
Mediterranean naval powers in the 16th century.  Different type and different size of 
oared ships -çektiri- were seen in Ottoman navy during this century.
The  kadırga  is,  what  we translate  as galley,  was  the main striking force of 
Ottoman Imperial navy. Especially, after the promotion of Barbaros Hayrettin as Grand 
Admiral of Navy,  kadırgas formed the basis of  navy.  Their size and category was 
usually expressed in terms of thwarts or oar benches as oppose to tonnage, by volume or 
weight in the case of sailing ships and the kadırga had 25 or 26 such thwarts. This type 
347 Pryor, ibid,  p  86
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of Ottoman ships were equavalent of galee sattile.(see Fig. 3) Galee sottilis were used 
by Genoese, Venetians, Spaniards, the Papacy and the Hospitallers as a striking naval 
force as well. All these types of light galleys were usually rowed by three oarsmen per 
bench -galee alla sensile-
The bastarda  was the name of larger types of galleys.  It had up 36 thwarts. 
These types of ships was used as leading ships of galley squadrons.  Bastardas were 
commanded by ranking captains and  Kaptanpaşa's ship was also called as bastarda. 
(See Fig.4)
The kalita, a Turkicization of the Italian galiotta, was used for a galley of a size 
smaller than the norm. These smaller, faster (in short distance) and more maneuverable 
galleys were preferred by Mediterranean corsairs in the late middle ages and throughout 
the 16th century for predatory attacks. (See Fig. 5)348
The mavnas were equivalent of  galeazza of Venetians (in English as galleass), 
the largest fighting oar-ship in a sense of military version and development of  galera 
grossa da mercato. These type of ships had usually 26 thwarts but each oar was pulled 
by seven men. These warships were gross and slower but they could carry more heavy 
guns in relation to other smaller type of galleys. (See Fig. 6)
There  were  several  ships  used   as  boats  of  logistics  in  Ottoman navy.  İnce 
donanma consisted of ships of smaller, lower in the water, carried militias and supplies 
of army over the rivers. As well some type of ships carried cannons, horses or  similar 
supplies for sieges unlike warship galleys. 
348 Svat Soucek, Certain Types of Ships in Ottoman Turkish Terminology, in Studies in Ottoman Naval 
History and Maritime Geography (Istanbul, ISIS Press, 2008) p 181-184
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Fig. 1. Storage arrangements on board a galley,,including provisions, gunpowder, oil, 
tar, ropes and other supplies. From : Ahmet Güleryüz, Kadırgadan Kalyona Osmanlıda 
Yelken (Denizler Kitabevi, 2004)
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Fig. 2. The location of the guns at the galiot (kalita), galley and baştarda depending to 
theirs  sizes.  (Ahmet  Güleryüz,  Kadırgadan  Kalyona  Osmanlıda  Yelken,  Denizler 
Kitabevi 2004)
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Fig. 3. Model of a single-masted Ottoman Galley of the time of Barbaros Hayrettin 
Pasha. From :İdris Bostan, Kürekli ve Yelkenli Osmanlı Gemileri(Bilge Yayınevi,2005)
Fig. 4. Model of a bigger and heavier, two-masted Ottoman galley (Bastarda) of the 
time of Barbaros Hayrettin Pasha. From : İdris Bostan, Kürekli ve Yelkenli Osmanlı 
Gemileri (Bilge Yayınları, 2005)
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Fig  5.  Model  of  a  kalite  (galiot).  From:  Ahmet  Güleryüz,  Kadırgadan  kalyona 
Osmanlı'da Yelken (Denizler Kitabevi, 2004)
Fig 6. Model of a galleasse that could have fought at Lepanto. From: AhmetGüleryüz, 
Kadırgadan Kalyona Osmanlı'da Yelken (Denizler Kitapevi, 2004)
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